Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons

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July 2001

The observations and conclusions contained in the following study are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent, in whole or in part, the views of members of the IASC.

A Study Commissioned by the Reference Group on Small Arms of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee

A publication of the Small Arms Survey
with support from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

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Abbreviations

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
CNRT	Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense
DDA	Department for Disarmament Affairs
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ELN	Ejercito Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army)
FALINTIL	Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Lest
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARC	Fuerza Armado Revolucionario de Colombia
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FSO	Field Security Officer
GNP	Gross National Product
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICIET	International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IHL	International humanitarian law
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
KDOD	Kenya Department of Defence
KSH	Kenya Shilling
MdM	Médecins du Monde
MNF	Multi-national force
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NEP	North Eastern Protectorate
NGO	Non-governmental organisation

OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Overseas development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
RGSA	Reference Group on Small Arms
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
TNI	Tentara Nacional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	UN Mission in East Timor
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCHR	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNSECOORD	Office of the UN Security Coordinator
UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
US	United States
USCR	US Committee for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

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Executive Summary

Background and Broad Objectives

> *Small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns.*
>
> *Light weapons include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft and missile launchers, recoilless rifles, small mortars of calibres less than 100mm and ammunition, and explosives. UN, 1997*

In October 2000 the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC's) Reference Group on Small Arms (RGSA) contracted the Small Arms Survey (SAS), a Geneva-based NGO, to undertake a formal comparative study on the impacts of small arms on civilians.[1] The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) all contributed resources toward a four-month assessment. Through broad-based consultations with stakeholders, the two SAS consultants sought to define and systematise the pathways linking the availability, threat and use of small arms on civil society as well as on both humanitarian and development agencies. In attempting to describe the problem, the consultants also sought to operationalise a *conceptual framework* that might inform the humanitarian community regarding methods of measuring the scope and magnitude of the impacts.

The broad objectives of the following report are to determine the humanitarian impacts of small arms on civilian populations and humanitarian and development agencies seeking to provide relief and long-term assistance to vulnerable groups. The discourse on small arms, then, has been deliberately shifted away from abstract discussions on broad threats to "international peace and security" to a focus on their individuated human impacts. In this way, the consultants sought to document and capture the role small arms play in the practice of warfare, rather than the narrative of warfare. In other words, the study attempts to reflect the reality of the human costs attributable to small arms - rather than the more normative aspects of arms control.

Humanitarian impacts were provisionally defined in the *Terms of Reference* (ToR) as "the short and long-term effects of armed violence taking place immediately prior to, during and following from complex, human-made (multi-causal) humanitarian emergencies".[2] The definition also considers the enduring social and economic consequences of armed violence - particularly in relation to how they undermine sustainable development. To this end, the consultants sought to determine a range of comparative indicators that usefully "measure" the (dimensions of the) threats that unregulated access to small arms pose to civilian populations and the relief and development communities as a whole.[3]

Primary indicators include death and injury resulting from small arms and light weapons. Secondary indicators consist of forced displacement (both cross-border and internal) in addition to declining access to entitlements, particularly among vulnerable groups. Moreover, the study aims to illustrate how small arms availability is inhibiting the activities of relief and development agencies in the field. Specifically, the consultants sought to illustrate in what way humanitarian and development workers are being targeted, how the militarisation of refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) camps adversely affect day-to-day operations and the manner in which arms-related insecurity presents significant opportunity costs to the carrying-out of agency mandates.

Although the study is global in scope, the RGSA proposed that two or three countries be visited in order to elaborate the varied dimensions of the problem. It was agreed, by consensus, that Kenya, Colombia and East Timor be visited. It was also decided that the principal output of the initiative would include a report ('study', hereafter) assessing the global impacts of small arms. The following study outlines a preliminary conceptual framework to enable policy makers to consider, and therefore

better address, the humanitarian impacts of small arms. Furthermore, it demonstrates that despite some early doubts, a vast amount of relevant and useful data is currently available within agencies themselves.

An additional output of the study relates to the process of data accumulation itself. In consulting a wide cross section of humanitarian and development workers with regards to the problem of small arms, important gains were made in sensitising operational workers in the field to the needs of generating systematic and continuous information on arms-related insecurity. In this regard, a broad network of researchers were brought together, if indirectly, to shed light on the issue. It is anticipated that these process-related gains will mobilise further interest and action on the issue at the field-level.

General Concerns and Key Findings

People are directly affected by small arms use before, during and after conflict: Small arms directly kill well-over 300,000 people in conflict each year (with at least three times that many injured), and affect millions more through terror and suffering. Though small arms and light weapons are often associated with armed warfare, such as in Colombia, firearm-related killings are also increasingly occurring outside of the immediate context of conflict - with rising banditry, armed assault and violence in areas experiencing a high availability. People living in pre and post-conflict environments demonstrate similar forms of vulnerability to firearm-related homicide and assault. The explicit targeting of civilians during conflict and in post-conflict contexts, in contravention of international humanitarian law (IHL), is common.

All manner of weaponry are being used in situations of conflict, crime and systemic insecurity: The virulence of conflict and violence is increasing as a result of newly introduced technology. Military-style automatic and semi-automatic weapons (e.g. AK-47s, G-3s, Galils, AR-15s, grenade-launchers) are the most commonly used weapons in Kenya, and are killing and injuring people there and throughout the African continent. “Armas cortes” or short-barrelled weapons (e.g. .32, .38 specials, 9mm revolvers and pistols) are overwhelmingly used in atrocities and common-crime throughout Colombia, and killing and affecting people throughout Latin America. In East Timor, small arms have only rarely been used in armed confrontations since the country's recent independence from Indonesia, though the threat remains. In West Timor, however, the threat or use of small arms is on the rise. Both classes of weapons are used indiscriminately by civilians, guerrillas, militia and paramilitary forces - as well as by the states under consideration: in “conflict-like” situations as well as in criminal violence.

The impacts of small arms go well beyond the casualties claimed by the bullets: Small arms availability and use have a broad range of secondary impacts - from forced migration (across borders and internal) to the collapse of household entitlements and access to basic needs. There is ample evidence emerging from Kenya, Colombia and East Timor, that the mere threat of small arms availability and use affects household and individual decision-making regarding (forced) migration and the pursuit of employment or rural livelihoods. In Colombia, for example, there is a strong correlation between the incidence of firearm-related massacres or "political killings" and forced displacement. Testimonial evidence gathered from the field suggests that small arms play a significant role undermining socio-economic development because assets are frequently seized and families violently dismantled.

The effects of small arms undermine development processes - from the micro to the macro levels: At the macro-economic level, small arms availability undermines social and economic development. Firearm-related insecurity partly conditions foreign direct investment and can shape the allocation of

budgetary resources among and between government departments. Furthermore, arms-related insecurity affects UN and NGO spending priorities. At the micro-economic level, the use of small arms and threat of firearm-related violence affects the labour, production and transfer (inheritance) entitlements of individuals - both directly (e.g. homicide and injury) and indirectly (e.g. undermining public services and the destruction of common property resources). More difficult to measure, small arms have an emboldening effect on those who possess them, particularly children and young men, encouraging "cultures of violence" and creating (negative) multiplying effects ("violence multipliers") in conflict and non-conflict affected societies.

Humanitarian and development agencies are exposed to and made vulnerable by unprecedented small arms availability and use: The nature of humanitarian and development work is changing - taking place amid internal rather than cross-border conflict and ostensibly tied to an economy of warfare. Increasingly, civilians, and those who are seen to protect and assist them, are regarded as legitimate targets for extortion, threat, theft, rape and brutality. For example, the current firearm-homicide rate for UN civilian staff is between 17-25 per 100,000 - firearm-related homicide rates that are analogous to those experienced by civilians in the top ten most dangerous countries in the world. The current security arrangements for UN staff are woefully inadequate. They are premised on a system designed over two decades ago for an operational reality that no longer exists. Institutional responses within the UN to redress insecurity, while laudable, are inappropriately designed, applied or enforced.

Refugee and IDP camp militarisation, at the site of temporary asylum or resettlement, is a growing phenomenon: Arms are made available by ex-combatants, local dealers and active militias - though arms availability (and use) is also generated by perceived insecurity among refugees, IDPs and host communities themselves. Though not endemic to all situations of return or resettlement, arms-related insecurity affects camps in a variety of ways: in terms of domestic violence, intra-communal violence and tensions between refugees or IDPs and host communities. The trafficking of small arms to and from camps also affect the communities located "in transit" as well as humanitarian and development agencies seeking to protect displacees.

Humanitarian and development agencies are obstructed by small arms availability and use: Among humanitarian and development agencies themselves, small arms availability and use are threatening their operations, stakeholders, beneficiaries and local investments. Though these opportunity costs are vast, they are difficult to measure with precision. Very generally, development gains are undermined and programme costs are ballooning. At a minimum, costs relating to transportation of aid and personnel are increasing and the quality of programme implementation, monitoring and evaluation is undermined. Furthermore, surplus expenditures on security measures and communication infrastructure to mitigate armed threats severely curtail the scale of operations and affect the morale of personnel. Alarmingly a rapidly growing number of agencies are completely unable or unwilling to operate in areas where arms are widely available and used.

Central Recommendations

Broaden the Small Arms Debate to Encompass Humanitarian and Developmental Concerns: A humanitarian and development focus, to complement the prevailing disarmament perspective, is encouraged for advocacy on small arms. The dialogue and language on small arms, then, should seek to reflect as clearly and thoroughly as possible - the short and long-term human costs of their availability and use. The scale and dimensions of these "human costs" are deceptive - and extend well beyond death, firearm-related injury and violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). The insecurity generated by the widespread availability and use of small arms undermines social and economic development, post-conflict reconstruction and basic human rights. In this way, framing the "effects" dimension of small arms is of parallel importance to political and traditional security perspectives - and serves to reposition people to the centre of the dialogue on arms control.

Undertake Focused Empirical Studies (for Advocacy Purposes): Advocacy and pro-active campaigners would do well to consider how the Landmine Campaign developed rigorous empirical material on the "effects" of such weapons in order to mobilise a broad constituency around the issue. Though the issue is not as clean-cut or neatly defined as the Landmine Campaign - much of the latter's success was generated out of a comprehensive humanitarian advocacy strategy based on accumulating irrefutable evidence from the field. The Landmine campaign began with the accumulation of focused studies to inform a broad advocacy strategy rather than the other way around. It sought to prioritise trends and impacts on vulnerable groups rather than numbers in the ground. In this way, country-specific studies appraising the relationships between firearm-related insecurity and development would contribute to the definition of priorities for campaigners and donors alike. In order to make a compelling case for the "human costs" of small arms, such studies should seek to assemble primary and time-series data on, *inter alia*, firearm-related mortality and morbidity, forced displacement, access of individuals to basic health and education services in arms-affected societies and declining foreign and local investment in insecure regions.

Support Non-Governmental and Governmental Data-Collection Capacities: If further evaluations of the humanitarian impacts of small arms are to be undertaken, it is vital that case-specific material is gathered, research supported, and that government, field agency and non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives are sensitised to the importance of collecting and reporting on small arms-related impacts. Of equal, if not greater, importance, reliable information-gathering sources and databases need to be supported to ensure that ongoing surveillance of key indicators (e.g. data on mortality and morbidity or forced displacement) are maintained over time. Over the long-term, support for surveillance and monitoring should also enhance the capacities of countries to respond to the problem of small arms in a comprehensive manner. Ultimately, if intelligent domestic policy is to be made on containing small arms and their impacts, donor states and multilateral agencies should support the development of such initiatives. What is more, the strengthening of such capacities has the added benefit of indirectly supporting the work of a variety of IASC members - particularly in relation to their programmes not directly tied to small arms.

Enhance Institutional Memory on the Impacts of Small Arms: Procedural efforts to improve, systematise and consolidate data-collection in the field would go a long way in encouraging norm building at the agency-level regarding the impacts of small arms. At a minimum, field security officers (FSOs) and/or (newly) designated "security personnel" should be supported and given responsibility (and held accountable) to collect ongoing data on small arms-related insecurity at the country level. Humanitarian and development agencies should reflect on and appraise the particular way small arms affect the fulfilment of their mandates. In this regard, institutional memory could be vastly improved at both the national and field levels through systematic and comparative indicators that are monitored over time.

Encourage Information-Sharing on Small Arms Among Stakeholders Efforts should be made to collect and share existing information between national public institutions, UN agencies, international and indigenous NGOs and "faith-based organisations" where possible and appropriate. Traditional intelligence-gathering techniques employed by humanitarian and development agencies could also be adapted to incorporate small arms-related issues such as domestic and regional legislation on weapons, production and leakage of small arms and the impact of collection and destruction programmes. Continuous and time-series data on firearm-related mortality, armed assault and banditry among the civilian population and personnel - should be integrated or "mainstreamed" into programme considerations. Such information can provide critical early warning indicators and allow humanitarian agencies to assess risks and vulnerabilities in the field and plan appropriately for contingencies

Build Anti-Weapon Norms and Encourage Transparency: The consultants note that there are clear instances where armed insecurity is so endemic that a modicum of physical protection is required for UN personnel and or stakeholders in the field. Nevertheless, it is strongly urged that the UN continue to adopt clear and transparent norms discouraging weapons use in its field activities. Symbols and emblems condemning the possession of small arms - such as those produced by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - are often effective in inculcating norms of non-possession. At a minimum, efforts should be undertaken to discourage the presence of arms in day-to-day activities and (where possible) to find alternative solutions (e.g. other than military presence or private security) to addressing systemic forms of insecurity. Furthermore, UN entities would do well to consider supporting a logistical transparency and oversight regime to ensure that relief and development-aid infrastructure is not being used (indirectly) to facilitate arms proliferation or purchasing.

Consider Non-Traditional Approaches to Disarmament: Given that small arms proliferation and possession cannot be singularly regulated by supply-side controls, humanitarian and development agencies would do well to begin considering alternative approaches to arms control. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has already advanced the concept of "weapons for development" - an approach that implicitly acknowledges the importance of security as a pre-condition for sustainable development. The UNHCR and UNICEF, on the other hand, have sought to reduce vulnerabilities of their primary stakeholders by introducing programmes that reduce their exposure to firearm-related incidents. What these initiatives have in common is a focus on demand-related incentives for firearms. These approaches should be supported and analysed - with a view of possible replication in areas where arms are being used to devastating effect.

Picture ICRC 1999

Section I. Introduction

Underdevelopment, Inequality, Conflict and Small Arms

Of the more than 150 major conflicts since the Second World War, 130 have been fought in the developing world. The vast majority of wars today are internal and low-intensity and violent political conflicts that diffuse across borders are actually increasing.[4] Underdevelopment and inequality are both a cause of and are caused by armed conflict in which small arms are the principal weapons used.[5] Nevertheless, some continue to believe that large-scale weapons systems are primarily responsible for the deaths of civilians during conflict. There is also a misconception that machetes and knives - and not projectile arms - are the most prolific weapons in today's civil wars. As a result, certain governments and NGOs, believe that the “small arms problem” is irresolvable and insist instead on focusing on the root causes - or, at worst, ignoring the issue altogether. But the impacts of small arms are inescapable. In ongoing conflicts and post-conflict contexts there are an asymmetrical number of civilians who are killed and injured by small arms and light weapons - and many millions more who are killed as a result of secondary costs attributable to armed violence. Disconcertingly, as this study will demonstrate, in situations of insecurity and unrest, civilians are killing each other with greater expediency and impunity than ever before.

Box 1. Lethal Characteristics of Small Arms

Low Cost and Wide Availability. Small arms are relatively low-tech tools of war - and due to state-driven demand, there are well over 600 suppliers around the world. With more than 550 million in circulation - whether newly produced, liquidated by downsizing militaries or circulated from conflict to conflict - small arms are inexpensive and easily diffused.

Increasing Lethality. The increasing availability of rapid-fire military assault rifles, automatic pistols and submachine guns and their diffusion to non-state actors has given such actors a firepower that often exceeds that of police or military forces. The adoption of newly available technology into shoulder-fired rockets, mortars and light anti-tank weapons has magnified the presence that warring factions bring to bear in civil conflicts.

Simplicity and Durability. Small arms are easy to maintain, require little logistical support and have lifelines that may span several decades. They require almost no training to use effectively, greatly increasing their use in conflicts involving informal militias and children.

Portability. The flow of small arms is extremely difficult to track or monitor. Small arms and light weapons can be carried by a single soldier or light vehicle, are easily shipped or smuggled to areas of conflict and can be effectively cached in legitimate cargo, warehouses or the outdoors often in the harshest of climates.

Military, Police and Civilian Uses. Unlike major conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons cross the dividing line separating military and police forces from the civilian population. In many countries, there has been a dramatic increase in the number and size of private militias and security firms that, in many cases, are equipped with military-type weapons.

Small arms are a prime ingredient of these new wars (Kaldor, 1999). Cast as tribal, religious or ethnic conflicts, a growing number of “communal” conflicts are actually resource-base clashes - long-term conflicts motivated by profit, or violence generated out of scarcity and inequality.[6] Indeed, it is now clear that light weapons are more likely to be used in societies of low to medium human development, weak governance and falling per capita income.[7] Small arms themselves are frequently assuming the status of a currency. Guns from enduring conflicts are often hidden or stowed away by a variety of actors for later use, traded in informal markets and across frontiers, or trafficked via international brokers and criminal syndicates at exceptional return. Criminal and informal economies throughout Africa, Central America and Eastern Europe often profit from the re-circulation and re-use of small arms - undermining what are often frugal development gains. Real and perceived insecurity among

civilians fuel increased proliferation and use. Arms availability in such regions is swelling and exacting a high price - both in terms of lives lost and development costs.

As a result, small arms and light weapons, including military-style weapons designed for trained and organised militaries, are now in civilian hands and increasingly used in contravention to IHL and human rights. These arms, circulating from conflict to conflict (or criminal syndicate to criminal syndicate), are also diffusing throughout civil society due to their facility of use, portability and durability (*see Box 1*). Rights-abusing regimes are also known to procure vast quantities of arms (from so-called "rights-respecting" states) to repress civilians - or, as in the case of such countries as Colombia, East Timor and Kenya, to arm civilians against perceived threats to national security - however defined. All too often, however, such arms are taken up against the very civilians they were intended to protect (*see Annex 1*).

Owing to the paucity of data on small arms and light weapons, and because traditional data focuses on organised military units, conventional indices on arms flows have almost exclusively concentrated on major weapons systems. But estimates are emerging. Recent efforts to gauge the volume of arms in circulation suggest that there are well over 550 million, of which an estimated one million (or 0.2 per cent of the total) are in the hands of non-state or "rebel" actors. A further 305 million are thought to be in private civilian hands (*Karp*, 2001). Less well appreciated, however, are the qualitative shifts in small arms proliferation and, importantly, their impacts. There is a relatively new trend underlying the patterns of violence in many unstable regions: the diffusion of increasingly powerful technologies of violence.[8] As accessibility to new and more powerful weaponry make it easier to kill people, it is easier for countries to become locked in perpetual cycles of (internal) conflict that render any "normal" trajectory of political and economic development impossible. This has increased the virulence of mass violence (e.g. fatality rates) - as automatic rifles are replacing single-action and non-automatic weapons.

A UN report (1999) suggests that "the proliferation of small arms … affects the intensity and duration of violence and encourages militancy … a vicious circle in which insecurity leads to a higher demand for weapons". There is growing body of evidence indicating that even a modest build-up of small arms can lead to disproportionately large increases in armed violence, conflict and criminality (Muggah, 2001; Smaldone & Craft, 2000). Small arms facilitate the creation of "cycles of violence", that ratchet up the scale and severity of violence - disrupting social networks within communities and the public institutions that are supposed to serve them. In the words of Homer-Dixon (2001:1), "weak and illegitimate governments … stimulate conflict, attracting an influx of light arms; the light arms then make the conflicts more extensive, bitter and protracted, which weakens the central government even more". In many ways, then, it matters less how many such arms exist, but rather where such arms are being used and who are most vulnerable.

At the local level, these so called cycles of violence undermine and distort the way attitudinal and behavioural norms are acted out in a given society. In its most benign form, cultures of violence (or "consumerist militarism") entail the normalisation and glorification of war, weaponry, military force and violence through popular media, sport and recreation. There are common patterns across societies. Cultures of violence privilege violent solutions to peaceful ones; in which individuals seek recourse to physical protection rather than dialogue and reconciliation. In societies affected by such cultures - and particularly where perceptions of insecurity are high - individuals become more likely to acquire arms for self-protection.[9]

At worst, cultures of violence celebrate armed violence - with small arms elevated to the status of a totem. As a result of the sheer scale of force and sense of powerlessness among victims, civilian interpretations

Box 2. Legal and Humanitarian Basis for Small Arms Control

Basic principles of IHL provide for the protection of non-combatants and prohibit the indiscriminate use of any weapon (Geneva Conventions 1949 and the Protocols 1977). Based on a number of case studies elaborated by the ICRC (1999) in its seminal report, *Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict,* the organisation has elaborated a "case for restraints on arms availability, based on humanitarian law and core humanitarian principles". It can be summarised as:

"The unregulated availability of weapons can increase tensions, facilitate their indiscriminate use and lead to a rise in civilian casualty levels … Fundamental humanitarian principles require that the issue of weapons proliferation be addressed, as it can needless increase the number of victims in war situations."

Although Article 51 (of the UN Charter) allows states to acquire armaments required for security, states also have a solemn moral and legal responsibility, under Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions (1949), to "respect and ensure respect" for IHL. "In particular, the knowing provision of arms into situations where serious violations of IHL occur or are likely to occur should be considered a matter of grave concern".

"While the primary responsibility for compliance with IHL falls on the "user" of the weapon, arms producing and exporting states and companies bear some responsibility to the international community for the use made of their weapons … States should also, as a matter of urgency, elaborate rules and principles, based on IHL and similar criteria, governing the transfer and spread of arms and ammunition".

Extract from ICRC (1999: 63-64)

of "reasonable" or "acceptable" thresholds of violence are profoundly distorted. What is more, extreme levels of armed violence induce psychosocial trauma and shock to both victims and witnesses to atrocities.[10] Automatic weaponry is frequently engaged to increase the speed and scale of killing (virulence) in many areas of the world. In this way, armed violence is infectious - "as even more people are sucked into a vortex of bitterness and anger … yet these very same technologies mean that it takes ever-smaller numbers of people seeking revenge to keep the cycle going" (Homer-Dixon, 2001). At its most sinister, as in Rwanda during the genocide, Hutu militias were trained to murder 1,000 humans every twenty minutes - a killing ratio that improved fivefold on rates achieved by the Nazis during World War II (Shawcross, 2000).

Direct and Indirect Impacts

As this report will demonstrate, the direct impacts of small arms on civilian are tremendous. Firearms kill more than 500,000 people each year - including 200,000 in so-called peaceful countries (Muggah, 2001; Cukier, 1998). Millions more are injured. By one estimate, approximately two million children have been killed as a result of armed conflict since 1990 (Machel, 2000). But the majority of casualties are young men, often unemployed and with limited formal education. The early death or injury of productive individuals obviously affects production capacities of entire societies - exerting tremendous strains on public health facilities. Ultimately, the targeting of civilians in situations of war, regardless of whether they are men, women or children, constitutes a grave violation of IHL (*see Box 2*). The availability of small arms, then, constitutes a threat to basic human rights such as the right to life, liberty and security of person (Article 3, UN Declaration of Human Rights). But the impacts of small arms are not restricted to death and injury.

A single weapon has vast persuasive power. Evidence gathered together in this report suggests that arms often play a vital role in compelling people to leave their homes. Individuals and households are increasingly being coerced from their houses and fields by arms-wielding thugs. The global caseload of refugees and displaced persons, a proxy indicator of armed violence, is growing. The number of refugees fleeing from armed conflicts worldwide has increased from 2.4 million in 1974 to more than 27.4 million with another 23 million people internally displaced (UNHCR, 2000). Children and women make up an estimated 70-80 per cent of displaced populations. By the late nineties, an esti-

mated 50 million people had been forced to involuntarily relocate as a result of violence - one out of every 120 people on earth (USCR, 2000). Violence-induced displacement inhibits the access of vulnerable groups to education and health - resulting in long-term costs to social well-being and economic activity more generally.

It is abundantly clear that armed conflict and firearm-related violence have additional secondary costs on civilians. On the one hand, persistent armed violence limits the capacity of states to create responsive institutions that are critical to ensuring prosperity, safety and social welfare. What is more, access of civilians to public goods and services is severely constrained by widespread weapons availability and use. Both of these factors - responsive institutions and accessible public services - are affected by small arms availability. For example, ex-combatants who were not effectively disarmed or demobilised can undermine the social capital of entire communities - severely disrupting mobility, productive capacities and local development more generally. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), war-related agricultural declines often have disastrous consequences for child nutrition levels: "the destruction of crops and livestock results, at best, in reduced food security and, at worst, in famine and death" (FAO, 2000; Luckham, Ahmed & Muggah, 1999).

Global economic losses from unrelenting armed conflict in developing countries over the past two decades amount to an estimated $US 37 billion, while those states received only $US 29 billion in food aid over the same period (Duffield, 1998; Jolly, 1998). Though small arms are but one of many factors that contribute to these gross impacts, the long-term macro-economic costs are staggering - reducing economic productivity and severely distorting the cost of living. In many parts of the world where armed conflicts show no sign of abating, development gains are severely curtailed due to the destruction of human capital, infrastructure, inflation and the perceived risks associated with long-term investment. Relief operations and implementing partners are habitually paralysed by armed violence - with NGOs often forced to evacuate or devote resources to capital and logistics-intensive emergency assistance. Even in societies not entirely ravaged by war, the opportunity-costs of firearm-related violence are prohibitive.

Humanitarianism Under Siege

Despite the rising incidence of small arms-related violence and instability, the relief and development community is expanding its role in conflict-affected areas. During the Cold War, the UN seldom intervened in political crises or complex emergencies without a cease-fire and the prior agreement of the parties to the conflict.[11] This is no longer the case. But in situations where respect for the well-being and safety of civilians and vulnerable people is disregarded, the principle of providing humanitarian workers with access to those in need of assistance is often ignored. In the words of one official "… because [they] are undesirable witnesses, because their activities slow down or even thwart the objectives of combatants, because they are 'rich' in countries that are poor … for all these reasons [they] are considered perfectly legitimate targets by those who prey on humanitarian organisations" (ICRC, 1999: 15). This is particularly worrying, as "disease, starvation and abuse increase when humanitarian agencies … are the object of attack and are forced to suspend operations or leave a country" (Ibid. 71).

The humanitarian aid community is under siege. Partly because the issue has only recently been accorded serious attention, insecurity for active UN employees in the field (civilian and peacekeeping) and the humanitarian community in general, remains precarious. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), for example, records that 185 UN civilian staff members have died from hostile actions between 1992 and 2000. UN staff members have lost their lives in over 40 countries around the world (*see Figure 1*). But firearm-related deaths only tell part of the story. Since the beginning of 1994, for example, some 240 UN staff members have been taken hostage (frequently at gun-point) in more than 60 separate incidents. There have also been an unprecedented number of

rapes, incidents of sexual assault, armed robbery attacks on aid convoys, car-jacking, harassment and arbitrary arrest and detention.[12] While tallies of direct injuries suffered during armed violence are not systematised within the UN system, some epidemiologists believe that for every firearm-related fatality registered in "war-like situations" - another three to four are likely to have been injured.

Figure 1. UN Civilian Staff Killed as a Result of Hostile Actions: 1992-2000

Africa		Middle East		The Americas		Asia		Europe	
Algeria	5	Gaza Strip	9	Colombia	1	Afghanistan	4	Albania	1
Angola*	10	Iran	1	El Salvador	1	Bangladesh	1	Bosnia & Herz.	3
Burundi	7	Iraq	6	Jamaica	1	Cambodia	7	Georgia	2
Cameroon	1	Lebanon	1	Haiti	2	East Timor	3	Kosovo	3
Comoros*	2	Yemen	1	India	1	Moldova	1		
Côte d'Ivoire	5			Indonesia	3	Tajikistan	3		
DRC	1			Pakistan	1	Uzbekistan	1		
Egypt	1								
Ethiopia*	6								
Guinea	1								
Kenya	5								
Madagascar	1								
Mozambique	2								
Nigeria	2								
Rwanda	59								
Sierra Leone	2								
Somalia	11								
Sudan	5								
Tanzania	1								
Uganda	5								
Total:	**128**	**Total:**	**18**	**Total:**	**5**	**Total:**	**20**	**Total:**	**14**

** = includes fatalities from plane crashes over or near country's air space*
Source: Adapted from UNSECOORD documents

In response, UN agencies and humanitarian coalitions are attaching ever-greater importance to the physical security of relief and development personnel. Of the UN's 150 duty stations, for example, approximately 38 have a designated Field Security Officer (FSO) and 28 are located in "hazardous" areas. But there were only seven security officers in 1999 and nine permanent security staff for 70,000 UN staff and dependants in 2001. Even though recent gains have been made to improve field security and bolster representation at headquarters, UNSECOORD is still relatively under-funded and under-staffed.[13] The lack of centralised funding for security training, equipment and personnel and ad hoc approach to recurrent expenditures more generally, constrains UNSECOORD's mandate.[14] UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has himself described the UN's security management system as "clearly inadequate to meet the minimum requirements [of UN staff]" and called for "urgent remedial actions" to redress this "untenable situation."[15]

In the words of one UN report (UNGA 2000) "virtually every part of the UN system is dealing with the consequences of armed conflicts, insecurity, violence, crime, social disruption, displaced people and *human suffering* that are directly or indirectly associated with the wide availability of these weapons" (emphasis added). In response to the threats posed by small arms to humanitarian and devel-

opment work more generally, certain elements within the UN have called for an integrated and proportional approach to security and development - otherwise known as a "security first" perspective. At the very least, such an approach highlights the endogenous features of armed conflict (in relation to development) and the importance of prioritising "human security" in programme design and implementation. But such changes are slow in the making. Rather, many agencies have instead focused on revising their security procedures and introducing more elaborate protocol at the field level.[16] But tinkering with security institutions and protocol, while wholly warranted, is but one of many ways to mitigate against increased vulnerability. A critical, if obvious, problem that needs to be better understood is the role that small arms play in affecting civilian populations and humanitarian operations. One of the key tasks of this study is to better understand how small arms exacerbate "human suffering" and, in this way, to contribute a vital dimension to the discourse on small arms control.

Small arms, a legitimate tool of self-defence for states, will not disappear.[17] But their rampant availability can be contained and reduced. While not necessarily the mandate of UN operatives in the field, the problem of small arms must be addressed from the perspective of both supply and demand. Concrete normative measures and codes of conduct must continue to be introduced to contain the unregulated manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of small arms between states and non-state actors. Parallel legislation must be enacted to control the possession and use of such arms among civilians. But in reality, the humanitarian impacts of small arms are overwhelmingly a consequence of a relatively small, if growing, number of old arms; weapons that are (re)cycled from existing stockpiles. Perversely, old arsenals are simultaneously being updated with new, more lethal arms - both among the inventories of existing standing armies and police forces as well as among civilians and informal militias. At the global, regional and national levels, the destabilising multipliers of such weapons are glaringly apparent.

Section II. Developing A Framework

With the exception of a small number of seminal contributions,[18] there have been few attempts to systematically evaluate the broad effects, much less the humanitarian impacts, of small arms on civil society or the humanitarian and development communities. Although there is a vast (and rapidly growing) literature on small arms more generally, much of this is premised on anecdotal and circumstantial evidence. Studies on small arms and their effects frequently lack the primary data and rigour necessary to make a case for the policy-making community. At best, they seek to reconcile divergent perspectives and bridge competing paradigms (e.g. arms control vs. public health) - providing, in many cases, constructive theoretical contributions to the literature.

19. In preparing the study, it was recognised early on that there would be clear opportunities and challenges facing any evaluation of the specific empirical humanitarian impacts of small arms. On the one hand, the consultants noted that the broad economic and social impacts of conflict[19] could not be narrowly interpreted as a proxy for small arms. This is because the vast majority of casualties following large-scale conflict perish as a result of secondary impacts that are not immediately attributable to small arms availability or use. On the other, the consultants recognised that in spite of an abundance of data on the issue, time limitations would hinder the development of a truly nuanced and global profile. Nevertheless, there are a number of indicators that one can usefully engage to gauge, comparatively, the varied impacts of unregulated small arms and light weapons availability.

Introducing the Indicators

The most obvious and least controversial indicator of the "human cost" of small arms is firearm-related mortality and injury (see 1.1 of Figure 2). The cause-effect of a gunshot wound is easily determined and firearm-related casualties are occasionally recorded by national governments. In some cases, the type of gun, the situation in which the weapon was used and the nature of the injury are also documented. Where national surveillance data is limited - statistics can also be gathered from municipal police and health clinics as well as non-governmental institutions working in the health sector. But there are other indicators that illuminate the varied primary impacts of small arms and light weapons. Collins (1998) argues that data that "irrefutably identifies a causal connection between unregulated weapons availability and humanitarian impacts" include armed assault, armed robbery and the incidence of child soldiers.[20]

Scholars have also noted that violence-induced displacement and refugee flows provide a proxy for arms availability - though it should be noted that in many cases, forced migration flows are a product of many factors (the last of a range of coping strategies available to individuals). Certainly, in the case of Colombia, Kenya and East Timor, the mere presence of small arms has aggravated forced migration patterns (*see 1.2 of Figure 2*). In these cases, a subjective perception of firearm-related insecurity has taken on a reality tantamount to objective threat. Forced displacement is therefore influenced by small arms availability and use at both the sites of expulsion and resettlement or return.

More difficult to measure are the broad range of secondary impacts that follow from arms availability and use. Small arms availability and use have a number of "indirect" impacts - broad qualitative impacts in terms of fostering "cultures of violence" and "violent conflict resolution" as well as quantitative consequences for commercial transactions, local trade and production, labour and inheritance entitlements (*see 1.3 of Figure 2*). Small arms availability and use facilitates the abuse of individual

Figure 2. A Conceptual Framework for Assessing the Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms

Broad Effects	Humanitarian Impacts	A Sample of Proxy Indicators
Impacts on Civilian Populations	1.1. Mortality and Injury	Firearm-homicide rates, types of lesions, demographic profile of victims
	1.2 Forced Displacement	Numbers and trends of refugee and IDP flows, vulnerable groups, R&R patterns
	1.3 Declining Access to Entitlements	Production and labour costs, impacts on children, access to basic needs
Impacts on Humanitarian and Development Personnel	2.1 Targeting of Humanitarian and Development Personnel	Mortality and injuries, psychosocial trauma, staff turnover
	2.2. Militarisation of Refugee/IDP camps	Incidence of armed violence, victim profiles, impacts on agency mandates
	2.3 Opportunity Costs of Programmes	Programmes impeded, decreasing investment, costs for transportation, communication, security logistics, monitoring and evaluation

and collective endowments and entitlements[21] in a number of ways: affecting the labour productivity and psychosocial well-being of individuals, household units and their communities. Like landmines, the mere threat of arms use affects land-use patterns and harvesting, livestock production and grazing and local investment in commercial activities. The disruption of entitlements has profound implications for the social and economic development of communities.

Another indicator of the humanitarian impacts of small arms relates to the effects of weapons availability (and their associated violence) on humanitarian and development personnel (*see 2.1 of Figure 2*). As with the civilian populations they assist, expatriate and local staff are increasingly being affected both directly (e.g. mortality and injury) and indirectly (e.g. psychosocial trauma, shock and risk-taking behaviour) by deliberate small arms use and generalised insecurity. All of these impacts are measurable where and when agencies have consistently recorded firearm-related incidents - and can be directly related to the perceived or real threat of small arms. High rates of staff turnover may also indirectly indicate arms-related threats - though other variables, ranging from family concerns to poor housing conditions, may influence individual decisions to leave a posting.

At the operational level, the militarisation of refugee and IDP camps also indicates the presence of small arms and light weapons (*see 2.2 of Figure 2*). As more and more agencies are compelled to employ privatised security in their area of work (e.g. whether refugee camps, field offices or development project sites) - wartime economic activities are favoured over peacetime ones (Anderson, 1999). This is because agencies are devoting increased proportions of their overall budgets to ensuring security. The growth of refugee flows and internally displaced populations, and more specifically, the existence of militarised camps where they temporarily reside, has had qualitative effects on the very “protection” mandates of agencies involved in ensuring their security. Armed insecurity, then, has led to increasing costs for refugee operations - both financially and more qualitatively.

At the broadest level, small arms availability and use can inhibit humanitarian intervention and undermines rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Unregulated small arms availability can directly block the progress of relief and development programmes, directly impinging the welfare of civilians and the mandates of agencies. The excess expenditures devoted to ensuring security (e.g. evacuations, increased monitoring and evaluation, transportation and communications costs) constitute opportunity costs (*see 2.3 of Figure 2*). Furthermore, dependence on private armed security reinforces "cultures of violence".

Methodological Caveats

While it is manifestly clear that these primary and secondary indicators are broadly interconnected, they have been separated nonetheless for the sake of conceptual clarity. To be sure, there are spatial and temporal relationships between small arms availability and their impacts that influence the experience of individuals. For example, firearm-related homicides induce displacement among other households, resulting in precipitous declines to entitlements and increased mortality and morbidity. The impacts themselves are overlapping - and do not necessarily follow a linear sequence or pattern. Furthermore, the changing importance attached to small arms themselves (e.g. both financially and socially) often determine the extent to which they are "valued" in a society or are used in acts of aggression. Where arms suddenly increase or decrease in price - their relative utility to pastoralists, criminals, civilians and militias may also change - and it may be difficult to fully appreciate their particular impacts. As briefly alluded to above there are a number of additional confounding variables that obfuscate a clear assessment of the humanitarian impacts of small arms. A number of challenges relate to the mythologisation of numbers, poor data-collection facilities, selection biases, cultural variables and issues of confidentiality. Each of these will be briefly examined in turn.

The humanitarian advocacy community frequently generates "*mythological*" numbers, often premised on loose estimations, to shift opinion and generate broad popular consensus on a range of issues. If its proponents are to be believed there have been 500 million firearms in circulation since the early 1990s, 300,000 child soldiers in active service over the past four years, 180 million anti-personnel landmines and 23 million IDPs, since the early 1990s. But rates and numbers change from year to year and even season to season. Despite the lack of nuance, the "numbers game" serves a purpose; for what global figures lack in precision, they make up in potency. But loose approximations can also unintentionally and destructively re-orient the debate away from the substance of a given issue and undermine the credibility of all involved. The advocacy community is increasingly recognising the value of rigorous empirical research as a basis for informed debate.

A recurring problem for researchers evaluating the impacts of small arms (from any disciplinary angle) is the *inadequacy of existing data-collection facilities.* The consultants repeatedly encountered only nominal or piecemeal data on straightforward indicators such as firearm-related homicide, armed assault, theft, banditry, rape and injuries. Though this can be frequently attributed to under-reporting on the part of victims or police, more often it is a function of poor institutional capacity, a lack of resources (i.e. financial and human) and ignorance of the problem. For example, UN offices in New York and Geneva as well as field duty stations often possessed limited archival or institutional memory, or had only recently started collecting data on security trends, much less the impacts of small arms. Indeed, it is very possible that existing surveillance systems, including those of the UN, tend to under-report the incidence of armed violence more generally.

Another methodological obstacle, perhaps more serious in Latin America, South Africa and South East Asia relates to *selection bias.* For obvious political reasons, surveillance systems designed for the evaluation of armed violence are frequently based in urban centres. Data collection is naturally facilitated by the ready availability of respondents in cities and towns. As urbanisation rates in Colombia exceed 70 per cent of the population, there is often a tendency for indigenous (and by extension, international) data collection facilities to focus on urban trends at the expense of rural phenomena. As a result, where profiles emerge tends appear to be one-sided, mirroring a reality that often fits urban policy-making priorities. The problem of selection bias is even more pressing in countries such as Kenya, where 80 per cent of the population live outside of urban centres. Such populations are therefore totally under-represented in official statistics.

Cultural norms, whether religious or customary, often confound attempts to accurately document the humanitarian impacts of small arms. Indeed, as a result of stigmatisation and other behavioural tendencies, there are many communities that are less likely to report happenings to their respective governments or authorities than others. The incidence of under-reporting can also reflect prevailing political or social conditions - though are also often a product of other systemic (formal and informal) norms that govern the way people live their lives. To take one example, there is serious challenge to registering deaths in Islamic communities in the Philippines where deaths are under-reported due to the immediate burial of victims of violence (or other causes) as prescribed by religious edict. Financial incentive schemes introduced by the government to entice civilian registration of firearms-related deaths have lead to a situation of over-reporting of fatalities within said country (Oxfam 2001b).

A final dilemma relates to confidentiality - and the (justifiable) reluctance of many agencies to disclose information that they feel might compromise their mandate or impartial status. In situations of armed conflict, humanitarian agencies are often balancing relationships with a combination of non-state actors, military brigades, criminal factions, warlords and civilians. Information on the movement, trafficking, use and caches of small arms and light weapons, an essential part of warfare, is obviously an issue to be handled with the utmost sensitivity. Information on the "effects" of such weapons can

also be mis-construed. Agencies such as ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) do not disclose information on individual patients - though do occasionally make public various findings emerging from analysis of patient data.

Section III. Introduction of Countries

Though the study is global in nature, the IASC-RGSA decided to fund field research to assess the specific and ongoing impacts of small arms. In October 2000, it was agreed that three countries were to serve as the basis of analysis of the humanitarian impacts of small arms. The criteria that conditioned country selection included:

- Geographical diversity
- Experience of either asylum or expulsion
- Societies in pre-conflict, conflict, or post-conflict situations

To this end, Kenya, Colombia and East Timor were chosen - and ten-day field visits were conducted in each country.[22]

Kenya

It is impossible to speak of small arms and insecurity in Kenya without considering the regional context. Four countries bordering Kenya - Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia - have each experienced significant internal conflict or outright collapse. The lax, even non-existent, control and oversight over national stockpiles in a hyper-militarised region - coupled with the traditionally porous constitution of the countries' borders - have led to a situation where small arms are continuously circulated within a "conflict system".[23]

It is estimated that there are more than five million small arms and light weapons circulating in the Horn and East African region alone. Since the collapse of Said Barre's regime in 1991, Somali traders, occasionally in collusion with international dealers, have moved arms across the 1,200-km frontier with little to no opposition. The Somali port of Kismayo and the Kenyan port of Mombassa, for example, are well-known points of entry (Sabala, 2000). The same can be said of Sudan and Ethiopia - where small arms are known to move as easily across borders as pastoral and livestock herders. Further, Uganda maintains an arms factory at Nagasongola - some 250 km from the Kenyan border. Local reports speculate that illicit trafficking of small arms and ammunition from Uganda to Kenya, via small-scale traders or the Karamojong, may be taking place.[24]

It is manifestly clear, then, that small arms are flowing into (and out of) Kenya from every quarter: some place the total at between 500,000 and one million with estimates of up to 5,000 automatic rifles crossing back and forth across the Somali border every month.[25] AK-47s and M-16s with US, Chinese, Bulgarian and Chinese markings, have been collected in border towns such as Wajir, Wagella and Garissa (IRIN, November 10, 2000). Also found are 303 rifles, Ceska rifles, Browning revolvers, US-manufactured Smith & Weston and Colt revolvers and sporting guns (Sabala, 2000). Small arms that are available in the five border countries are commonly found in Kenya - as are new models outfitted for military campaigns in Southern Africa and throughout Eastern Europe. Not unlike other African conflicts, the demand factors driving the diffusion of small arms and ammunition appear to be a combination of inequality, urban crime, rural banditry, inter-clan conflict and an increased desire for self-protection.

But it also appears that domestic supply (and use) is in some cases feeding demand. As the Kenyan military frequently upgrades its military hardware (rather than expanding in size), there are also rumours that the Kenyan government is considering the import of two new weapons: India's INSAS rifles and Galil rifles from Israel. Like other militaries and police forces around the world, Kenya has experienced leakage from its own stockpiles.[26] In terms of manufacturing, Kenya runs a small arms ammunition factory in Eldoret.[27] The factory, established in 1996 with assistance provided by FN Herstal (Belgium), is capable of producing 20 million rounds per year (Jane's Intelligence Review, 1998). Though still speculative, it is feared that some of the ammunitions from this factory find their way to criminal and insurgent groups in Kenya or across the frontiers - such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia.

State presence in either the North Eastern or North Western stretches of the country is largely absent, and there is virtually no police or army surveillance except along key tarmac roads to the capital, Nairobi. The lack of government penetration and investment is reflected in the relative social and economic (under) development of the two regions - where indicators for health, nutrition and education are substantially lower in the peripheral "up-country" areas than in the more prosperous, urban south and coastal settlements. With an estimated 90-95 per cent of "northern" households armed[28] - the implications for raiding, banditry and crime, in conditions of considerable scarcity, are obvious. The *de facto* modalities of traffic are varied - though fluvial transportation, except in the coastal region of the country and in Lake Victoria, are rare. Small arms and light weapons are transported via donkey, camel, long-distance cargo carriers and public vehicles. Also known is the fact that pastoralists and livestock herders physically carry small arms during their migratory search for grazing land.

Civilian possession of firearms is technically illegal in Kenya (Firearms Act Cap 114 - Section 2).The actual value of illegal firearms, then, fluctuate according to the anticipation of conflict and new fighting inside and outside of Somalia as well as the "asking price" in Nairobi's Eastleigh District and Mombassa. According to one report, in the North Eastern Protectorate (NEP), a Russian-made Kalashnikov (AK-47) assault rifle increased in price from $US 130 to $US 200 in just three days in mid-August 2000 (IRIN November 10, 2000). Ammunition also increased from $US 0.15 to $US 0.25 over the same period. Double-barrelled anti-aircraft guns are also purported to have increased by 15 per cent, from $US 26,000 to $US 30,000. On the other hand, there are verified reports that in the Northwest AK-47s and G3s sell for the price of two cows (depending on the season) or a camel (approximately $US 100), and 1,000 rounds of ammunition runs for a single goat (or about $US 25).

In recognition of the transnational dimensions of the problem, the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has initiated a much-heralded regional effort to regulate international control and flows - culminating in the "Nairobi Declaration" in March 2000. At a path-breaking meeting of states from the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, parties agreed to "seize the opportunity to comprehensively address the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the sub-region; and to encourage a concrete and co-ordinated Agenda for Action (sic) … to promote human security and ensure that all states have in place adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the possession and transfer of small arms and light weapons" (Kenyan Government, 2000). In addition to presiding over the Declaration, President Moi has himself taken a personal interest in the small arms "problem" - bringing up the issue in no less than three international press conferences in 2000.[29] Though recent expressions of commitment are encouraging, without decisive action the prospects of security in the region appear very bleak indeed.

Colombia

Colombia's internal conflict among the government, various guerrilla movements and paramilitaries has claimed 130,000 lives in over 37 years of "political violence". Although the global media lens is focused on the "drug war" and insurgency - crime exacts a particularly heavy toll on Colombian society: in the past ten years alone, over 200,000 Colombians have been killed as a result of armed criminal violence. Approximately 70-80 per cent of all of Colombia's average 20,000 firearm homicides a year are officially attributed to "delinquency" or "common crime". Only eight to ten per cent of firearm deaths are attributed to "political" or "selective" homicide or massacre. Though this relationship generally holds in urban areas, the reverse is often true in rural zones affected by high levels of conflict or significant capital interests. Arms play a part in virtually every act of violence - whether massacres[30], homicide, suicide, domestic violence, robbery or petty street crime.

Figure 3. The Estimated Price of Legal and Illegal Small Arms in Colombia (2001)

Legal Value of Small Arms in Colombia		Black Market Value of Small Arms in Colombia	
Type	**($US)**	**Type**	**($US)**
Submachine gun Colt, 9mm	2700	AK-47 Assault rifle, 7.62 x 39mm	3000
Submachine gun Uzi, 9mm	2600	AFAG Submachine gun, 7.62 x 51mm	12500
Pietro Beretta Pistol, 7.65	1900	M-72 Rocket launcher	3000
Pietro Beretta Pistol, 7.65	1400	RPG7 and RPG2 missile-launcher	12000
Browning Pistol, 9mm	1700	Galil Rifles, 7.62 x 51mm	3200
Colt Revolver, 38 Special	850	Pistols, 9mm	1200
Smith & Weston, 38 Special	900	Pistols, 7.65mm	850
Llama Revolver, 38 Special	600	Revolvers, 38 Special	280

Source: Conversations with National Police in Bogotá

Colombia too must be appraised in an international context - though the internal dynamics of small arms use and violence are distinct from the Greater Horn context. Colombia, like Kenya, is bordered by five countries (i.e. Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Panama) through which many small arms enter the country by water, air and land. The topography of the country has made the detection and control of arms movements exceedingly difficult - as has the fact that the illegal cost of arms is often less than that for legal purchase. Furthermore, a consequence of various internal conflicts in countries such as Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador, the trafficking of arms into Colombia from Central America has expanded dramatically over the last two decades. Furthermore, Russian mafias investing in narco-trafficking, in collusion with brokers of all nationalities, have forged significant gains in Colombia's illegal small arms market over the past few years.[31]

Like Kenya, the Colombian government has supplied information to the *UN International Firearms Study* (1998) noting that it produces firearms, components and ammunition for both domestic and export markets. Colombia has been manufacturing small arms since the 1930s. Various types of small arms ammunition are produced at the state-owned company, Industria Militar, located in Bogotá.[32] Worryingly, the fabrication of "cottage industry" or "homemade" firearms (e.g. "changones") is also growing. Such arms come in an array of different styles and calibres, but are not considered to have similar "stopping-power" as a standard weapon. They are generally used by gangs, urban militias and various subversive groups in urban capitals.[33]

Firearms, specifically .32s, .38 specials, 9mm revolvers are the weapons of choice for most actors - and used in up to 80 per cent of all political or crime-related homicides. Current estimates suggest that there are between 200,000 and 300,000 legally-held firearms, and up to 1,000,000 if all private secu-

rity actors are included (2001). According to the same source, illegal weaponry held by non-state actors and narco-traffickers are believed to number between 2 and 4 million - though as ever, imprecision reigns. As in most other countries, there are innumerable ways that small arms find there way into Colombia.

The armed conflict between guerrillas, auto-self defence or paramilitaries and the military has encouraged a significant demand for arms and other contraband across borders - illegal weapons that are often purchased at inflated prices (*see Figure 3*). Further, the relationship between narco-trafficking and non-state actors, whether in terms of production, processing, distribution or retail, has ensured a steady source of income to purchase small arms of all type. The trafficking of such weapons is carried out with virtual impunity (Policia Nacional, 2001). A large "distention zone", located in the southern Meta province ("Departamento", hereafter), was granted to the *Revolutionary Armed Front of Colombia* (FARC) guerrillas in the late nineties - though "many people here say the zone has merely served to let the rebels fortify themselves ... [t]he government has accused the FARC of using the areas a base in which to hold kidnap victims, recruit child, guerrillas, cultivate coca, to buy arms and to organise attacks on other regions" (Forero, 2001). There are also growing concerns that similar activities may take place in the newer "distention zone" being granted to the *National Liberation Army* (ELN) in Bolivar Departamento.

For obvious reasons, Colombian authorities have taken a lead on arms control measures in the region - seeking to elaborate innovative and collaborative ways to reduce the flow of small arms across its borders. As early as the mid-1980s, it called for increased efforts to contain the illicit flow of arms at the First Committee, some ten years before the UN began addressing the issue in a substantive fashion.[34] It was also a central actor in the preparation of the Organisation of American States (OAS) Convention on illicit manufacturing and trafficking. The *Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials,* was adopted in Washington DC on November 1997. As with the Nairobi Declaration, the OAS Convention sets out various operational and legal measures designed to harmonise international efforts at stemming small arms proliferation (OAS, 1997, Article 2). In this way, it aims to improve monitoring and control of the regional manufacture and import of guns as well as improving record-keeping on export, import and international transit license systems. The Convention's broad definition of "firearms" - including rockets, missiles and their delivery systems - ensures coverage of a wide range of weaponry. But due to massive impunity within the country, widespread criminality, the high value attached to cocaine and the persistence of armed conflict, peace and structural stability remain elusive to most Colombians.

East Timor

The humanitarian impacts of small arms in East Timor for the first two decades of Indonesian occupation are difficult to document. Jakarta apparently did not keep public records of gunshot wounds and secondary effects of small arms' use in East Timor, which it invaded in December 1975.[35] The Indonesian army's actual or threatened use of firearms was an effective instrument of terror, death, and coercion. The 1991 massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, which is widely believed to have resulted in more than 150 deaths,[36] was unique only in the international media exposure it garnered.

The conflict took on a new dimension and the humanitarian impact of small arms became much clearer to ascertain in January 1999. It was then that President B. J. Habibie announced his intention to permit East Timorese to determine their future relationship with Indonesia. It was decided in May that a Popular Consultation would be held, permitting East Timorese to choose between enhanced autonomy within Indonesia or independence. To influence the vote in favour of continued allegiance to Jakarta, the Government of Indonesia created paramilitary forces, coercing East Timorese to join

them in a campaign of political intimidation and violence. Indonesia had used relatively small numbers of militias in East Timor for many years to augment the thousands of uniformed soldiers and Special Forces. But in preparation for the Popular Consultation, the number of militias grew significantly toward the end of 1998 and in early 1999. Whereas militias had been chiefly used as informants, in 1999 they were routinely armed and increasingly used to terrorise the population. Examples of militia-instigated armed violence were recorded as early as February 1999. The militias became increasingly brazen and their attacks more deadly in the months leading up to the August 1999 referendum. There are no reports of major weapon systems being used during this period.

Although by most accounts the presence and use of small arms in East Timor are not pressing concerns, there is good reason to challenge this conventional wisdom. There are credible reports that the East Timor National Liberation Army (FALINTIL for Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste), the militias, and the Indonesian army have weapons caches in East Timor. Political fragmentation within the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT for Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense), the increasing culture of violence and numbers of gangs, and the very real ongoing threat militias pose in West Timor, all suggest that such weapons may soon surface with deadly effect. East Timorese are reluctant to inform the UN of weapons they know to exist because they fear retribution or retaliation from those who own or control the weapons.

Moreover, as this study documents, any discussion of East Timor must refer to what is now happening in West Timor. The perpetrators of much of the armed violence – together with their weapons – have largely relocated across East Timor's land border with the part of the island that remains Indonesia. They remain organised within their individual militias.

Section IV. Thematic Review: A Look at Civilian Impacts

Mortality and Injuries

The most immediate and tragic "humanitarian impact" of small arms use is death. But as noted above, there are distinctions between mortality and morbidity resulting from conflict more generally and the specific impacts of small arms availability and use during war. Even though it is widely accepted that small arms are overwhelmingly available and used in today's internal conflicts, the international community has only been able to generate the most tentative conclusions on the global death toll attributed directly to such weapons (WHO, 2001). Just as it is believed that several million men, women and children are killed as a result of war and post-conflict situations - it is still difficult to know (with precision) what proportion are killed as a result of small arms injuries, or as a function of arms-related insecurity leading to multi-causal impacts.

Although ICRC, MSF and the World Health Organisation (WHO) aim to register wound types[37] in much of their operations - they still have difficulty distinguishing between those casualties suffering lesions resulting from bombs and artillery fire; weapons other than firearms and light weapons (e.g. machetes and spears); or secondary effects such as malnutrition, food-insecurity due to politically-induced drought or the diversion of aid.[38] This is partly attributable to under-capacities of statistics collection, under or over-reporting on the parts of governments', non-state actors and NGOs and or lack of international observance in insecure regions.[39]

In terms of primary impacts, the most conservative global estimates are in the order of 300,000 killed directly and intentionally as a result of small arms in conflict-like situations. This does not account for suicide, accidental death or domestic violence occurring during conflict. An additional 200,000 indi-

viduals are killed as a result of gunshot wounds in so called "peaceful countries" (Cukier, 1998). Early estimates from the 1990s envisioned approximately 90 per cent of casualties during conflict as civilian - a complete reversal from the early 20th Century.[40] Though this is conceivable in certain circumstances, others have revised the estimate to between 30 and 65 per cent - which itself is an extraordinarily high rate.[41] In a recent review of the ICRC surgical database (17,086 patients admitted for weapon injuries), approximately 35 per cent of the victims of gunshot wounds were female, males under 16, or males' over 50. The ICRC (1999: 16) writes "this is a conservative indicator of the proportion of people injured by weapons who were probably non-combatants".

The lethality and incidence of injury is conditioned by, *inter alia*, a weapon's "type" (e.g. grenade, automatic rifle, or single-shot pistol), context of use (e.g. combat, crime or domestic abuse) and access of medical logistics (e.g. health personnel, blood supplies or evacuation services).[42] Studies on arms-related mortality and injury often focus on the distinctions between civilians and combatants - where combat injuries include those sustained during inter-factional fighting or from anti-personnel landmines. Recent findings suggest that civilians are injured in both war and non-war contexts, during and following from conflict. Studies drawn from Afghanistan, Croatia, Nicaragua and Chechnya note that firearm-related death is the leading cause of mortality in conflict and post-conflict zones.[43] According to Collins (1998:5), in the case of Somalia, the killing and injury of civilians was often in conjunction with banditry and inter-clan fighting and "accounted for more deaths than deaths among combatants in pitched battles".

There are also demographic profiles emerging of victims of small arms - suggesting that vulnerable groups are differentially affected. Young adult men, often unemployed, represent both the greatest abusers as well as the largest pool of victims (Muggah, 2001; Cock, 2000). Women also suffer particular forms of arms related sexual violence and intimidation - precisely because of their gender.[44] Single women who have lost their husbands or partners are also vulnerable to many forms of insecurity. Nor are children spared from violence. For example, in Sarajevo, almost one child in four has been wounded. Also, in Chechnya, 40 per cent of all civilian casualties were children - many having been systematically killed with bullets to the temple. As the following sections will demonstrate, Kenya and Colombia show a tremendous variation in the range of actors currently victimised by the availability of small arms.

Kenya

The spill over effects of armed violence resulting from regional and unresolved conflicts, a near-ubiquitous feature of the African landscape since independence, are worsening. Kenya - particularly its civilian population, is a casualty. While Kenya is not at war in any formal sense, indicators suggest that it is experiencing conflict-like homicide rates in many parts of the country. In recent years there has been an upsurge in gun-related crimes in Kenya, particularly in the country's urban centres (Sabala, 2000). That said Kenya has not contributed information on homicide rates to either the *United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation* (1999) or the *UNDP's Human Development Index* (2000). According to key informants, however, there have been well-over five hundred firearm-related homicides in Nairobi during 1999 (25 per 100,000), and a national rate close to 15 per 100,000.[45]

The actual manifestation of gun-related crimes include car-jacking, kidnapping, violent rape and robbery of residents, businesses in urban centres, as well as livestock raiding in the semi-arid districts of Baringo, Samburu, Isiolo, West Pokot and Turkana. Though patterns of violent crime traditionally involved lone individuals - trends are changing. Increasingly, gun-related crimes involve trained and well-armed military groups - often carried out by three or more actors. In the North East Protectorate (NEP), roving bands with between ten and 20 armed-actors are not uncommon (*see Box 3*). Victims are often young, frequently unemployed, men, livestock herders, women and merchants, impoverished

communities in marginalized communities outside of urban centres, political dissidents and, alarmingly, children.

Field research for the IASC study was conducted principally in three areas - Nairobi, Lokichokkio (North West) and Garissa (North East). The findings emerging from all three regions indicate a surge of small arms-related homicide and injury over the past ten years, particularly following the collapse of Somalia and the worsening of the conflict in southern Sudan. The townships of Lokichokkio and Garissa are particularly illustrative. For example, in and around Lokichokkio[46] there are an estimated five shooting incidents per week. Local police report that three to four people are killed as a result of firearms-use every week - or approximately 200 deaths a year. The numbers of firearm-related deaths have remained relatively constant in spite of the tremendous population growth (in and around Lokichokkio) over the past decade. This represents a firearm homicide rate of some 590 per 100,000 per year - though the rates could be much higher, up to 1,300 per 1,000,000. Many more civilians are left permanently disabled, or die of related injuries due to the lack of access to hospital or clinical facilities. Though verifiable statistics on the treatment and care, or demographic profile, of victims are hard to come by - anecdotal evidence suggests that the firearm homicide rates are disproportionately high among young men. According to UN officials and government hospital workers, the firearm homicide rates are roughly analogous in the much larger towns of Garissa and Wajir where inter-clan rivalries persist.

Box 3. Killings in Kenya's North East Protectorate (NEP)

On October 25, 1998, the official death toll in Wajir following a gunfight between members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Somali community in NE Kenya placed the death toll at 42 – though "the real number, believed to be much higher, will almost certainly never be known". A recent ACCORD report put the toll at 142 – with 50 abductions. According to UN reports written at the time, "more than 10 days after the military-style attack, survivors are still emerging with bullet wounds and fractures" (IRIN, 9 November, 1998). The attack was executed with automatic guns and rocket propelled grenades and turned a traditional dispute over grazing and water rights into an unprecedented slaughter. The government claimed that 52 villagers, mostly teenage girls, were also kidnapped and that more than 17,500 cattle and 2,000 camels were also stolen by the raiders - though remained "unrecoverable". Continued fears about insecurity were hampering humanitarian efforts.

According to IRIN reports, the proliferation of small arms has directly contributed to an increase in incidents of banditry in the NEP, as well as disrupting the fragile balance between pastoralist communities. Issues of grazing and territorial rights have lead to localised disputes; facilitated by shifting alliances that, according to local leaders, draw on support from heavily armed kin in neighbouring Somalia and Ethiopia. In the absence of "decisive government action in an area where people are treated like second class citizens", Kenyan MP Wajir West, insists that people will purchase arms "if they feel they have to". Ironically, the NEP has suffered brutal security exercises in the name of gun control and chronic underdevelopment. The notorious Wagalla massacre, that took place in 1984 in North East Kenya, is but one example. Though most observers claim that over 800 people were killed in a hail of gunfire during a single afternoon, the government admitted that "only 57 people were killed in a security operation to disarm the residents". Although political freedoms came after the lifting of the state of emergency (imposed until 1991), the NEP remains largely inaccessible to humanitarian and development agencies.

Reliable and time-series data on firearm homicide in Northern Kenya is available only from a disparate range of sources. While there are an increasing number of media-based reports of firearm-related massacres in regional and national newspapers[47], these are seldom verified. A number of academic journals have also sought to explore raiding and armed conflict from a developmental perspective - though they rarely dwell on the particular role of small arms.[48] Nor do publicly administered hospitals or clinics in the frontier maintain rigorous or time-series data on the types of injuries incurred by patients. Indeed, most rural clinics in Kenya are largely abandoned as few doctors or nurses are willing to work in such precarious and "hostile" regions of the country. There is an urgent need to generate consistent data on homicide and injury trends at the municipal, national and regional levels.

Figure 4. Wounded by Small Arms in South Sudan and NW Kenya



Source: Loeiping hospital, ICRC-Lokichokkio

There is, however, a growing body of primary data emerging from the international humanitarian community - foremost among them, ICRC. Primarily concerned with evacuated patients in need of critical attention[49] from southern Sudan and Northeast Kenya, the Lokichokkio Loeiping Hospital, with a capacity for 450 patients, maintains a database that illustrates the range of injuries facing victims of armed violence. Figure 4 illustrates the annual total admissions to the hospital (the largest field hospital, after Chechnya, of its kind), of which approximately 50 per cent are "war-wounded". Approximately 40-50 per cent of all evacuees are treated for injuries resulting from automatic weapons. Key informants suggest that well-over 95 per cent of all war-wounded are directly affected by small arms.[50] Landmines account for an estimated two per cent of casualties evacuated from southern Sudan and Northwest Kenya. Interviews with ICRC delegates also indicated that ICRC fits approximately 30-50 per cent of all new amputees with prosthesis and approximately 60-90 per cent of outpatients with orthosis. Respondents also noted that a large proportion of the patients suffer from various forms of depression, psychosocial trauma and shock.

The rest of the war-wounded are recovering from injuries attributed to bombing[51], fragmenting munitions and "secondary illnesses/morbidity attributed to small arms use".[52] Bombing has enormous secondary costs on the Southern Sudanese – mostly cattle and livestock that are killed - that in turn, affect their access to basic entitlements (*see section on Entitlements*). It should also be noted that tens of thousands of Sudanese are also killed and wounded by gunfire resulting from inter-tribal fighting - and that these people rarely receive treatment or care from humanitarian agencies. The head of the sub-delegation noted that the dynamics of the conflict, and therefore the injury profile of the patients,

differed dramatically from conventional conflicts in places such as Lebanon or Palestine – where there are two known sides, structured warfare, heavy arms and where, consequently, the situation tends to be "safer" for civilians and ICRC delegates.

Colombia

Without doubt, Colombia has the highest firearm homicide rate in the world - approximately 5-8 per cent of the global total. Verifiable sources indicate that between 90 and 95 per cent of all homicides and political killings in Colombia are meted out with firearms and small arms – whether revolvers or automatic rifles.[53] Mortars and grenades are not a serious problem in terms of inflicting direct casualties among civilians, though anti-personnel mines continue to present a security risk in rural areas. Between 1995-1999, 99,851 people lost their lives to firearms – approximately 78 per cent of the total number of violent deaths (128,635) in the country (*see Figure 5*). To this must also be added the number of reported violence related lesions – approximately three to five times the homicide rate (Medicina Legale, 2000a). This accounts for the infamous notation of "one violent death every twenty minutes". To put the crisis into an international perspective, Colombia's annual aggregate homicide rate is double that for all of Western Europe combined.

Figure 5. Violent Deaths Attributed to Small Arms in 1995-1999

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Homicides	20,353	25,665	20,435	18,416	19,553
Suicide	575	658	653	681	708
Accident	NA	63	86	81	69
Undefined	NA	91	105	121	NA

Source: Grupo de Estadístico del INML y CFI

In contrast to Kenya and East Timor, Colombian authorities maintain meticulous statistics on virtually all manifestations of violence. According to authoritative government sources over 80 per cent of all homicides are a result of common criminality or "delinquency". More controversially, the same sources claim that only 8-10 per cent attributable to "political violence". Furthermore, between 50 and 70 per cent of all violent deaths are purported to occur in state capitals, whether as a result of criminal groups, delinquency or armed factions. This is not surprising, given that over 70 per cent of Colombia's population dwell in cities. According to one ballistics expert with Colombian intelligence, "the revolver, the .38 special, kills the most people in Colombia". It is also widely believed that actual armed confrontations between military actors are relatively rare - though a high number of deaths among guerrilla, police and army actors do occur. There are clearly exceptions to the rule.

In the towns of Turbo and Apartado, in Uraba, the homicide rates are exceedingly high (by Colombian standards) - in the latter, exceeding 1,000 per 100,000 (among young males) between 1994-1996 and declining somewhat over the past five years. In the cities of Puerto Asis, Caicedo and Guamez (El Hormiga), in Putumayo, the homicide rates in urban regions were 770, 1247 and 1908 per 100,000 (among males) respectively during 1999 (Box 4). According to the records of a single diocese in Puerto Asis, a town with a population of 15,000, there were 27 politically motivated killings registered in a single week in mid-1998; the local Church registered some 92 funerals resulting from political assassinations in 2000 alone.

While firearm homicide rates have remained relatively stable over the last five years (average of about 20,000 per annum) – the modalities and profile of victims are changing. First, the number of child and youth deaths resulting from gunshot wounds is rising (8-10 per cent per year). Of the total number of

people killed from firearms between 1998-1999 – 30 per cent were between the ages of 15-24, 27 per cent between 25-34.[54] According to most national sources consulted, including UNICEF and ICRC, this represents a significant change from previous years (*see Figure 6*).[55]

Figure 6. Violent Firearm Deaths in Colombia: 1999

Age	Homicide	Accident	Suicide
Less than 18	1,333	58	16
18-24	5,495	225	18
25-34	6,223	193	11
35-44	3,662	87	10
Gender			
Male	18,351	626	60
Female	1,202	82	9
Total	**19,533**	**708**	**69**

Source: Medicina Legale, 2000a

Second, the incidence of "selective" assassinations throughout Colombia is rising dramatically – ranging from massacres of entire families to individual killings of (suspected) sympathizers and "delinquents". Some regions, notably Uraba, are experiencing a shift from collective killings to single, selective targeting of individuals. As a result, the national media has frequently interpreted the declining rate of massacres to a "calming" of the situation. This ultimately renders a false impression of "peace" in regions such as Uraba and Putumayo – though social cleansing and assassinations of community leaders, indigenous people, IDPs and trade-union groups persist unabated. All those deemed to be "unfit" by various armed groups have been killed including drug-dealers, prostitutes, street children and "undesirables".[56] It is widely agreed that virtually all massacres and "political killings" are committed with illegally acquired firearms.

Third, it is widely accepted that the level of aggression with which murders are being committed is intensifying. The use of "terror" as a weapon has been popularized in the last three years. Armed intimidation (or threats backed up with targeted violence) is frequently employed to clear land of people and "cleanse" populations. According to the Ombudsman's office (Defensoria de Pueblo), a 50 per cent increase has occurred in the number mass killings in 1999 as compared to 1998 – with up to 70 per cent committed by paramilitary groups.[57] Of serious concern, indigenous groups, numbering some 720,000 (less than 0.1 per cent of the population) are frequently caught in the crossfire and deliberately attacked. Regarded as "more organised" in their collective action than many campesinos they are seen to represent a latent threat to armed actors.

Finally, there is a perceptible growth of women in irregular and non-state service. It is estimated that approximately five per cent of guerrillas are women and that they are used to infiltrate guerrilla networks on behalf of paramilitary groups. Glossy images of scantily clad women brandishing automatic rifles are also used by paramilitary forces (e.g. as billboards or advertisements) to encourage recruitment among both sexes. On the other hand, there is also a visible increase in the numbers of widows and orphans throughout Colombia; the proliferation of local support groups represents one proxy indicator. The changing nature of household composition has long-term implications for societal well-being and the economic earning potential of families. The "generational" implications of repeated acts of violence on children are obvious. The inculcation of children into "cultures of violence" ensures that armed violence is systemic and sustained from one generation to the next. The implications are

Box 4. Homicide in Putumayo - The Most Dangerous Place on the Planet?

Putumayo registers one of the highest rates of homicide in the country – though the killings are concentrated in the lower part of the state – particularly urban centres. Homicide rates among young men (ages - 15-34) in Puerto Asis, Caicedo and Guamez (El Hormiga) are 770, 1247 and 1910 per 100,000 respectively. An estimated 99 per cent of all homicides and selective massacres are committed with firearms – both pistols and automatic weapons. According to the Puerto Asis' mayor's office, approximately 80 per cent of the bodies show signs of torture – with hands tied behind the back, bullets in the temple, or letters left on the forehead". The motives governing homicide are often difficult to discern. It is often impossible to determine whether any given "selective" killing is a product of politics, delinquency, narco-trafficking, a personal grievance or unpaid debt. According to all sources consulted – most killings are politically motivated – that is to say, they are generated by the conflict. Indeed, they represent the reverse of the national trend – with 80 per cent of killings attributed to "political reasons" and less than 10 per cent to "delinquency".

A study prepared by the Department of Health noted that in 1995, with a homicide rate of 1080 for a population of 254,159, one could speak of Putumayo as "como una de las zonas mas violentas del planeta" (Departamento Administrativo de Salud de Putumayo, 1999: 5). Armed violence has taken on epidemic proportions. Epidemiological data suggests that well over 60 per cent of all deaths in the region are attributed to violent death. Indeed, there is little respect for age, sex or profession – though a majority of the deaths recorded constitute men between the ages of 15-40. One health study notes that men are approximately 12 times more likely to be killed than woman (Departamento Administrativo de Salud, 2000).

far from abstract. Following an interview with community representatives, one child, only four years old, after seeing vultures circling above the city, pointed north and said "there are dead people over there".

East Timor

It is unclear what percentage of murders in East Timor during 1999 was caused directly by firearms. The number of deaths resulting from the violence unleashed by the Indonesian National Army (TNI for Tentara Nacional Indonesia) and the Indonesian-controlled militias in East Timor during 1999 is believed to be around 1,000. The UN is continuing to investigate reported gravesites, exhume bodies, and undertake forensic work in an effort to document human rights violations and bring the perpetrators to justice. However, many bodies will never be retrieved, including those reportedly dumped into the sea. It is also known that many victims were killed with knives, machetes, swords, bows and arrows. Arson also resulted in several fatalities.

However, there are many eyewitness accounts that underscore the central role firearms played in the carnage, even if such weapons were not the direct cause of death. For example, the UN International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (ICIET) report on gross human rights violations during the months preceding the Popular Consultation and its immediate aftermath provides a glimpse of the methods and means by which the militias and their supporters operated. ICIET conducted more than 170 interviews throughout East Timor during November and December 1999. The following accounts are largely taken from the ICIET report.

A common practice was for shots to be fired at random or in the air to terrorise people and make them flee their homes. As mentioned below, tens of thousands fled to the protection of the hills. Others sought refuge in buildings such as prominent persons' homes, churches, or police stations. The militias, having succeeded in cornering their victims, would then enter the building or the premises, begin randomly shooting or throwing grenades [58], and then use knives, machetes and homemade weapons. On 6 April 1999 at the church in Liquica, for example, eyewitnesses report that militia and Indonesian army personnel went on a shooting spree in and around the church, where several hundred IDPs had sought a safe haven. People were killed by bullets and knives, and some were mutilated.[59] On 17 April, militias attacked the house of Manuel Carrascalao, a former member of the East Timorese Assembly,

at which more than 100 people had gathered for protection. Carrascalao's 17-year-old son was among those killed that night, which have been reported to number between 12 to as many as 30. On 6 September at the church in Suai, at least 26 people were killed principally with guns and grenades, but machetes were also used and people suffered from burns when the church was set afire.

According to several eyewitness accounts, a common practice was for an attack to take the form of three concentric circles with the militia comprising the innermost circle, Indonesian police forming the second circle, and the Indonesian army forming the outer circle. Both the police and the army were customarily equipped with side arms and rifles. On 8 September, around 100 militia members entered the police station in Maliana where some 6,000 East Timorese had sought protection. The militia killed using machetes, but outside the church behind the marauding militia were armed Indonesian police and soldiers. Forty-seven bodies believed to have been victims in this attack were later recovered in a nearby river.

The militia operated throughout East Timor's 13 districts. However, it appears that the heaviest casualties were inflicted near the border with West Timor, particularly in Bobonaro and Covalima districts. Given the concentration of people and political activity, Dili also experienced numerous casualties due to militia-instigated violence. Pockets of the country appear to have escaped widespread or indiscriminate intimidation and attacks, but it is difficult to document this with any precision. Empirically, the fact that parts of Baucau, for example, were for the most part unscathed during the destruction and looting after the Popular Consultation suggests that certain influential individuals were able to protect their areas of interest. Whether this degree of protection covered people as well as things is unclear.

There is much anecdotal evidence that independence supporters in particular and young men in general bore the brunt of the casualties, with young women singled out for sexual violence. Several UN staff members who served in East Timor during the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) report that that independence-activists were routinely harassed and sometimes killed. Some observers have commented after visiting refugee camps in West Timor that there appear to be relatively few young men among the population there. If true, this might support accusations that young men were specifically targeted. A doctoral student focusing on the issue has coined the term “gendercide” to underscore the scope of what he believes to have taken place.[60] According to an East Timorese NGO that promotes human rights and women's issues, militia members committed a higher rate of rapes and sexual assaults during the period leading up to the Popular Consultation and immediately following it, than had the TNI during the Indonesian occupation.

However, as is clear from bodies recovered from the Suai massacre, children and elderly were also targeted. According to forensic experts, of the 26 known victims (perhaps half as many as were killed during the attack), 15 were male, 8 were female and three were of undetermined sex. Their ages varied greatly: one was a child, two were in their teens, six were in their teens to mid-twenties, 12 were middle-aged, two were elderly, and three were of undetermined age.

Since the arrival of the UN-authorized International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) on 20 September 1999, there have been very few incidents of gunshot wounds and firearm-induced violence in East Timor. Fears that the multi-national force would incur and inflict significant casualties did not materialise. In July and August 2000 perhaps 150 militia members infiltrated East Timor, resulting in a number of attacks against UN peacekeeping forces. Two peace-keeping personnel ("Blue Helmets") died as a result. It is believed that the vast majority has since returned to West Timor, although the UN Border Control Unit acknowledges that it has reason to believe that small numbers of militia continue to routinely cross into East Timor.[61]

The claim that small arms are not currently being used in East Timor is borne out by hospital records. As of mid-January 2001, the country's largest medical facility, the ICRC-run hospital in Dili, had not registered anyone with a gunshot wound since February 2000. The MSF-run hospital in Baucau, the second-largest hospital, has yet to treat anyone with a gunshot wound. The hospitals in Maliana and Suai, run by Healthnet International and Medecins de Monde respectively, each report to have admitted only one individual suffering from a gunshot wound during the last six months or so. Militia members were reported to have been the perpetrators in both cases. In neither instance did the patient die (although it is understood that another victim who was not treated at the hospital died of injuries sustained in one of the attacks). UN-run hospitals and medical facilities report that they have not treated many civilians with gunshot wounds.[62]

Forced Displacement: Fleeing from Armed Violence

Conventional wisdom suggests that refugee and IDP flows provide a general, if imperfect, proxy for small arms availability and use. Though this may be partly true in some contexts - the hypothesis must be treated with a measure of caution. It is important to carefully appraise the dynamic nature of forced displacement and involuntary resettlement and how it can vary over time. Often forgotten, neither refugees nor IDPs are a homogeneous unit. Even within a single household, not all people flee for the same reasons.[63] Moreover, it is often impossible to document or register all war-affected and displaced people in ways that correspond to their own ideas about collective identity, their livelihood strategies or migration patterns.

Nevertheless, there is an indication that refugee and IDP flows from arms-infested societies (particularly where firearm homicide rates are high) have increased over the decade (*see Figure 7*). Also as a consequence of expanding capacities, the humanitarian community - particularly UNHCR - is assisting more refugees and "people of concern" than ever before (UNHCR, 2000).[64] The forced displacement of people is endemic throughout much of conflict-affected Africa, particularly Angola, Burundi, DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and throughout the Horn. Refugee outflows from countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, also show few signs of abating in the near future. It comes as little surprise, then, that IDP flows in many of these same countries are also extremely high. Return is often made impossible by persistent threats at the site of origin (Macrae, 1999). As the following section will argue, violence-induced displacement is often triggered and sustained by the perceived threat or existence of armed threat. The casual relationship is perhaps most pronounced in situations where conflict is ongoing, though is also known to occur prior to and following from low-intensity violence and in situations of extreme inequality or poverty (e.g. underdevelopment). The humanitarian impacts of forced displacement, whether cross-border or internal, are manifold. The case of massive IDP movements in Angola over the past two years is illustrative.

The Angolan displacement crisis has been accompanied by alarming increases in indiscriminate armed violence and a serious deterioration in the medical and nutritional situation throughout the country. Confirmed in numerous UN and NGO reports, there have been over 450,000 IDPs who have moved from the countryside to provincial towns since 1998. Among the displaced population, infant and under-five mortality rates were 235 and 395 per 1,000 live births respectively - "much worse than the already catastrophic estimated national infant and under five mortality rates [166 and 292 per 1,000]" (IRIN, 2001). Though malaria remains the primary cause of child mortality, and routine immunisation coverage has fallen - "malnutrition is still the underlying factor for morbidity and mortality of children and women". Violence-induced displacement has a range of detrimental impacts affecting a broad range of entitlements, livelihoods and development more broadly. Mass displacement is known to lead to food crises: in Angola MSF has noted a 20.5 per cent global-malnutrition rate among the displaced population (MSF, 2001). Furthermore, IDPs in Angola rarely attend school in a country where less than 50 per cent of the entire school-age population is enrolled.

Figure 7. Refugee and IDP Populations

Country	Refugee Populations UNHCR, 1999	IDPs a=UNHCR,2000 b=Global IDP Database, 2000
Sudan	391,000	4,000,000a,b
Angola	13,000	1,5-2,000,000a, 2,300,000b
Colombia	230	1,800,000a, 1,900,000b
Myanmar	…	500,000-1,000.000a,b
Turkey	2,800	500,000-1,000,000a,b
Iraq	128,900	900,000a
Indonesia &East Timor	162,500	800,000b
Bosnia & Herzegovina	65,600	800,000a,b
Burundi	22,000	800,000a, 300,000b
DRC	285,000	800,000a, 1,800,000b
Russian Federation	80.100	800,000a, 600,000b
Afghanistan	…	500,000-800.000a,b
Rwanda	34,400	600,000a, 0-600,000b
Former-Yugoslavia	500,700	600,000a,b
Azerbaijan	221,600	600,000a, 500,000b
Sri Lanka	20	600,000a, 800,000b
India	180,000	500,000a,b
Sierra Leone	6,600	500,000a, 1.3b
Kenya	223,700	100,000b

Source: UNHCR (2000), USCR (2000) & IDP Survey (2000-01)

Kenya

Kenya is not typically regarded as a refugee-producing region[65]- but rather as a regional centre of "asylum". The plight of refugees and IDPs in Kenya is worsening, partly as a consequence of decreasing international support for assistance, but also as a result of growing arms use and availability in regions where refugees and IDPs are living. One of the consequences of the collapse of Somalia and the defeat of the Derg army in Ethiopia was a massive influx of declared and undeclared (self-settling) refugees into Kenya. Sudanese refugees have also moved into Kenya since the 1970s.[66] Though under-reported, there are also a large number of (economic, drought and violence-induced) IDPs in the country - recent estimates place the number at 100,000 (IDP Survey, 2000). But Kenya has had IDP crises in the past: politically inspired armed violence in the early 1990s uprooted up to 300,000 Kenyans, leaving well-over 1,500 dead.[67]

The forced migration of Ethiopians, Sudanese and Somalis into Kenya is conditioned by a number of factors (e.g. war, food insecurity and migratory patterns) - not the least of which relate to pre-existing kinship networks that transcend international frontiers. According to UNHCR, more than 600,000 refugees poured into Kenya during the early nineties. At the peak of the crisis, there were several camps in Kenya: along the Eastern coast, the Somali border as well as Dadaab[68] and Kakuma. They housed a range of nationalities - from Sudanese Dinka, Ethiopian Oromo and Somalis to Burundian Tutsis, Rwandan Hutus, Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. Refugees also included ex-combatants, senior government and military officials - many of who carried arms for personal security. As a result of consistent pressure from, among others, the Kenyan government[69], there are today only 200,000-odd refugees in the country, a dramatic decline.

One of the more chilling implications of refugee flows and "temporary" resettlement in Kenya has been the militarizing effect such settlements have had on host communities. The political economy of

Figure 8. Security Incidents in Kakuma Camp



and small-scale subsistence agricultural activities. With depleted livestock resulting from armed cattle rustling, drought and rising food insecurity - UN-sanctioned settlements offered new sources of livelihood and an easy target for local grievances. From the very beginning, transactions between the new refugee and host communities were quickly problematised by armed violence. Though refugee-host exchange and barter are fundamental (even planned) components of refugee camp economies[70], they have taken on a violent tenor in Kenya's two remaining camps - Dadaab and Kakuma (*see Figure 8*). According to one Sudanese elder in Kakuma camp, "we trade many items with the outside community. These trading relationships are often marked by violence - particularly when traders are drunk, they come using guns".

Box 5. Rape in Dadaab

UNHCR officials working with the Dadaab refugee camp, located in Northeast Kenya, hired CASA Consulting in Montreal to assess the high incidence of rape of refugee women and girls in the bush around the camp while collecting firewood. Firewood is the principal cooking fuel in many parts of Africa and its collection is often the traditional responsibility of women and girls. Rape and sexual violence - either within or outside the camps - have posed a serious threat to refugee women and girls in the Dadaab camp(s) since the early 1990s - and a difficult challenge to UNHCR, with its mandate to assist and protect refugees. Between January 1998 and September 2000 alone, some 300 rapes and attempted rapes have been documented among registered refugees - with vast majority perpetrated by armed assailants.

The sheer number of armed individuals in the Dadaab area and ease of access to firearms, often brought across the nearby border with Somalia, are key contributing factors to the vulnerability of refugees within and outside the camps. Local bandits, some of whom have taken up residence within the refugee camps, are well armed, as are Somali militia who are said to frequently traverse the open border with Somalia. Refugees interviewed in the region believe that there are large numbers of firearms being stockpiled within the camps, from which point they are trafficked and sold in Nairobi and throughout Kenya. Many explain that they live in terror and are reluctant to report rape and other forms of violence, theft and extortion, for fear of reprisal from armed perpetrators.

The prevalence of firearms also conditions the reactions of women, who often leave the camps in large groups to collect firewood. In approximately 75 per cent of all reported incidents of rape and attempted rape in Dadaab, one or more assailants were armed with a firearms. The sight of even a lone male in the bush will often cause a groups of women to scatter and run back to the camp, rather than act in each others defense: they know the chances that he is armed are high, and they dare not risk defending one from rape, if one among them could be killed. Generally, the prevalence of firearms in Dadaab presents a major obstacle to the types of community-based policing and security practices normally prescribed for the prevention of rape.

Source: contributed to the IASC study by Virginia Thomas, CASA Feb 2001

Though the literature reviewing security risks to refugees and IDPs is growing[71], it is worth focusing on a recent country-specific study to illustrate the range of threats facing refugees living in Kenya. Crisp (2000) has documented a number of security threats in and around Kenya's refugee camps. His typology alludes to five chronic insecurities. The first includes domestic and community violence common to most areas where there exists a high concentration or density of populations. He cites the example of customary punitive systems - such as a locally administered prison in Kakuma camp, as one example of localized potential for violence.

A second, if potentially related, type of insecurity relates to sexual abuse and violence - particularly armed violence targeted at women collecting firewood (*see Box 5*). According to one Sudanese refugee interviewed, it is "always women are collecting wood, these are home-activities ... they are expected to be the ones that collect wood … But Kakuma is very dangerous and they have great exposure to danger". Though elders have advised women to stay within the camp, they admit that the issue has not been adequately addressed; women are still expected to prepare food for the family. In recognition of the real threats outside of the camps, refugee leaders have pushed UNHCR into providing fuel-wood for families. But frustration is mounting among refugee communities because UNHCR lacks resources to continue administering the initiative.[72]

A third form of insecurity relates to armed robbery between refugees and also theft committed by locals against refugees. According to statistics accumulated during the consultant's visit to Kakuma there are between 10-15 armed robberies committed each month. During periods of adversity such as the dry season, there are, according to Crisp's report, "up to one serious incident per night". As *Figure 9* above indicates, the range of insecurities is vast - among refugees, locally hired police and host communities. A fourth risk relates to intra-factional violence between refugee groups. Such violence often occurs between former combatants or rival tribes in a bid to settle old scores and can occur in even the most benign circumstances. During the consultants visit, for example, members of the various Dinka communities fought each other (with clubs and sticks) following an organized celebration – resulting in some 66 injuries - six of them critical. The obvious despair of one Sudanese elder was expressed thus: "we cannot share services unless we realise that the commonality of our being refugees makes us a common community".

Colombia

Four decades of armed violence has wrought catastrophe on Colombia. At present, there are Colombian refugees in each of its five neighboring countries - as well as in the USA, Canada and throughout Europe.[73] Though refugee flows wax and wane in relation to the internal conflict, there are indications that overall outflows are on the rise. In Ecuador, for example, there were reported to be between 300 and 350 refugees receiving assistance from UNHCR in 2000. By 2001, there were over 2000.[74] In Venezuela, there are approximately 800 that have sought support from UNHCR - though estimates range between 5 and 10,000 who have not declared, or been granted, official refugee status.

In Panama, there is approximately 100-500 at any given moment - though the real numbers are not known.[75] In addition to official refugee flows, there is a massive out-migration of middle and upper-class civilians - many who are leaving from urban regions on account of the direct or indirect threat of armed violence (and/or for related economic reasons). The government estimates that such flows rise to over 350,000 a year - and represent a serious blow to the GDP and human capital base of Colombian society.

Though Colombia is both a country of asylum and expulsion - it suffers acutely from a crisis of internal displacement. IDPs and refugees are pawns in a conflict where terror and armed intimidation are applied to encourage the clearance of land. Though subject to debate, estimates of the IDP population

range from 400,000 since 1996 – to 2 million since 1985 (CODHES, 2000; CONPES 3057, 1999, see Figure 9). Disputes over the 'actual' number of IDPs continue to cause tension between public entities and the non-governmental community. These arguments are due, in part, "to traditional biases associated with the motives of IDP migration, increases in collective (as opposed to individual) conflict-induced displacement, disparate approaches to data collection and the dilemmas associated with 'case identification'" (Muggah, 2000: 137). The IDP situation has been an ongoing source of concern to the international community since the mid 1990s - following visits by the Special Representative for IDPs, Francis Deng (in 1998) and other UN envoys.[76] The relationship between armed violence and displacement in Colombia is relatively straight forward - as *Figure 10* demonstrates.

Most IDP flows are from conflict-affected areas in rural areas, to crime-affected urban sites - though multiple and repeated displacement is common. The capital of Colombia, Bogotá, receives the largest number of IDPs – approximately 35 households a day. Between 1985 and 1999 – 327,500 people moved to Bogotá (62,230 households); approximately 60 per cent of those entering the city in 1999 were between the ages of one and nineteen. Such populations are dislocated from their pre-existing cultural milieu and have lost, in many cases permanently, their assets and livelihoods. As a result of their lack marketable skills and the high rate of unemployment in Bogotá (i.e. between 18 – 22.5 per cent), IDPs are frequently stigmatized by host communities.

Figure 9. IDPs in Colombia: 1985-2000



Forced displacement affects the education and health of Colombians. Displacees (particularly children) are often unable to enroll in schools (e.g. financial burden is too high, lacking academic prerequisites, etc.) and forced to enter formal and informal labor markets prematurely. According to most humanitarian and development agencies in Colombia, violence-induced internal displacement is also the cause of many illnesses. New epidemics have been observed among IDP populations that are not occurring among host communities.[77] For this reason, both ICRC and the Colombian Red Cross have begun focusing their attention on IDPs since 1995. Furthermore, the growth in urban crime and delinquency, often conducted with small arms, has been frequently attributed to IDPs - though this has yet to be proven empirically.

Figure 10. Massacres and Internal Displacement (2000)

Department (State)	Massacres	Victims	IDPs
Antioquia	103	484	35,184
Arauca	5	20	588
Atlantico	4	10	18,863
Bolivar	25	151	22,520
Boyaca	1	5	1450
Caldas	9	38	765
Caqueta	9	67	1,179
Casanere	4	23	1,905
Cauca	11	43	1,948
Cesar	32	150	5,418
Choco	1	4	8,395
Cordoba	9	43	6,307
Cundinamarca	6	23	2,055
Guajira	4	17	2,030
Guaviare	2	7	NA
Huila	5	20	6,722
Magdalena	15	74	25,520
Meta	4	21	1,964
Narino	12	39	4,248
Norte de Santander	36	239	5,831
Putumayo	10	43	2,483
Quindío	1	5	260
Risaralda	8	30	4,323
Santafe de Bogotá	12	60	19,500
Santander	20	82	3,529
Sucre	10	45	6,167
Tolima	11	40	11,104
Valle del Cauca	28	119	15,927
Total	**397**	**1902**	**228015**

Source: CTI, 2000 and CODHES, 2001

Putumayo and Uraba experience both expulsion and reception – with abandoned homes being re-colonised or occupied (i.e. asset transfers) - and others being supported in abandoned primary school facilities. According to the Personoria's office – an estimated 80 per cent of the Putumayo population has been at one time or another displaced by armed violence – and many are predicting more IDPs and refugees as the Colombian government and US-sanctioned fumigation programmes that make up part of "Plan Colombia" are still only in the nascent stages (Loughna & Muggah, 2000). According to the municipal government, in 2000 alone, some 20 per cent of primary school students dropped out of school because of their violent displacement. Worryingly, many teachers are also leaving – often forced to abandon their homes and professions as a result of direct intimidation (*see section on Entitlements*).[78]

According to the national welfare agency (RSS), the state is caring for some 4000 IDPs in Putumayo – though it remains unclear to what extent these people are receiving assistance. Urban IDPs are reluctant to seek sanctuary in rural areas because they are regarded as collaborators with the AUC. On the other hand, rural IDPs are unable to move into urban regions lest they be singled-out as guerrilla sympathisers. As a result – many expulsions go unreported or, individuals are simply unable to flee.

Furthermore, IDPs that are wounded or ill are frequently unable to secure aid or health services in medical hospitals or clinics because the facilities themselves are perceived to be paramilitary enclaves or are too expensive for IDPs.[79]

Violence-induced displacement is also affecting the education and health of IDPs in Uraba. The influx of IDPs into two municipalities - Atrado and Turbo - has overwhelmed local public services. In 2000, ICRC supported 6,000 IDPs, or an estimated 80 per cent of the new "caseload" of IDPs in the region (ICRC, 2000c). Even prior to their arrival, services were described by the Head of the Sub Delegation as "woefully inadequate". There are only three public hospitals and a few private clinics in the entire region - facilities that are supposed to service some 400,000 residents. The hospitals reportedly lack even the most basic materials and goods; one ICRC delegate claimed in despair that there were "no needles to deal with patients ... nothing at all". Furthermore, as detailed in the subsequent section, health workers are terrified to operate in a region where perceived collaborators are killed with impunity.

East Timor

Unlike other conflicts in which natural disasters contribute in whole or in part to forced displacement of people, in East Timor during 1999 the cause can be linked almost exclusively to the presence and use of small arms. Numerous eyewitness accounts and testimonials speak of the central role that guns played in uprooting tens of thousands of East Timorese from their homes and their communities in the months preceding the Popular Consultation. Credible reports record that militia-instigated violence resulted in 40-60,000 East Timorese IDPs during this period. In the weeks after the vote, more than 250,000 people, the vast majority of them abducted or forced at gunpoint to load boats or trucks, became refugees in West Timor. Another 300,000 fled to the hills. More than half of the East Timorese population were forcibly displaced from their homes in the days and weeks following the elections.

Those East Timorese who were internally displaced fared relatively well. The situation concerning IDPs in East Timor is perhaps unique in that they were able to return to their homes or their communities within weeks and months, rather than years or decades, as is so often the case. Subsequently only 3,000 IDPs from the Districts of Bobonaro and Covalima were recorded in East Timor. They left their homes during July and August 2000 as a result of increased militia infiltration from West Timor. By September 2000 most IDPs had returned after the situation had quieted down.

A confluence of events resulted in a suddenly- and vastly-improved security situation, the likes of which are not likely to be replicated elsewhere. The Government of Indonesia, acknowledging that it could not uphold law and order, asked the United Nations for assistance and agreed to withdraw its troops from the territory. The Security Council quickly authorised a multi-national force with a robust mandate under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Australia, a country with sufficient military assets and force projection to undertake the mission, agreed to lead the MNF. The most relevant political organisation in the region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), just happened to be meeting at the time plans for the force were being negotiated, which substantially facilitated obtaining the necessary political support for the initiative.

In the weeks after the vote, more than 250,000 people, the vast majority of them abducted or forced at gunpoint to load boats or trucks, became refugees in West Timor.

Still, it will take years for many of these people to rebuild their lives. Some lost their homes and everything they owned. Others returned to find that what few valuables they possessed had been looted. Families were separated, and many have yet to be reunited. Ultimately, the internal displacement of the population during 1999-2000 compounds the 25 years of oppression and deterioration of families, and East Timorese culture more generally, experienced during Indonesian occupation.

The experience of the East Timorese forced to take refuge in West Timor has been much more severe, and the situation is likely to deteriorate further. Tens of thousands of refugees live in squalid conditions, discussed in greater detail below. Eyewitness accounts confirm that militia in the camps have threatened to use, and on more than one occasion have used, firearms to dissuade refugees from returning, which the militias know would reduce their influence. While the militias' control is considerable, it is not absolute, and approximately 175,000 East Timorese have returned home since September 1999. However, fewer than 5,000 had returned since the murder in September 2000 of UNHCR staff members, which led to the suspension of operations and the evacuation of all UN staff. UNHCR believes that between 80-120,000 East Timorese refugees remain in West Timor. The prevailing climate of insecurity suggests the UN will not return any time soon.

Declining Access to Basic Needs: Endowments and Entitlements

There are a rash of new studies that assess the high financial burden associated with the treatment and care of victims of firearm-related violence, related costs to property and assets and concomitant public expenditures on security and justice.[80] One of the aims of this study, however, is to move beyond broad-brush macro-perspectives - and to identify a series of micro-level impacts of small arms on households and individuals. One way of evaluating the impacts of small arms on households and individuals would relate to "endowments" and "entitlements".[81] Endowments are the rights and resources that people have in principle - such as land, labour and skills. Endowments, in the following section, are confined to public health services and education. These social rights, so often taken for granted in peaceful societies, are often lacking in war-affected societies plagued by small arms. Indeed, the spread of small arms can also create a climate of insecurity that may inhibit or discourage people from going to school or work, or participate in public life - and affects the fundamental human rights of individuals.[82] What is more, the "quality" of services often plummets dramatically - affecting the human capital base and human development of entire communities. Vulnerable groups are often the casualties, as reduced access to health facilities results in precipitous decline in health indicators.

Box 6. Children and Guns

Much attention has been focused on the role of children (less than 18) in formal and informal military service. According to the Coalition to Ban the Use of Children in Armed Conflict, guns are in the hands of as many as 300,000 children under the age of 16 in 25 countries. According to one background paper prepared for the Machel (2000) report, child soldiers are "more obedient, do not question orders and are easier to manipulate than adult soldiers." For the last 10 years what has occurred is the systematic use of children on a very large scale. And it's developing very, very fast." But the impacts of small arms and children are vast, and go far beyond child soldiering. Indeed, the availability and use of small arms have severe inter-generational implications for the productivity and security of societies.

There are reasons why the consideration of small arms is intrinsic to any discussion of children in conflict or post-conflict situations. The M-16, the AK-47, the G-3, the AR-15 and the Arma-Lite rifle, weapons that, as this report notes, are found in Kenya, Colombia and East Timor, weigh about 8 pounds. With a light squeeze of the trigger, they fire a burst of bullets that travel at more than 900 yards per second and can punch a fist-sized hole in human flesh. For many children that squeeze of the trigger is their first sensation of power, identity and belonging. In Colombia, for example, young children (and potential recruits for paramilitaries or guerrilla groups) are seduced by the gun and see it as a source of status and privilege.

On the one hand, guns are inexpensive and toy-like in their simplicity. In countries impoverished by war or underdevelopment - there is a strong economic incentive luring children into armed gangs or organised military factions. For example, in Colombia and Kenya, children joining particular gangs in urban centres are often able to earn up to the equivalent of $US 100 for every policeman killed. There is, however, a tremendous amount of ignorance among young recruits - many of these children lack an education or a clear understanding of what they are fighting for. One Colombian priest described this as "painting birds in the sky". The implications of this naivety are devastating. As soldiers, children are often considered the most expendable: during the Iran-Iraq war, child soldiers were sent out ahead in waves over minefields" and Sierra Leonean children are often severely abused, drugged and raped (Machel, 2000).

The term 'entitlements', on the other hand, does not refer to people's rights in a normative sense – what people *should* have – but the range of possibilities that people can have.[83] The entitlements approach represents a framework through which individuals' command over trade, production, labour and inheritance (or transfers) can be assessed. Entitlements are obviously context-dependent, dynamic and vary over time - a measure of potential outcomes given the initial endowment set and depending on the actual constraints and opportunities available to a given actor (Dreze & Sen, 1989). Calculating the humanitarian impacts of small arms-related violence on household or individual "endowments" and "entitlements" is an imprecise science.

According to UNDP, trade-based entitlements relate to the lawful ownership and transactions of traded resources (UNDP, 2001). Legal or illegal possession of small arms are often strong predicators of armed robbery, intimidation and death - all of which upset the social and legal transactions upon which trade is negotiated. Production entitlements are those assets that one acquires through the use of their own resources, or resources hired from willing parties. As with trade-based entitlements, small arms can be used to illegally acquire production entitlements, or indirectly affect the value or worth of the resources. Labour entitlements include self-labour - and the rights associated with ownership of trade-based or production-based resources. Individuals affected directly by small arms use (e.g. homicide victims, widows, or temporarily and permanently injured), are obviously at risk of losing their labour entitlements. Finally, inheritance and transfer entitlements relates to those assets voluntarily given from one person to another (provided they are legitimately owned by the original party) with the possibility of such an exchange occurring after the original owner's death. A primary example of the way small arms use relates to the loss of inheritance entitlements is violence or conflict-induced displacement - where land registration, cultural property and all manner of assets are often lost, sometimes forever.

In some cases, the gun itself provides access to entitlements - particularly if one assesses the alternative sets of utilities derived from the weapon. For example, armed robbery represents an (illegitimate) acquisition or (informal) transfer-based entitlement. The future sale of the weapon could be construed as an "interest-earned saving" based entitlement. In this sense, due to the long-life of the particular weapon - it can be passed on from generation to generation - gaining or losing value according to the particular context in which the weapon is exchanged. Further, the status derived from ownership or possession constitutes a social value in itself - endowing the actor with various capabilities, including capital accumulation, prestige, and the (unlawful) ability to satisfy basic needs through the informal and formal markets. This phenomenon has been observed again and again, particularly among youth (child soldiers), young, frequently unemployed men, and those suffering from "economic apartheid" (*see Box 6*). For example, a Congolese document prepared by entity charged with ensuring a ceasefire confirms that " ... la quasi totalité des jeunes ex-miliciens veulent de l'emploi. Le chômage est la cause principal de la guerre Congolo-Congolaise" (Comite Exécutif, 2000:3). The use of small arms by children also undermines long-term development and the social cohesion of communities - due to the generational impacts of "cultures of violence".

Kenya

The availability and use of small arms has had severe macro-economic and micro-economic effects on the Kenyan population. Combined with the worst drought in over 50 years, armed violence has contributed to decreased agricultural carrying capacity and productivity (e.g. as people are migrating from violence prone regions).[84] Armed insecurity has effectively obstructed local and national trading systems and infrastructure, and contributed to a reduction in investment over the past decade. The dramatic fall in tourism and foreign-direct investment (FDI) are testament to the declines in security. Public services are indirectly affected due to the shift in government spending from development to mechanisms attempting to contain violence - all of which contributes to the declining “endowment-set" of Kenyan citizens. This gradual process of unravelling has been otherwise described as the "emerging dysfunction of the state".

Box 7. Oral testimony: UNICEF Informant

"On February 17th, 1990, Toposos raided Turkanese near Lokichokkio ... killing civilians. A primary school was attacked with ten primary students killed - they were told to enter a hole in the ground and shot on the spot with hole sealed up immediately after. People were stripped naked, property stolen, communications equipment looted and four relief workers killed on the Kenyan compound. The years between 1991 and 1994 were bad. Civilian populations were at risk - with more and more attacks on escort vehicles. The slaughtering of children [in Loki] has made families keep their children from attending schools. As a result, all of the schools have clustered around this [UNICEF-OLS] and other UN compounds. These developments have occurred over the last five years."

At the micro-economic level, the effects of small arms availability and use on livelihoods and entitlements have been disastrous. Public goods to which Kenyan citizens have basic rights, such as schooling and health, have, in many cases, collapsed. Primary and secondary schools established in the interior some twenty years ago have been long-since abandoned (*see Box 7*). Literacy and school enrolment rates in arms-affected regions (particularly in rural areas) are far below the national average. There are virtually no health centres, health clinics, or sub-district hospitals in the interior – putting at greater risk those already injured and the long-term health of civilians. Dispensaries and operational clinics, where still staffed, are difficult to access. NGOs and mission services have, in some cases, attempted to fill the gap. But with approximately three-quarters of Kenya out of government control - it is a “no mans land … (there are) no hospitals, no primary schools, no clinics … the government presence is totally absent in Lokichokkio and the Turkana region”.[85] In essence, the resulting constraints on mobility and basic endowments constitute a fundamental risk to entitlements.

Among the predominantly pastoral population of northern Kenya, legally and illegally acquired small arms have affected every aspect of their rural livelihoods. Of particular concern, are the impacts of small arms on production and inheritance (or transfer) entitlements. For example, among the Karamojong - a tribal group that straddles the Ugandan-Kenyan border, small arms have been used for the past 20 years during cross border cattle-rustling raids. Prior to the introduction of semi and automatic rifles to the region, relatively small-scale raiding was conducted with spears, clubs and knives (Hendrickson et al, 1999; 1998). The cow, described as “the centre of the Karamojong value system, and cattle rustling as way of life … for men who need the animals for dowry”, remains a source of constant conflict (Borzello, 2001). Though the gun is not the cause of the raiding per se, it has clearly increased the scale and breadth of killing - and theft. But mass murder and theft have long-term implications beyond the tragedy associated with firearm-related mortality.

Large-scale theft and bloodshed, made possible by the abundance of small arms, has undermined the livelihood strategies and food security (i.e. production entitlements) of sedentary and pastoral communities. As in Uganda, due to constant raiding[86] from pastoral tribes, subsistence farmers are increas-

ingly forced to rely on hoes, rather than cattle, for crop production. Planting and harvest schedules are disrupted by violence - with armed pastoralists grazing their livestock on cultivated land. The global acreage under cultivation, then, is declining rapidly. What is more, future crop reserves are destroyed leaving the population without seeds for cultivation in subsequent seasons. Among pastoral populations that raid between one another, generations of cattle - and therefore subsistence food sources - are severely reduced. In addition, customary institutions, such as marriage contracts, dowry systems and barter economies, are shattered. In all of these ways, production, trade and inheritance entitlements of civilians are undermined. According to one Sudanese refugee, “we used to marry with cows. There are no cows. I don’t know where we are exactly - no cows do not mean we have rejected the system - we are between systems. We marry on contract - but it is unclear when the cows will be transferred”.

Though many pastoral groups do not like the effect guns have on their lives, this does not necessarily imply that they are prepared to give up the weapons. Indeed, the risks to their collective entitlements remain high. Common property resources essential to their way of life, such as water points and wells, have been abandoned and are no longer used for fear of armed attack. Such sites were and remain critical for pastoral groups along migratory routes. Those that are still used are rarely maintained and their infrastructure (e.g. boreholes, pipes, etc.) is collapsing. Perversely, efforts to ensure maintenance are made impossible due to the high level of insecurity in the region.[87] As a result, analysts believe that disarmament programmes in the region must be heavily complimented by assurances of security and livelihood amelioration. According to one observer "long-term development programmes are required to provide sustainable alternatives ... and attempts to remove arms from the communities [pastoralists] must be initiated simultaneously ... and complimented by similar activities in at least three countries Sudan, Uganda and Kenya".[88]

Colombia

Small arms affect every aspect of Colombian life - and there are no shortages of indigenous studies that measure their impacts. If one accepts that the majority of violent deaths in the country are attributed to firearms, for example, it is possible to measure the indirect impacts of arms availability and use on national labor productivity. For example, measured by disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) - a health indicator that measures the impacts of deaths on population labor productivity - firearm injuries cost Colombians the equivalent of $US 5.5 billion between 1991-1996 (Presidencia de la Republica, 1999: 35). Between 1998-1999 – the DALY rate was an estimated $US 1.4 billion (Medicinas Legale, 2000b). Other macro-economic impacts attributable to the presence of armed actors and the ready availability of illicit small arms relate to lowered corporate transactions, declining international and domestic commercial activity, shrinking investments in human capital and reduced agricultural productivity (Tovar, 2000). For example, food supplies are growing scarce (and of poorer quality) as the guerrillas are regulating supply and demand of certain foodstuffs. According to the Colombian government, a fragile situation exists wherein price rises and inflation are imminent. It comes as little surprise, then, that the endowment set of Colombians is threatened by the use of small arms.

As in Kenya, public services for rural areas are in short supply – and the reliable provision of electricity, telecommunication services and potable water are limited. Educational and health-related services are also inadequate to meet the needs of rural populations. As a result of both inadequate resources and armed intimidation of teachers and doctors perceived to be collaborating with one side or another, many professionals are fleeing arms-affected areas (see Box 8). Predictably, there are large zones of the country where people have no access to health care or services as a result of armed insecurity.[89] Illnesses in arms-affected areas are increasingly being attributed to lack of medical penetration and restrictions of civilian movement. Given the inaccessibility and destruction of health facilities; the deterioration of sanitation services and refuse collection in insecure areas and; the tangible declines in cleanliness of food markets - the possibilities for health declines are tremendous.

Box 8. Violations of Human Rights in Colombia

Disappearances: Centro de Investigacion Nacional Popular (CINEP) reported 309 cases of "forced disappearance" during the first 9 months of 1999.

Violence Against Civilians and Detainees: Torture and other forms of inhumane or degrading treatment are frequently underreported. Prison violence is endemic – 80 per cent of deaths in jails are from small arms smuggled into prisons (between 100-150 convicts killed a year).

Hostage Taking: Some 2,946 cases of hostage taking were reported in 1999 by the foundation Pais Libre. This represents an increase of 25 per cent since 1998. Trends are worsening. Approximately 1000 cases were reported to the ministry of Justice in the first four months of 2000.

Indiscriminate or Terrorist Attacks: According to CINEP and Justicia y Paz, 19 cases of terrorism were reported in 1999. In addition, an estimated 70,000 landmines are scattered across 105 municipalities in 21 of Colombia's states. In 1998, 255 landmine incidents were reported – about 50 per cent of whom died from their wounds.

Though a combination of many additional factors, much of Colombia is increasingly susceptible to epidemics.[90] For example, due to the violence resulting from fumigation and crop-destruction programmes, and armed conflict between two paramilitary factions and the five components of the FARC south block, vaccination coverage in Putumayo rates among the lowest in the country.[91] There are similar trends throughout much of Uraba – where outbreaks of small pox, yellow fever, hepatitis B and tuberculosis in arms affected areas have been noted.

Like Kenya, Colombia is undergoing severe climatic pressures affecting the production of agriculture (though not necessarily subsistence production) in some regions and present confounding variables in assessing the secondary impacts of small arms on production entitlements.[92] Nevertheless, at the household level, the abandonment, theft and or disposal of key income earning assets (e.g. land and livestock) following armed violence and forced displacement presents an immediate threat to production entitlements. Predictably, declining production entitlements also affect (informal) trade entitlements reducing the possibility of vulnerable groups from eventually exchanging assets for other commodities. In this way, the terms of trade decline rapidly in areas where the costs of arms are high.

For example, a recent armed blockade in the Departamentos of Putumayo, Huila and Narino - between October and December 2000 – severely affected the regional and local economies and the civilian population. As a result of the blockade, gasoline prices soared six fold – from a low price of 2,000 pesos ($US 1) to 12,000 pesos ($US 6) per gallon.[93] As the majority of inter-household and individual economic exchanges (e.g. transfer entitlements) take place in the informal sector (e.g. small-scale vegetable markets, street stalls and vendors), the paralysis of the formal market profoundly affected all other transactions. Those in a position to leave the department did so, with or without the support of the Colombian armed forces and subsidised plane travel. Rumours persist that the blockade may be resumed – because, in the words of the Mayor of Puerto Asis – "the guerrillas have free reign, they can do whatever they want; it is a culture of impunity". According to local church-based organisations, the passion for weapons combined with "el ambition por el plata" (ambition for money) has massive long-term social effects on youth.[94] Ironically, however, increases in narco-trafficking and arms availability has run parallel with a decline in common street crime and a growth of Churches in the regions most affected by armed violence.

Counter-intuitively, small arms availability and use is not always directly correlated with analogously high rates of "conventional" crime in Colombia. For example, in a number of acute conflict zones, crime (e.g. such as petty theft, prostitution, drug use, etc.) is rare. Indeed, there appears to be little

crime in Apartado or Puerto Asis – but rather, a form of "rough justice", as all those considered by armed actors to be undesirable - simply “disappear” (*see section on Mortality and Injury*). But private or informally administered "security" has its costs. Indeed, civilians are coerced into compromising a number of basic endowments, such as mobility, the right to land and access to health and education services. In Uraba, for example, these constraints manifest themselves in the guise of armed intimidation of local farmers, repeated searches by armed actors at roadblocks and outright “controls on the way people live”.[95] Paramilitaries have also been known to impose limitations on the amount of money locals are permitted to carry[96] so as to limit “suspected support for guerrillas”.

Guerrillas do the same - though they rarely limit their controls to hard currency - extending prohibitions to basic food items such as salt (e.g. regarded as a preservative for food) and household goods such as kerosene and gasoline. Those who do not comply are physically threatened and harassed or killed outright. All of these confiscated liberties are provided ostensibly for the sake of “security” in the areas they occupy. The obvious question remains: security for whom and by whom? The privatization of security and culture of impunity has profound implications at many levels - particularly when considering questions of governance and democracy.

The impacts of small arms on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the freedom of political association and thought, are disconcerting (*see Box 8*). Colombia registers the highest number of “political” assassinations in the world. In 1990 alone, three presidential candidates were assassinated in quick succession - Luis Carlos Galan, Bernardo Jaramillo and Carlos Piarro. Selective violence and intimidation against political candidates from the municipal to the federal levels persist. According to government statistics, 12 mayors were shot dead along with 22 public officers in the 1999-election campaign. An additional 121 kidnappings and 14 armed-attacks against registration offices also took place. With all parties on the spectrum affected - 920 candidates retracted their candidacy in order to preserve the lives of themselves and their families.[97]

East Timor

As the influx of small arms in East Timor was short-lived and very recent, its long-term effects are still unclear. The apparent lack of comprehensive and useful statistics severely complicates any analysis. Certainly, with more than half of the population displaced during September 1999 and much of the territory’s infrastructure destroyed and property looted, people’s endowments and entitlements were severely restricted or curtailed. However, swift and generous international assistance and the size and scope of INTERFET and UNTAET have helped avert another major humanitarian catastrophe in East Timor. The situation for East Timorese languishing in West Timor, however, continues to deteriorate.

At the outset it should be noted that several factors, besides small arms-related insecurity, had a negative effect on East Timorese access to various endowments. Many Indonesian civil servants, doctors and teachers working in East Timor were not particularly enthusiastic about being posted there. They therefore saw a pro-independence vote as reason for them to return home, a sentiment Jakarta may not have discouraged. Also, a growing sense of nationalism among the East Timorese made non-ethnic East Timorese uncomfortable. Many doctors, teachers and public servants left not because of the threat that small arms posed or at the behest or the acquiescence of Jakarta, but rather because of intimidation on the part of East Timorese.

A culture of violence is one of the legacies of 24 years of Indonesian occupation and abuse.

The recruitment of children to serve in the Indonesian army, the militias, or with FALINTIL does not appear to have been undertaken on a large scale. UNICEF has contracted Lyndal Barry, a journalist with many years’ experience in the region, to conduct interviews throughout East Timor for a study on East Timorese children involved in armed conflict, which will focus on both FALINTIL and the militias.

The report's first draft was recently submitted, and the paper will be shared with the IASC when it is published later this year. According to Barry (2000), children under 18 - and some as young as 14 - were commonly recruited to serve in the militias. Another report mentions that at least in Bobonaro District, East Timorese as young as 17 years of age were recruited for the Indonesian-trained militias.[98] It appears that after the November 1991 massacre in Dili, FALINTIL stepped up its recruitment efforts, which may have included children less than 18 years of age. There does not appear, however, to have been any special recruitment of children (or adults) in advance for the Popular Consultation. Indeed, FALINTIL made a special effort to canton its troops and refrain from military activity in the months prior to the vote.

The lack of large numbers of child soldiers does not diminish the huge impact that recruitment for the militias had on East Timorese society. Tens of thousands of young men were either enticed to join the militias for material gain or self-preservation. They left their studies, their jobs, their fields, and their families. Those who successfully ran from the militias suffered similar dislocation from endowments and entitlements, but without experiencing any of the "benefits" that came from gun ownership as highlighted above. The forced taking of drugs by young men in the militia has been documented along with its short-term effects of making them into crazed killing machines.[99] The long-term effects of the introduction of drugs on these young men and on East Timorese society are unclear, but deserve greater study.

The vast destruction of houses and buildings has had a profound and widespread effect on people's lives and East Timorese society, although massive aid flows substantially lessened the blow. Health officials assume that people's health was adversely affected from being uprooted and forced to flee into the mountains but cannot document deaths and illnesses that resulted. Because East Timor is temperate, exposure to the elements was not as severe as in countries with severe cold or heat. The destruction and looting of hospitals and clinics in East Timor was extensive, but the medicines were quickly replenished by international NGOs at first, and subsequently by the largesse of the Government of Japan. It can be assumed, however, that rural communities suffered disproportionately as distribution of these medicines was not immediately forthcoming.

A dysfunctional justice system certainly plays into the population's desire to take matters into their own hands. It appears that there is a widespread desire to enact vengeance against militia members -- or perhaps high-ranking militia members -- who violated human rights in 1999. The population's desire for revenge is palpable. For example, in January 2001 citizens of Maliana surrounded a police office at which a relatively minor militia member was being detained for questioning. They threatened to lynch him. While the crowd eventually dispersed peacefully, the incident underscores the mood of the times. Some observers believe that expressed desires for reconciliation are genuine, but are being frustrated by the general appreciation among the populace that the prospects for holding senior militia leaders accountable for their crimes are very slim.

It is hard to determine to what extent the violence that preceded and immediately followed the Popular Consultation played into current and ongoing social problems. A culture of violence is one of the legacies of 24 years of Indonesian occupation and abuse. According to experts on women's issues and health officials. anecdotal evidence suggests that women in East Timor increasingly face domestic abuse and general acts of harassment. One NGO official posited that this behaviour stemmed in part from a misguided need by many males, especially teenagers and young adults, to exercise their newfound freedom and vent years of frustration.[100]

The situation among the refugees in West Timor has deteriorated seriously since UNHCR suspended operations in September 2000. In Atambua, for example, according to a December 2000 report by a local NGO, refugees were receiving only a fraction of the rice allotments promised to them by the gov-

ernment. Distribution was uneven, which created additional tensions. Small financial disbursements were half of what was expected. Those refugees fortunate to be able to plant crops would not reap what they have sown for many months. Because of the scarcity of food, refugee children had begun to beg aggressively, which had created a heightened sense of insecurity among local people. Several robberies had been reported. The report described the health situation in Atambua as "extremely wretched" with malaria, diarrhoea, coughing, itchy sores, colds, asthma and dysentery all in evidence.

Section V. Thematic Review: The Operational Security Environment

Targeting of Humanitarian Personnel

There is ample evidence that humanitarian and development professionals are overwhelmingly susceptible to armed attacks in the field. In the UN system alone - between 1992 and 2000, 185 UN civilian staff were killed in situations of warfare and conflict (*see Figure 11*). Only three of the 177 cases involving the violent death of UN personnel have been brought to justice. A conservative estimate of the UN's firearm-homicide rate places it at between 17 and 25 per 100,000.[101] The threats are manifold - from death and injury, to harassment, intimidation, kidnapping, extortion and long-term psychological trauma (*see Figure 12*). Since January 1994, 240 UN personnel have been taken hostage or kidnapped at gunpoint in 63 incidents. These occurrences have to do with, on the one hand, the "humanitarian imperative" compelling institutions and employees to work in ever-more dangerous regions, and on the other, to the growing availability of small arms in conflict and post-conflict zones, and the propensity of armed actors to use them (*see Box 9*).

Though most humanitarian and development agencies completely restrict the presence, much less the use, of small arms and light weapons on their premises, they are not invulnerable to attack. Though it is generally recognised that "guns draw gunfire and should be avoided" this is not always practised.

A conservative estimate of the UN's firearm homicide rate places it at between 17 and 25 per 100,000.

Box 9. ICRC & MSF Testimonials

RWANDA, *18 January 1997.* Several places in the town of Ruhengeri were attacked by unidentified armed men. The objectives varied, but included several buildings occupied by humanitarian organisations. On entering the premises of Médecins du Monde, the assailants sacked it, killing three Spanish employees with one or more bullets each and wounding an American employee, whose leg later had to be amputated. Following these targeted attacks, the humanitarian organisations working in the area reduced the scale of their activities and nearly all the expatriate staff were evacuated.

RUSSIA, *17 December 1996.* "In the middle of the night, I woke up to the sound of heavy boot steps on the staircase. I immediately realised that strangers had entered our residence. A few seconds later, I heard a horrible scream coming from the room opposite mine. Just one scream, followed by a dull noise. I was terribly frightened when a few seconds later boot steps again approached my door and somebody tried violently to break in. I was still standing in the middle of my room - paralysed by fear." During that night, six ICRC delegates were murdered methodically and in cold blood in the Novye Atagi hospital dormitory.

AFGHANISTAN, *23 July 1994.* While returning to Kabul, a convoy of two ICRC vehicles was stopped, first by a military commander who forcibly placed an Afghan doctor and his wife in one of the vehicles, and then, a little farther on, by six armed combatants. These men forced the occupants to leave their vehicles, beat them up, robbed them of all their personal effects and made off with the vehicles. The ICRC employees managed to reach Kabul, but the passengers imposed on them had disappeared.

That said, agencies are responding to new security threats with, in some cases, the recruitment of stress-counsellors, pay incentives, additional paid leave and institutional reform.[102] Because the perception of threat is so pervasive - UN and partner agencies have also begun to catalogue the direct and indirect impacts of small arms. But progress is slow. With the exception of ICRC, global databases on staff mortality and threats have been established only over the past one to five years. Preventative strategies, then, premised on evidence-based analysis and early-warning indicators are only in the earliest stages. Nevertheless, academic studies and internal evaluations are now emerging, documenting the impacts of insecurity in the field.

One recent study collated by Sheik *et al* (2000), reviews 382 deaths of humanitarian workers (that occurred during emergency or transitional periods) between 1985 and 1998.[103] Of the total number of deaths recorded, 58 occurred among NGOs organisations, 52 among the Red Cross, 177 among UN programme workers and 88 among UN peacekeepers. Intentional violence was the cause of 253 deaths (68 per cent) compared to only 65 (17 per cent) attributable to motor vehicle accidents: a ratio of at least 4:1.[104] Between 1992-1995, particularly as a result of the Rwandan crisis,[105] intentional death accounted for 75 per cent of all deaths.[106] According to the same study, the ratio of deaths among nationals to expatriates was 4:3. Furthermore, one of every six deaths occurred in the first three months of duty; "many deaths occur early in an assignment, before risks may be fully appreciated" (Sheik et al, 2000: 19). The largest number of deaths occurred in Rwanda (63), Somalia (39), Cambodia (28), Angola (17) and Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Sudan (16 each). Of those who died, 17 per cent died within the first month of service and 31 per cent within three months. Disturbingly, median length of service at death was only eight months.

Figure 5. Violent Deaths Attributed to Small Arms in 1995-1999

	UNHCR	UNDP	UNICEF	WFP
1992	Ethiopia (2)	0	Somalia (1), Sudan (2)	Pakistan (1)
1993	Afghanistan (1), Bosnia (1)	0	Somalia (1), Uganda (1)	Angola (3)
1994	Burundi (1), Iran (1), Ethiopia (1), Rwanda (11), Somalia (1)	Mozambique (1), Rwanda (17)	Cameroon (1), Egypt (1), Rwanda (11)	Angola (1),Burundi (1), Rwanda (1), Somalia (1), Uganda (3)
1995	0	0	Angola (1), Burundi (1), Nigeria (1), Somalia (1)	0
1996	Kenya (1), Zaïre (1)	Rwanda (2)	Comoros (1), Somalia (1)	Angola (1)
1997	Rwanda (1)	Rwanda (1)	Sudan (1)	Ethiopia (2), Rwanda (2)
1998	0	0	0	Angola (1), Burundi (1), Sudan (2), Uganda (1)
1999	0	Colombia (1)	Burundi (1), Jamaica (1), Somalia (1)	Angola (1), Burundi (1)
Total	27	22	29	25

The international humanitarian and development community's growing concerns with security are crystallised in two recent reports issued by UNSECOORD and UNHCR[107], as well as by numerous General Assembly Resolutions and preventative activities at the field level. And yet, the gap between good intentions and implementation is broad. There are still only nine professional international staff responsible for co-ordinating and managing a sprawling system covering 70,000 UN employees and

dependents in over 70 duty stations. Furthermore, there are only 60 cost-shared FSOs officers in the field and an estimated 138 UN staff addressing security, either explicitly or as an additional component of their duties. An incremental step forward relates to the UN Malicious Acts Insurance (MAI).[108] The insurance only covers staff in high-risk countries (e.g. over threshold III) in case of death or disability caused by a "malicious act".

Notwithstanding protective and deterrence-related security precautions at the institutional level, perceptions of insecurity among staff persist. In a 1994 survey conducted internally by ICRC, 41 per cent of male and 28 per cent of female delegates report having been attacked, injured, harassed or threatened. The fact that anything could happen to anyone at any time was a recurrent concern among staff responding to UNHCR surveys in the former-Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. One staff member in Burundi noted "I worry … especially at military check points. The soldiers are usually drunk or high on drugs and heavily armed. You never know what they are going to do, especially if you are a woman" (UNHCR, 1997: 16). Significant numbers of staff members with both ICRC and the UN had to sit through shelling, gunfire and the rounding up of prisoners - while many employees had also experienced car-jacking, usually by armed individuals, and/or had been threatened at gunpoint.

Figure 12. Causes of UN Civilian Staff Death Resulting from Hostile Actions: 1992-2000

Year	Gunshot Wound	Rockets Bombs Missiles	Land-mines	Knife Wound	Other NA	Notes	Total
1992	9	1	-	-	1	na = "kidnapped and murdered"	11
1993	19	1	2	-	2	na = 1 "killed by soldier"; 1 "weapon injury" 1 "weapon injury"	24
1994	9	-	-	46a	8	na = 2 "killed"; 4 "ambushed truck"; 1 "robbery assault"; l "accident"; a = 45 due to "Ethnic Violence" in Rwandaassumed to be machete attacks	63
1995	3	3	-	-	6	na = 1 "killed"; 1 "ethnic violence"; 2 carjacking; 1 robbery; 1 bus ambush	12
1996	8	-	-	-	3	na = 1 "kidnapping"; 2 killed aboard hijacked commercial airliner that crashed after running out of fuel	11
1997	15	-	-	-	2	na = 2 "robberies"	17
1998	11	7b	-	-	1	na = 1 "criminal act" b = 5 died aboard UN aircraft believed downed by explosive device; 2 others killed aboard UN aircraft downed by missile or artillery	19
1999	10	2c	-	1	-	c = 1 killed aboard UN aircraft downed by missile or artillery	16
2000	7	-	-	4	5	na = 2 "hostage taking"	15
Totals	91d	14	2	51	27d	d = UNSECOORD reports that 107 staff members died from gunshot wounds, meaning that 16 of 23 deaths not specified above were the result of gunshot wounds (2 of 25 having died in hijacked airliner, 2 of strangulation)	185

Adapted from internal UNSECOORD documents (2001)

In a number of ICRC surveys on perceptions of armed violence, concerns over armed security threats were common. Some delegates had been killed while other had attempted or succeeded in committing suicide after leaving the organisation. Danger was mentioned as a major stress factor with many feeling unsafe in their houses at night and lived in fear of random violence. Harassment and threats at checkpoints, always at gunpoint, were also frequent. According to the ICRC (1999) "armed conflict, mines, gunfire, murder, banditry, car-jacking, robbery, the narcotics trade, substance abuse and other criminal activities in the … surrounding areas were reported-stress factors". *Figures 11* and *12* demonstrate that such perceptions are often based on a relatively accurate appraisal of reality. The most conservative estimate suggests that at least 91 UN staff have been killed as a result of gunshot wounds in the last eight years. Many of the additional 68 "unspecified deaths" resulted from grenades, deaths attributed to downed aircrafts and other related causes. Given that neither UN peacekeepers nor civilian staff in peacekeeping operations were included, it is likely that the numbers actually under-represent the incidence of insecurity as a whole.

Kenya

The security situation facing humanitarian and development staff in Kenya is separated into two components - day-to-day security and operational security. The threats posed by firearms are varied - involving, on the one hand, homicide, armed robbery, rape and restrictions on movement at the domestic level (e.g. as in at UN compounds or in Nairobi). On the other, there are innumerable threats facing staff on "mission" or conducting cross-border operations from headquarters in Kenya into Somalia or Sudan. In this latter sense, the armed threats are not necessarily emerging from Kenya proper - though transportation to and from departure sites is frequently hampered by insecurity or bogged down by logistics associated with protection and contingency planning. For the purposes of this report, Lokichokkio, located in the far North West corner of the country, is explored in detail in order to highlight the humanitarian impacts of small arms on personnel on the ground.

Lokichokkio is a border town – with a 10km diameter - and a population of some 35,000. The UN and over 35 NGOs, under the auspices of Operational Lifeline Sudan (OLS), as well as ICRC, have established a number of "compounds" in the town from which they conduct operations in Southern Sudan and Kenya.[109] As suggested above, the risks facing humanitarian and development actors come from within and without. In the town itself, an estimated 90 - 95 per cent of households are purported to own or possess small arms that are either legally or illicitly procured.[110] Lokichokkio is also a well-known centre for small arms trafficking – "a commercial centre for the purchase of ammunition".[111] Naturally, given the security situation in the town and surrounding region, local community members are reluctant to co-operate with the police to tell them where arms or ammunition are stored.

Figure 13. Security Incidents in Lokichokkio



According to every key informant consulted in the region, all local communities surrounding the town's perimeter are considered "hostile" and "extremely well-armed". As with local "residents", virtually all pastoralists in the frontier regions brandish small arms – due to aforementioned insecurities generated by bandits and raiding parties from Sudan and Uganda. In the words of the district police, "virtually 99 per cent of youth (18-25) are armed … Children as young as 15 are using them … they are all using AK-47s and G-3s". Though predominantly wielded by men, household members are ascribed individual tasks in relation to the weapon: women are frequently charged with cleaning the arms and elders are consulted on more and more infrequently, prior to use. Such arms were initially acquired to protect the household's livestock from raiders, but are now used against civilians as a means of resolving disputes, acquiring goods or for self-defence.

A paradoxical relationship exists between the camp and rising firearm-related homicide and crime rates. Having raised the standard of living for a small minority of locals who conduct paid domestic and security work, the UN and humanitarian community are involuntarily drawing otherwise pastoral populations to the site. As a result, local populations are abandoning traditional forms of livelihood – and turning instead to salaried or waged work. This phenomenon has effectively increased pressure on the UN and affiliated agencies to hire still more local staff – even if untrained or lacking rudimentary skills. With only 150 locals hired (via a locally organised co-operative) – other residents are facing increased destitution and unemployment. In the absence of tangible alternatives, the gun is subsumed into livelihood strategies – and there are few disincentives to reduce its use (see Figure 13).

The mounting frustration of the community has culminated in a number of serious security incidents over the past three years. On one occasion, in the mid-1990s, the principal UNICEF compound was surrounded (in protest) when the OLS-coalition contracted the services of a Nairobi security agency to guard the compound perimeter. When the municipal police arrived to the scene, the residents of Lokichokkio returned to their homes and re-emerged with firearms. Intense gun-battles ensued, "with over 100 rounds fired into the compounds" - though few injuries were sustained.[112] The police, "ill-equipped to handle the situation", quickly resorted to dialogue - and the contracted security agents were returned to Nairobi the following day. Even since that incident a number of UN officers have been targeted and assassination attempts have taken place over the walls of the compound.[113]

Figure 14. Security in Southern Sudan, 2000



As a result of the prevailing insecurity, "the OLS cannot do what it would like … we are forced to do exactly what the community wants".[114] Even in spite of the presence of 54 "local" security officers (a ratio to UN and NGO staff of 1:5), no personnel are permitted to leave Lokichokkio before six in the morning and after six in the afternoon – and only then with a heavily armed escort. Because travel within the town is heavily discouraged, there is virtually no social life outside of the confines of the compounds - and alcohol, tobacco and risk-taking behaviour, is high.

The security risks facing staff in the field are more precarious. In Kenya, Somalia and Sudan virtually all transportation outside of urban areas requires both security clearance and a military escort. Reports of staff being attacked and robbed at gunpoint are all too common - though decreasing incrementally on account of the growing security presence. Field operations in Sudan and flights over the Southern Equatorial and Bar El Ghazal regions are almost inevitably accompanied by shooting and direct armed threat from either rebel-factions or the government itself. Armed insecurity resulted in 65 evacuations in 1999 (UNICEF, 2000: 64) - rising to over 70 in 2000 (*see Figure 14*).

In spite of the tremendous risks to humanitarian and development personnel, there are only five UN security staff responsible for the safety of more than 800 employees in Kenya and Sudan and over 500 co-operating NGO and UN employees in the field. Even with improved intelligence gathering, the collection of early-warning information and the establishment of contacts, insecurity reigns. In 2000 alone, there were 14 humanitarian staff killed in Sudan.[115]

Colombia

In terms of firearm-related threats to humanitarian and development personnel, the Colombian situation mirrors that of Kenya - though fortunately, the number of direct attacks against UN personnel and ICRC delegates is more limited. There has been only one reported death of a UN staff in the country - though there is ample evidence of national NGO staff, government and Church-based organisations being targeted by arms-wielding groups (*see Box 10*). Nevertheless, trends are changing - for the worse. The country's "secuestrado" (kidnapping) crisis is unparalleled: 45 per cent of the world's kidnappings take place in Colombia.[116] According to Fundacion Pais Libre, in 2000 alone, there was the equivalent of 14 kidnappings a day (or one every 1.5 hours). The same group estimates that approximately 60 per cent of all kidnappings are attributed to guerrilla factions, and the remaining 40 per cent attributed to "delinquents" and paramilitaries.

The Colombian Red Cross and ICRC note that the vulnerability of its staff at headquarters in Bogotá and in the field are increasing. Nevertheless, the two organisations insist on a strict "no-guns" policy in all areas of operation. But an alarming indication of the changing security landscape emerges from a number of recent statements (and actions) directed toward the humanitarian community by the various armed actors. So called self-defence groups, for instance, have often claimed that if they are labeled "para" militaries, NGOs and humanitarian agencies ought to be perceived as "para" guerillas. Though the incidence of deliberate or targeted attacks against humanitarian personnel is considered rare, there is an alarming rise in threats and intimidation against humanitarian actors. For example, in 1999, Oxfam was informed (by an unnamed group) that, "nobody could guarantee their security in particular regions if they continued distributing food aid". Around the same time, a Spaniard working for Paz de Mundo suffered an armed attack in Quibdio (in November of 1999) – though the facts around the incident remain unclear. CINEP, Justicia y Paz and Pastoral Social have all been threatened repeatedly. MSF was forced to evacuate from the Departamento of Cordoba in 1999 and on January 29th 2001, an MSF expatriate laboratory technician was released after enduring six months in captivity.

Box 10. Attacks on Health Workers in Colombia

A recent ICRC field survey recorded 468 violent infractions between 1995-1998 – and a large number of additional cases are believed to go unreported. Over 70 per cent of these infractions were committed against the lives or physical integrity of health workers. Armed groups regularly threaten or kill health workers on the basis of alleged collaboration with the enemy. According to one health worker "medical staff that go into (the conflict) zones are seen as spies and frequently attacked with guns". For example, as recently as March 2000, in Guajira state, the health director, one nurse and 14 hospital staff received death threats by non-state armed groups who gave them 48 hours to leave the area. In September 1999, another armed group publicly declared that several staff were legitimate "military targets" in Tolima state. Between 1999-2000, 4 health promoters in Putumayo were summurarily executed by armed factions.

Attacks on health workers threaten the very fabric of international humanitarian law. On 22 September 2000, for example, an ICRC truck carrying a wounded female guerrilla was stopped some 400 metres from the town of Apartado (Antioquia). The woman was taken out and killed despite of the presence of the ICRC sub-delegation head. The shooting occurred in spite of the presence of a military roadblock some 250 metres around the bend in the road. The ICRC condemned the attack (a rare event) and suspended operations until further noticed. A reprisal killing of a paramilitary occurred some 10 days later outside of Puerto Asis (Putumayo) – wherein the victim was killed inside the ambulance. The ICRC issued another condemnation and closed operations and evacuations of "war-wounded" until 22 December 2000.

Violations also extend to medical goods and equipment – such as discarding vaccines in nearby waterways or theft of ambulances and supplies for military operations. An MSF vehicle was commandeered and stolen by military actors in 1999. More recently, on January 11 (2001) in El Camino (Bolivar), an ambulance was deliberately attacked by armed actors and burnt. The action effectively reduced the local health service's capacity to service the town's 16,000 residents. In a recent development, the Ministry of Health has announced its intentions to document the violations committed against health workers – but this has, as yet, not been acted upon.

The armed security threats are roughly similar in duty stations around the country. An International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) team recently reported that "the deteriorating security situation and the wave of violence has increased considerably ... this is not only felt throughout the country ... but is also felt particularly in Bogotá and individually by each and every member of the United Nations family as they become victims and witnesses of several security problems which range from petty theft to murder" (ICSC, 200:5). Bogotá itself is virtually encircled by guerrilla factions and roadblocks within a 50 km perimeter, and incidences of armed ambushes are increasing within a mere 1.5 hours from the city.[117] Security incidents have been increasing in number and intensity – and international staff has been advised to limit their travel strictly to capital cities (by air) and to remain in urban perimeters unless authorised by the Presidential Advisor on Security.

The IASC consultant, however, focused much of his attention on insecurity among duty stations in Apartado (Uraba-Antioquia) and Puerto Asis (Putumayo). It was quickly recognised that in spite of the introduction of extremely tight security protocols from the capital, there is a widespread perception among humanitarian staff in "the field" that UN authorities in New York and Bogotá underappreciate the real and latent threats facing staff. This is especially alarming, given that Apartado and Puerto Asis are both considered threshold II zones, with the entire surrounding region rising to a threshold III. Indeed, security clearance is required from the Bogotá office for virtually every mission to areas of operation. In addition, inter-agency meetings are held every 1.5 months in Bogotá for debriefing and planning purposes. But, as confirmed by personnel in the field, the situation is precarious. In spite of continuous, even daily, dialogue with the various "armed actors" in the field, there is a permanent state of tension between UN and NGO staff, and the paramilitaries and guerrillas. In the town of Puerto Asis alone, armed groups directly threatened approximately ten expatriate staff in 1999.

Personal security for UN and humanitarian staff in semi-urban areas is likewise precarious – as "they are operating in conflict areas and certain risks obviously exist" (Leima, 2001). For example, in Puerto Asis – one bomb was reported to have exploded in the centre of town in November 2000 and two grenades thrown close to the ICRC premises just prior to the consultants visit in January 2001. Such activities are perceived to be "common". Though perceptions of insecurity are rampant among most staff, some respondents nevertheless claimed not to be always "threatened by small arms in [my] daily work".[118] Rather, "incidental encounters with armed blockades present the greatest risk" and not, as in Kenya, insecurity resulting from random banditry, crime, or personal assault.[119]

East Timor

The Indonesian-controlled militia frequently harassed and threatened UN staff and other humanitarian aid workers in the months leading up to the vote, which escalated in the days following the referendum and resulted in several murders. As concerned the UN, its local staff bore the brunt of the intimidation, which culminated on the day of the Popular Consultation with a local UNAMET civilian staff member being stabbed to death at a polling site in Dili District. It was the only fatality due to hostile action up to that time. Two days later, however, two East Timorese working for UNAMET in Bobonaro District were singled out for their "pro-independence" activities and shot to death by the militia. It is understood that local staff among the NGO community active in East Timor were also killed during this period.

Box 11. A message from the (late) UNHCR Staff Member Carlos Caceros

" ... At this very moment, we are barricaded in the office. A militia leader was murdered last night ... The militias are on the way, and I am sure they will do their best to demolish this office ...

These guys act without thinking and can kill a human as easily (and painlessly) as I kill mosquitoes in my room. You should see this office. Plywood on the windows, staff peering out through openings in the curtains hastily installed a few minutes ago. We are waiting for this enemy; we sit here like bait, unarmed, waiting for wave to hit. I am glad to be leaving this island for three weeks. I just hope I will be able to leave tomorrow ..."

Written on 6 September 2000. Carlos was murdered by the above-mentioned mob in his UNHCR office in Atambua hours after sending this e-mail.

Although the campaign of terror and intimidation failed to bring about the desired result – for East Timor to remain part of Indonesia – it is important to underscore the effect it had on UN operations and personnel. For example, UNAMET had little information or access to the tens of thousands of IDPs. An aid convoy to assist some of them in July came under militia attack. More than a month passed before another convoy was dispatched due to security concerns.

Several international staff that served in East Timor during UNAMET and prior to the arrival of INTERFET say that the threat they felt in East Timor – especially immediately after the Popular Consultation – was uniquely harrowing. UNHCR staff that had served in West Timor after the Popular Consultation expressed the same sentiment. One staff member recalled that the "anti-white and anti-UN" sentiment in West Timor was pervasive and oppressive, and that working there "…was literally a hair-raising experience."[120] He, like many staff members who expressed similar sentiments, had previously worked in other conflict zones and had witnessed massive human rights violations.

The coordinated manner in which the killings and destruction were undertaken and the feeling that a decision could be made to target UN staff at any time made East and West Timor unique. This fear proved to be founded: on 22 August 2000, three UNHCR staff members in West Timor were brutally attacked and narrowly escaped with their lives. Two weeks later, on 6 September, three UNHCR staff were killed in West Timor and two injured (*see Boxes 11 & 12*).

Box 12. Intimidation of UN Staff in East Timor: The Case of the UNAMET Spokesman

Shortly after UNAMET was deployed, Indonesia began to pressure the UN to reign in the mission's straight-talking spokesman. When this pressure at first failed to produce the desired result, death threats against the spokesman surfaced. They were considered credible and the spokesman was told to take some time off from his post in Dili.

Ten days in Darwin did not resolve the matter. The spokesman, who had been assigned a 24-hour bodyguard, was now provided with a "Deputy" on his return to East Timor, following an attempt by New York to remove him from the job entirely.

This compromise, initiated by the mission, allowed the spokesman to remain in his post, while his softer-spoken assistant assumed some of the spokesman's public duties for the period leading up to the vote.

Militarisation of Refugee Camps/IDP camps

Even as people flee from conflict, they are not always in a position to leave either war, or their politics, behind. Invariably, in spite of international and national norms invoked to control and regulate refugee camps, political and military activities often continue clandestinely. Camps are either used directly, as recruiting or training camps for insurgent or “terrorist” groups, or are de facto controlled by non-UNHCR interests. In some cases, host governments may themselves support the use of camps for counter-insurgency activities. As a result, refugees in the camps and the host communities nearest to them are often in situations of extreme vulnerability and risk.

In each of these cases, the presence of armed elements among refugee populations has exposed civilians (e.g. host populations), and increasingly UN staff, to serious risks. It has increased refugee vulnerability to intimidation, harassment and forced recruitment from within. For example, UNHCR has expressed concern that increased militia activity in southern Guinea could lead to the recruitment of fighters amid refugees living in overcrowded camps. In Kenya and Colombia, however - the reverse is often the case. Refugees and IDP populations are increasingly being exposed to a range of insecurities directly attributable to the abundance of small arms in the surrounding communities.

Whatever the case, refugee camp militarisation has distorted the perceived neutrality of humanitarian agencies intervening on the behalf of refugees. Indeed, IASC members do not want to be seen as complicit in training refugees in camps or (in)directly supporting the war efforts. UNHCR also said it feared that the presence of militia groups could draw attacks from rebels, endangering the security of both refugees and aid workers. The institutional response to militarisation has been slow - and has generally focused on increasing police presence - both armed and unarmed. UNHCR has begun to experiment with "community-policing" in Tanzania[121] and has declared them a success in spite of anecdotal evidence and few performance-related indicators or benchmarks. Though on some occasions unavoidable, it is inevitable that the “hiring of security guards favours wartime economic activities over peacetime ones … the relief ‘industry’ can reward those in control of the wartime economy” in bringing arms to bear (Anderson, 1999). Nevertheless, over the past two years, efforts have been made to increase monitoring of various camps - to register the severity of the problem.[122]

Kenya

Kenya enjoys a long tradition as a host country for refugees. As a result of the ongoing war simmering in southern Sudan, the conflicts that wracked Uganda under Amin, unrest in Ethiopia, the state collapse of Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda, refugees in Eastern Africa have continuously made their way toward Kenya for safety. Accompanying many of these refugees have been small arms - often the only means of ensuring protection on the long road to “cooler ground”.

There are only two camps still remaining in Kenya - Dadaab with some 130,000 refugees to the Northeast and Kakuma housing some 75,000 refugees in the Northwest. Both are located close to international borders: Dadaab was established less than 100km from the Somali border and Kakuma is within 80km of the Sudanese and Ugandan borders. In both sites, it is difficult for UNHCR officials to distinguish between refugees and non-refugees. Each site is also considered to be resting in neglected and high-risk zones[123], rife with bandits. Even more problematic, Somalis fleeing from their "collapsed-state", in some cases harbour territorial ambitions to reclaim their "traditional homeland" and frequently embark on cross-border excursions from both the camps in Kenya.

According to one report, "the sheer number of armed individuals in the Dadaab area and ease of access to firearms … are key contributing factors to the vulnerability of refugees within and outside the camps" (*see Box 6 in Section IV*). The prevalence of firearms in and around Dadaab - and particularly the insecurity this generates - has seriously affected the ability of UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies to carry out activities and programmes in an effective and efficient manner. Armed police escorts are required to accompany all personnel in and around the camps and strict curfews have been imposed. In the words of Virginia Thomas "the mobility of agencies staff, their accessibility and visibility to refugees, and even to some extent their motivation to be out and about among the refugees have, to a significant extent, been undermined by the heightened risks presented by the prevalence of firearms in the area".

Figure 15. Reported Security Incidents in Kakuma, 2000



The abundance of firearms in Dadaab affects the willingness of police to play an active role in defending or protecting the population. Many police have been killed during raids conducted by banditry groups: civilians who frequently outnumber the police and are better armed. The paralysis of the police, in turn does little to reassure the refugees, or contribute toward their protection. Rather, their inaction generates a context of virtual impunity, in which real authority resides with those carrying the biggest gun.

Similar trends are evident in Kakuma and among a number of Sudanese refugees (e.g. some of whom are former combatants) who populate the Northwest regions of Kenya. According to key informants in the region, there are a significant number of "refugees" who hide in Kakuma – knowing that they will be protected under the existing refugee regime. Among the refugees fleeing from Sudan are the

defectors from the SPLA, some of whom are selling arms before reaching the camps. As mentioned in previous sections of the study, Somali clan-based trading networks are also doing brisk business. The Ugandan and to a lesser extent Ethiopian borders are porous – though some supply side controls exist (e.g. gun-collection programmes by the Ethiopian and Ugandan governments).

But firearm-related insecurity appears to be as much of a pre-occupation inside the camps as outside. There have been a number of firearm-related deaths resulting from militarisation in and around the Kakuma camp(s). In 1998 alone, there were reportedly seven firearm-related refugee deaths resulting from banditry immediately outside the camp, in 1999 an additional three firearm-related deaths, and in 2000 a single reported killing from a firearm (*see Figure 15*). Humanitarian staff have also been directly affected - with two Lutheran World Federation (LWF) staff attacked and killed in Kakuma camp itself between 1997-1998. Fortunately, there have been no humanitarian employee deaths reported in 1999-2000.

Refugees are an easy target. Though media reports constantly headline reports of the militarisation of refugee camps[124], there is little physical evidence of a large number of small arms in the camps among refugees. Though arms are ubiquitous in the areas immediately surrounding Dadaab and Kakuma, there appear to be fewer arms stowed away (or being used) in the camps themselves.[125] Small arms are widely available (and on open display) among the Turkanese host community population that encircles the Kakuma sites - as well as the Kenyan and Somali communities close to Dadaab. Nevertheless, recent inter-ethnic clashes and communal conflicts between the Ethiopian and Sudanese refugees (nine killed in 1997), or from among the Dinka groups (six killed in 1998) in Kakuma itself, did not involve the use of arms.

Recognition of the need to “seal the weak spots” of Kakuma camp lead to, in 1999, the hiring of 34 Kenyan police reservists and 28 administrative (armed) police to monitor the site after dark. In addition, UNHCR has hired 25 KPR and 88 “refugee guards” drawn from a representative group of refugees who are paid between 1,800-2,500 shillings ($US 35-50) a month. Like the agencies working out of the Lokichokkio-OLS compounds, UNHCR is also compelled to hire host community staff[126] – often with few relevant skills and little education. Even with the new guards, there are never more than 70 on patrol at any moment – a relatively low "police-civilian ratio" of 1:1,000.[127]

Saber Azam, the (then) UNHCR Director of Kakuma Refugee camp has acknowledged that "the hiring of armed guards is one element of an otherwise imperfect solution". But other efforts are also underway. In spite of a chronic shortage of funds, UNHCR has also established refugee-host community counsels (chaired by the town's District Commissioner) to assess and resolve grievances and animosities between locals and refugees. Like in Dadaab, UNHCR personnel in Kakuma have introduced firewood collection schemes to reduce the vulnerability of refugees to armed violence outside of the camp. While the hiring of armed guards does little to foster norms on “non-possession” or a culture of “non-violence”, they have had a measurable effect in terms of reducing insecurity.

Colombia

Despite the massive forced cross-border and internal displacement of Colombians, there is currently no evidence of IDP or refugee camps being used to traffic in arms. Though “it is obvious that this might and or could occur – there is no hard evidence at this stage”.[128] Indeed, if any suspicions of such activity did arise, or came to the attention of the paramilitaries or guerrillas – "one or the other side would clearly kill all suspected perpetrators".[129] There are occasional reports, however, of former “peace community” leaders being “converted” to paramilitarism, but these instances are rare.[130] At a more general level, whether or not militarisation is actually occurring, NGOs and INGOs that assist IDPs are often regarded as collaborators of either side regardless. As a result, staff insecurity is rising.[131]

Although there have been a series of forced occupations of UN, ICRC and government offices by IDPs – these are ordinarily peaceful and or carried out without the use of small arms. Nevertheless, IDPs constitute an extremely "vulnerable" group to armed violence perpetrated by armed actors and as a result of crime - as highlighted in earlier sections on *Mortality and Injury and Forced Displacement*.

East Timor

The introduction and use of small arms in East Timor has resulted in an increasing problem for neighbouring West Timor. The militias retreated to West Timor in September 1999 in an organised manner along with their weapons. They also took with them medicines that they looted from hospitals and clinics, as well as valuables from the tens of thousands of people they forced at gun point to accompany them across the border to elevate their political standing and influence. They spread propaganda throughout the camps that it was unsafe to return to East Timor. People who chose not to heed their advice were often threatened, physically assaulted, and sometimes killed.

Detailed knowledge of the refugees' plight is scant and the ability to improve their lot problematic. The operating capacity of the UN in West Timor in the months following September 1999 was hindered due to the insecure and hostile working environment. Threats against UNHCR staff members resulted in a failure of the agency to undertake a registration of camp inhabitants, properly oversee the distribution of aid, and counter propaganda. Information is much scarcer since September 2000 after the three UNHCR staff members were murdered and the humanitarian community evacuated. As of February 2001 UNHCR's operations remained suspended. They are not expected to resume any time soon.

The militias were reportedly provided a wide-range of firearms. The exact number of weapons that the militia received is not known. Indonesia produces several small arms under licensing agreements and was heavily and generously armed with both light and heavy weapon systems from numerous suppliers. According to an Australian Government document based on open-sources, firearms reported to be in militias' hands included SP-1 (Indonesian license-built US M59), M-16A1, AR-15, FNC, SS-1 (Indonesian license-built Belgian FNC), AK-47, SKS, m/937 (Indonesian license-built German Kar-98 Mauser), G-3 (of unknown origin – either Portuguese license-built CETME/G-3 or those purchased directly by Indonesia), and Austrian Steyr AUG assault rifles, as well as fragmentation grenades (possibly of South Korean origin). The militias were also outfitted with bows and arrows, blowguns, machetes and swords.

Reports on the numbers of weapons that the militias possessed vary enormously. While the Indonesian army may have initially kept strict control of the weapons given to the militias and even required that the weapons be returned to the army after each attack[132], the militias eventually retained control of their weapons either by design or by fait accompli. By one account, Indonesia recruited some 50,000 militia members and provided them at least 10,000 weapons (including US Colt M-16 assault rifles).[133]

Indonesia's efforts to disarm the militia have been half-hearted and ineffective. UN Security Council resolution 1319 of 8 September 2000 insisted that Jakarta disarm the militia. Six weeks after the resolution, Indonesia claimed to have fulfilled the Security Council's demand, saying that its police had collected between 41–91 per cent of the militias' weapons with only 100-200 remaining in circulation. This is simply not believable. Credible independent reports from West Timor indicate that the militias continue to operate with impunity and with their weapons. Acknowledging that its efforts were incomplete, the Government undertook a gun buy-back programme in December 2000. Small arms in militias' hands represent a growing problem that Jakarta's disarmament efforts alone are not going to resolve.

Opportunity Costs to Programmes

The impacts of small arms availability on humanitarian and development interventions are reported daily. There is no single region untouched by armed insecurity - though it goes without saying that some areas are more dangerous than others. Even though agencies are lining up to provide services in otherwise inhospitable regions - there are many areas where even the most ambitious dare not tread. At the institutional level, the consequences of small arms accessibility touch every aspect of micro-management: funding, implementation, programme monitoring and evaluation. Furthermore, programmes are affected due to opportunity-costs associated with the rising costs of transportation, the provision of security and communications infrastructure. In many cases, programmes are entirely dismantled as a result of perceived and real insecurity. As a result, significant numbers of beneficiaries are deprived of assistance and or basic needs. A perverse effect is that humanitarian agencies are increasingly turning to less dangerous areas, where their returns can be justified on balance sheets and their outputs realised in the field.

UN operations are constantly put on hold throughout Africa - but most recently in the DRC, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Congo. Even one shot can bring down an operation. The same types of problems are also endemic in countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Georgia and Guatemala. With reference to Burundi, the Inter-Agency Network on Displacement noted "the lack of safe and unhindered access to vulnerable populations represents one of the major constraints to the provision of protection and assistance to displaced populations." With eleven of the 17 provinces in Phase III and the rest at phase IV, armed escorts is required for all road travel. These activities have massive opportunity costs to agencies. At the very least, complex airdrops, convoy operations and communications protocols have had to be introduced in recent years to ensure that aid is not diverted (*see Box 12*).

Though the debate on the politics of intervention is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to consider the role of small arms on agency mandates. Arms availability has qualitative impacts on the "protection" mandates of humanitarian and development agencies. This occurs in two ways - either in terms of the (popular) perception of agencies seen to be working in complicity with armed groups - or in relation to the way agency infrastructure is indirectly (and, in some cases, directly) used to facilitate arms movements themselves.

Box 12. Opportunity Costs in Somalia

Following the firing of AK-47s on a single-engine 9-seater Caravan (with no injuries or damage sustained to the aircraft), "plans to resume work in Kismayo anytime soon are severely curtailed ... Kismayo is off-limits for all UN operations until it becomes clear who carried out the attack and until the threat has been removed" (IRIN March 30, 2000). Elsewhere, in Merka (70 km south of Mogadishu), the UN has also been forced to suspend flights.

In September 2000, for example, security officers in Somalia who were carrying out a security survey to determine whether UN agencies could resume humanitarian operations after a 6-month suspension "were attacked at the UN WHO compound by a group of '30-40 men bearing small arms'. UN programmes had ceased after unidentified militiamen sprayed gunfire at a European Community humanitarian plane.

Other incidents in Merka include a bomb discovered on the roof of the WHO compound, a grenade attack at both the WHO compound and the offices of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Organisation for Voluntary Services, an Italian Agency". Attempts to impose curfews, gun control and disarmament have been limited - as "there is no authority here" (IRIN, September 19, 2000).

While no single agency or agency intervention is absolutely neutral - it is safe to say that some are more impartial then others. There are a number of ways that arms availability and use impacts the “impartiality mandate” of humanitarian and development agencies. Where agencies admit to, are accused of, or are implicated in small arms trafficking - the implications are obvious. Nor is the diversion of arms and ammunition with the knowing or (optimal) ignorance of relief activities a new phenomenon. It has occurred throughout Central America (e.g. special-interest and religious US-based NGOs), in the Balkans (e.g. the Serbian Red Cross) and Sierra Leone (e.g. World Vision). Sudan is also a classic case. In 1993, humanitarian agencies, including Norwegian People’s Aid and the Lutheran World Fund, were repeatedly accused of supporting the SPLA.[134] States, however, are also complicit in channelling arms through aid groups and non-state actors - often to undermine humanitarian objectives.

In many cases, aid is also regularly diverted away from intended beneficiaries and its flow controlled by vested interests. This is because those benefiting financially from the influx of aid (particularly warring parties) have an incentive in the continuation of conflict. The opportunistic use of humanitarian infrastructure for the purposes of arms trafficking has been noted in many reports. According to the RGSA (2000), there is often “the dual use of UN or other agencies logistics and equipment to facilitate arms transfers”. Indeed, WFP officials have also noted that their " infrastructure improvements … become a vector for all kinds of transport … [they] are aware that arms traffickers use [their] UN” routes. On the other hand, naively administered humanitarian assistance, in the context of high small arms availability, has also been known to fuel informal economies - through, for example, the substitution of humanitarian rations for arms. Often sensationalised in the media, this reportedly occurs less frequently in practice. Ration-substitution is common in camp and donor environments - but is often geared toward procurement of (higher-quality or preferred) foodstuff than anything else (see Cutts, 2000). Indeed, in the context of extreme adversity, such as refugee-like situations, the substitution of relief-assistance for arms is believed to be unusual. Alternatively, food is stolen (or forcibly diverted) outright - with proceeds used to purchase arms.[135]

Kenya

Armed insecurity affects all aspects of humanitarian and development work in the country; including transportation costs, additional financial provisions for security in areas of operation, monitoring and evaluation. All of these surplus expenditures divert scarce resources away from the principal mandate of humanitarian and development agencies. Though the impacts are broad, only a selection of these issues will be addressed in the following section.

Transportation Costs: Convoys transporting food assistance used to operate by road between Nairobi and Lokichokkio until the mid-1990s. These road-shipments were suspended following repeated attacks by bandits in possession of small arms. The result has been a steady increase in the costs of staff movement and aid delivery. Indeed, the two to three-day trip from Nairobi is significantly less costly than assistance flown by aircraft. Now, virtually all aid for Northwest Kenya and Southern Sudan is flown directly to Lokichokkio's "international airport", though transport trucks make fuel-runs periodically - under heavily armed escort. Predictably, the costs of running relief into Sudan have increased exponentially. This is not to say that insecurity is the only reason for air-delivered food-drops[136] - although it does represent a growing consideration. Though UN security personnel have recommended that certain precautions be taken to reduce risks in the "field"[137] funding constraints limit many of these initiatives from taking place.

Private Security: The recurrent costs devoted to security in the Lokichokkio OLS compounds are crippling. Over the past decade, UN agencies and NGO groups have erected high concrete barriers and barbed wire around the compounds that are manned, day and night, by local security personnel.

ICRC, located in a compound across town, has also had to bolster security around the site. A more vivid image of the seriousness of the situation is captured when the ICRC story is told in detail. In 1996 three armed thieves entered the ICRC compound, threatening staff. Immediately following the incident, ICRC hired three policemen. On the 18th of October 1997, four more organised bandits entered the compound – threatening expatriates and locals with Kalashnikov rifles. In response, ICRC planted a brush (thorn) fence, erected a bullet-proof wall and hired approximately 80 KPR forces to conduct nightly rounds. The costs, unsurprisingly, are high – representing opportunity costs in terms of what could otherwise be provided in aid assistance. According to the Head of the sub-Delegation, the costs for security and air delivery (as opposed to road delivery) amount to 33 per cent of the $US 40 million budget. But the implications extend far beyond the financial burden - affecting staff morale, trust with community members and the sustainability of the operations themselves. The ICRC-Lokichokkio delegation is one of only a handful of ICRC operations that employ armed escorts. Indeed, all of their aid in the region (since 1995/96) is administered with the support of armed escorts.

Drain from Aid Budgets: The institutional response to insecurity and the presence of small arms in Lokichokkio proper has been relatively slow. Because the OLS provides assistance in war-torn Southern Sudan, risk and security assessments are obviously focused on activities in Sudan. According to logistics officers working with OLS in Nairobi, security costs associated with OLS activities average approximately $US 1.5 million out of a total operating budget of $US 100-150 million per annum. These costs rise above $US 5 million as a result of a high number of evacuations. But the threats posed by small arms in Kenya, a country "at peace", are proving almost as daunting as those in a country plagued by war. Efforts are being made to remedy the situation. An *OLS-UNICEF Annual Report* (2000: 61) optimistically states, "Lokichokkio security continued providing escort for supplies, initiating co-ordination with local authorities and police escorts, providing improved security around the OLS camp, holding regular meetings with local authorities to help minimise insecurity in the area and working to minimise theft of OLS property. Illegal arms are also a very common problem in the area mainly due to outlaws who indulge in banditry and cattle rustling activities." But insecurity is likely to remain an endemic feature of the humanitarian landscape for the foreseeable future.

Colombia

As in Kenya, the opportunity costs resulting from a near-permanent state of armed insecurity in Colombia, are high. These "costs" stretch to the "appropriateness" of aid targeting, the cost and timeliness of relief delivery and transportation. Because entire tracts of the country are outside of government control - the access of humanitarian agencies to people in need of assistance is severely curtailed.

Aid Diversion: Because of the high degree of control exerted by armed factions throughout the country, the delivery of aid to areas affected by high arms availability is often inappropriately targeted. Relief aid, in the form of food, tools and vaccinations, is often diverted. Armed factions often commandeer entire hospitals – with goods pillaged and staff intimidated by gun-waving combatants. For example, the WFP is not able to operate in several insecure regions of Colombia – due to belief that food aid will serve to aggravate the situation. They do not use the "food economy approach" to deliver assistance (as in OLS or elsewhere). Instead, they align their assistance to fill critical gaps in IDP needs - prior to, between and following armed violence.[138]

Constraints on Monitoring and Evaluation: As might be expected, all of these factors affect the quality of humanitarian services and the effective monitoring of development programmes. It is often expensive and exceedingly time-consuming to assess the "success" or "failure" of particular initiatives - and therefore the long-term impact of humanitarian or development assistance. According to MSF and ICRC delegates – much of North and Southern Colombia is itself totally inaccessible - rendering needs-assessments of the country's vulnerable groups (i.e. beneficiaries) impossible. Indeed, as in

regions such as Sudan or Afghanistan, areas where NGOs are permitted are contingent on prior agreement with armed actors – particularly the FARC or the AUC. Even in Departamento capitals such as Medellin, Cali and parts of southern Bogotá, humanitarian and development access is limited on account of excessively high rates of armed homicide, crime and paramilitary activity.

High Transportation Costs: Also, transportation costs represent a significant and growing proportion of overall aid budgets. Like Kenya, both food and people are now flown to regions that used to be accessible by (more inexpensive) road transportation. But travel by vehicle outside of urban centres is no longer an option. According to the National Police, seven per cent of the country's highways have "security clearance" and 93 per cent require security assessments from the authorities before transportation can be authorised. Roads, fluvial transport and railways are constantly closed or barricaded by armed groups. Indeed, virtually all movement from Bogotá into target areas is by air. For example, the shipment of assistance to Putumayo involves an expensive flight for a trip that would otherwise take 5 hours by road.

Costs of Goods and Services Rising: Furthermore, internal armed blockades disrupt the local movement of goods and services - while also distorting the cost of providing assistance. During a recent armed blockade in Putumayo, the price of literally everything (with the exception of certain luxury goods such as cigarettes and alcohol) rose in less than one week. The blockade itself made travel in the region impossible – "everything was stopped - and costs for everything from gas to food rose dramatically".[139] Naturally, NGOs are not the only entities affected. The financial costs of the armed blockade to the Mayor's office were tremendous: the equivalent to some 100 million pesos ($US 500,000) over the course of just two months.

Costs of Communication: Due to the constantly shifting security landscape, humanitarian agencies are also forced to ensure that all travel is authorised from the security section in Bogotá. The logistics of communication, particularly telephone and physical debriefing, is costly and entails additional expenses related to internal travel (and time away from the field). At the field level, there are monthly meetings among the UN (and IASC) agencies - though sometimes these occur weekly (in Lokichokkio, by comparison, they occur every night). There are also stringent requirements demanding daily reporting and authorisation of "security clearance" - reducing the speed at which emergencies can be redressed, as well as the long-term capacity of agencies to observe particular violations or provide ongoing support to vulnerable groups.

Evacuation: On many occasions, direct threats force agencies to consider suspending their activities. The on going, if unpredictable, bombing of municipal centres and police stations are one such threat. In Apartado, for example, car bombs and repeated attacks on infrastructure (e.g. electrical columns) are common. While the explosions do not often kill civilians directly, they have incurred severe costs to municipal services and humanitarian agencies. For example, the deliberate explosions of 48 electrical columns in the region lead to a situation where there was no power for 21 days (December – January, 2001).[140] Further, the massive movement of 400,000 people overwhelmed the economy, and UNHCR capacities.

Direct and indirect armed threats incur high humanitarian costs. The threat of kidnapping or assault of agency staff, have forced NGOs to reconsider their approach to assistance. For example, the recently ended six-month kidnapping of an MSF worker forced the organisation to suspend all activities until the situation was resolved with the ERG (ELN offshoot). In addition, due to the ongoing attacks against health workers throughout the country - they are increasingly reluctant to work in areas where they are desperately needed – this in spite of accompaniment by ICRC and MSF.

East Timor

From a global perspective, the sudden sharp increases in UN humanitarian and peacekeeping missions toward end of 1999 complicated the ability of the UN to staff its missions quickly and appropriately. UNTAET, with an authorised strength of more than 10,000 international military, police and civilian personnel, is not even as large as the new UN Mission in Sierra Leone, for which the UN was also recruiting around the same time. To appreciate the strain these two missions placed on the UN, they represented around a 200 per cent increase from the number of peacekeepers deployed in June 1999.

The international community's response to the devastating violence unleashed against the people of East Timor as a result of the Popular Consultation has been generous and rapid. Given the country's relatively small size and population, as well as its geographical location, the requirements of the United Nations and the humanitarian and development community have been largely met, at least in the short term. Certainly, the sense of shame and outrage among certain powerful and influential countries for what occurred has contributed to such an enabling environment.

Moreover, foreign direct investment in East Timor has been significant, and arguably at levels greater than if the Popular Consultation had resulted in enhanced autonomy or a peaceful transition to a second phase toward ultimate independence. A sense of culpability may again have served as catalyst for such activity. Much investment caters to the international staff working for the UN and the numerous international NGOs, which have proliferated since the Popular Consultation. While such investments provide jobs for local staff, rehabilitate property, and contribute much-needed taxes for the fledgling East Timor Transitional Administration, the long-term nature of many of these enterprises are suspect.

Section VI. Conclusions

When all is said and done, a dispassionate appraisal of the human impacts of small arms is virtually meaningless. Small arms, as tools of war or crime, engender fear and terror. Facing the barrel of a weapon - having an automatic rifle levelled at one's head - is a horrifying and traumatic experience. Bodies riddled with bullet wounds - such as those witnessed in Lokichokkio or Putumayo - and the extinguishing of innocent childrens' lives by small arms are the stuff of raw emotion and tragedy. Just as worrying, individuals and communities immune to the effects of guns, who no longer ask who died or why somebody was killed, are likely facing a future of continued brutality. To be sure, societies affected by the unregulated availability of small arms, and there are many, are facing an endemic humanitarian crisis.

The use of small arms directly kills hundreds of thousands of people every year - and millions more die indirectly as a result of forced displacement and collapsing entitlements. The very presence of small arms affect every aspect of people's livelihoods from daily household decision making - to the engendering of cultures of violence. The long-term social and economic effects of small arms availability on individuals and states are profound. What is more, the availability of small arms permeates virtually every aspect of the humanitarian and development community's work. Herein lies the dilemma. On the one hand, small arms prevent interventions where they are most desperately needed. Perversely, the ready availability of such weapons in complex emergencies makes more work necessary.

It is possible with time to collect extensive data from among UN and humanitarian agencies on the problem of small arms. This should be encouraged, and supported by governments. Good data forms the basis of good policy. All of the evidence gleaned from the country visits reinforces the growing recognition that the humanitarian impacts, and therefore the human costs, of small arms are enormous: the findings are summarised in the Appendices at the end of this document (see Appendices 2,3,4). More generally, however, the empirical data gathered in Kenya, Colombia and East Timor illustrate two basic facts:

- That the indicators of the "humanitarian impacts" can be recorded and are, to some extent, quantifiable; and
- The effects of small arms availability are pervasive

In other words, the humanitarian costs of small arms are often so systemic, that people do not see them for what they are. For this reason, detailed data on the impacts of small arms is often lacking. This report demonstrates that within a short period of time, useful data can be collated in a way that injects new value to the discussion. Ultimately, what is perhaps the most encouraging conclusion is that the findings of this study represent only the tip of the iceberg.

Endnotes

1 The IASC created the Reference Group on Small Arms (RGSA) in November 1998. The IASC is the main body for co-ordinating humanitarian response and is chaired by the UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator. The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), an NGO member of the IASC, heads the RGSA – which is one of several IASC reference/working groups. UN bodies that participate fully in the RGSA include OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, and UNICEF. Numerous UN Secretariat departments and offices as well as several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and members of civil society have also contributed actively to the RGSA. ICRC participates as a "standing invitee".

2 The term “complex emergency” emerged in Africa in the late 1980s gaining wider currency following the Gulf War. The key distinction between complex humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters - is that the former is generally multi-causal in nature - requiring a system-wide response. See Duffield (1994) for more on complex emergencies.

3 In this regard, RGSA members issued a "call for information" to their field office by way of a paper entitled "Thematic Guidance for the Identification of Agency Data on the Humanitarian Implications of Small Arms". The response from the field was not encouraging: a sparse collection of documents was received by UNDP and UNICEF offices in Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Guatemala, Mali and Sierra Leone. See for example, informal submissions by UNDP (1999) and UNICEF (1999).

4 High intensity conflicts involve more than 1,000 deaths per annum, whereas low intensity and violent political conflict entails between 100-1000 and less than 100 deaths respectively. Conversations with Wallenstein, February 2001.

5 Furthermore, according to the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (1994), “homicide rates can be as much as five times higher in countries with a low human development figure than in those with higher levels”.

6 See, for example, Keen (2000), Collier (2000), Duffield (1998), Fitzgerald (1997) and Jean (1996).

7 For example, the per capita gross national product (GNP) of war-torn countries in the mid-1990s included: Afghanistan ($US 280), Angola ($US 700), Cambodia ($US 200), Georgia ($US 580), Liberia ($US 450), Mozambique ($US 80), Somalia ($US 120), Sri Lanka ($US 640) and Sudan ($US 480). By the end of 1995, wars had been running in Afghanistan for 17 years, Angola, 30; Colombia, 45; Liberia, 6; Somalia, 7; Sri Lanka, 11; and Sudan, 12.

8 Less well known, however, is precisely how durable military-style arms that have circulated from conflict to conflict may actually be in practice. Indeed, ammunition from older weapons (e.g. weapons that may have fired tens of thousands of rounds) are unlikely to retain their intended “stability in flight”. Furthermore, ammunition that is stockpiled can explode spontaneously after a period of time - particularly in hot climates. In this way, both the user and the victim may be in even more danger than earlier believed.

9 In post-conflict Guatemala, for example, the number of gun retail-outlets in the capital has increased from five (during the conflict) to over 78 - and though the national registration board (DECAM) records some 50,000 firearms in legal possession, informants believe that the number of illicit arms exceeds 500,000 (UNDP, 1998).

10 See, for example, Bracken & Petty (1998) and Lautze (1996).

11 UNICEF, however, did frequently intervene in complex emergencies in the 1980s - and often successfully contributed to the resolution of armed conflicts. Conversations with Richard Jolly, the former Deputy Director of UNICEF, March 2001.

12 UN Document A/55/494, "Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel: Report of the Secretary-General", 18 October 2000, para 2.

13 According to Robert Painter (UNSECOORD), the number of officers will increase to 16 by the end of 2001.

14 The UN regular budget, for example, provides for just 18 per cent of the operating budget of UNSECOORD operations. This represents $US 111,700 of

a total estimated budget of $US 650,000. Funding, then, is supposed to come from a variety of sources in order to promote good management and a shared sense of purpose. In this regard, UN Document A/55/494 calls for other UN agencies to provide contributions. UNV provides for 17.5 per cent; UNICEF 10 per cent; UNHCR 9 per cent; WHO 8 per cent, UNDP 7 per cent, FAO 5 per cent; and other remaining agencies less than 5 per cent.

15 UN Document A/55/494, para 30 and 8.

16 Even a brief glance at field security manuals reveals the growing importance attached to small arms and light weapons in areas where humanitarian personnel are working. See, for example, Van Brabant (2000), BICC & SAND (2000) and UNSECOORD manuals.

17 According to the oft-quoted Article 51 of the UN Charter: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security".

18 See, for example, ICRC (1999), Lock (1999), Collins (1998) and Louise (1996). See also, Meddings (1998) and Coupland (1999) for epidemiological studies comparing combat and non-combat related death and injury and Garfield for proposals to assess the broad health impacts.

19 See for example Collier (1999), Fitzgerald (1998), Stewart (1998), Green (1998) and Cranna (1994).

20 Collins (1998) also notes the incidence of rape as a strong correlate with arms availability. While the debate on sexual violence is well developed, though under-examined in this study, the variable must be approached with caution. This is because while small arms may be present in any act of rape - under-reporting and the use of other weapons (other than, for example, firearms) can often confound an accurate profile.

21 Drawn from Sen (1981), endowments are defined as a person's "initial ownership" - prior to transformation into entitlements. The key distinction between endowments and entitlements is that endowments are the rights and resources social actors have in principle, while the entitlements derived from them are what social actors actually get in practice (Sen, 1981). In highlighting the injustice of legal systems that legally allow for starvation, Sen has also referred to entitlements in a normative, moral sense - focusing on the command over resources through legal means rather than extra-legal (or customary) forms of entitlement.

22 Robert Muggah visited Kenya between 8-20 December 2000 and Colombia between 7 and 19 January 2001. Eric Berman visited Australia and East Timor between 8 and 23 January 2001.

23 Although there is no evidence to suggest that small arms destined to the Great Lakes region either originated from, or transited through, Kenya - political and fund-raising activities in Nairobi (in support of the Interahamwe) and allegations concerning the use of small aircraft based in Kenya indicates a possible "arms link".

24 For example, on 1 October 2000, police seized 15 sacks of AK-37 bullets (disguised as maize) loaded on a Nairobi bound bus at Busia (Daily Nation, 2 October 2000).

25 Interview with Ali Farah and other key informants, December 2000 and February 2001.

26 Conversations with key informants in both the Kenyan government and the Kenyan NGO community.

27 The production facilities fall under the authority of the government but are owned by a private consortium. President Daniel Arap Moi and two of his cabinet ministers are the principal shareholders.

28 The Pokot are believed to have more arms than neighbouring Turkana pastoralists. Interview with police chiefs in Lokichokkio and Garissa, December 2000.

29 Conversations with Bethuel Kiplagat, former Kenyan Ambassador and currently director of the Africa Peace Forum, December 2000.

30 Defined as the killing of four or more people for political reasons.

31 For example, in Colombia, arms have been sold for drugs since the mid 1980s - reaching a peak in 1999 and 2000. In October of 2001, a single drop of AK-47 assault rifles from the Russian mafia to FARC guerrillas was valued at $USD 50 million. Such weapons are used to coerce small landholders and farmers ("campesinos) to alter their land-use patterns from subsistence production and sharecropping to the more "market-friendly" coca.

32 The US has provided a great deal of equipment to Colombia, as military aid in the drug war, since the late 1980s. It has thus re-established itself as the major supplier of defence equipment to Colombia, at least in terms of volume. Brazil, Spain, France, Germany, Italy and Israel have also been important suppliers since the 1970s. Small amounts of equipment have been acquired from Argentina and both Chile and Russia appear likely to be added to the list of significant suppliers of defence equipment (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 4 February 2000).

33 Kotler (2001) has also recently noted how "missiles- made of hollowed-out propane gas tanks - have killed innocents, destroyed homes and alienated potential supporters [of the guerrillas]".

34 According to UN documents "Colombia has long believed that the United Nations should play a central role in the process of curbing the proliferation of conventional arms and controlling their transfer. It was this that prompted our country, in 1983, to introduce resolution 43/75 I, the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly on arms transfers and illicit arms trafficking.

35 Others, however, have estimated that as many as 200,000 East Timorese were killed as a direct consequence of Indonesian military force as well as military-inflicted malnutrition and disease during that period.

36 For example, the historian John Taylor reports the number of dead to number about 180 (Taylor, 1999: 213). Some knowledgeable commentators, such as Lyndal Barry, put the number killed in excess of 250. Indonesia media reports claim these numbers to be exaggerated, with one account mentioning 50 fatalities. Written correspondence with Anne-Claire Dufay, 26 February 2001.

37 For example, in spite of the ICRC introducing "war-wounded" as a separate category for admissions at its hospitals and medical facilities - the specific cause of the injury and the profile of the victim is not always clear.

38 For example, recent MSF and ICRC reports note instances of "war-wounded" and individuals "injured from fighting", but rarely disaggregate data. For example, citing a report from DRC: "in May (2000), MSF and the ICRC working in the health centres and hospitals of Kisangani, counted 27 civilian deaths and 155 wounded in three days of fighting" (MSF, 2000).

39 Alternatively, much of the clinical information generated by agencies such as ICRC or MSF is justifiably confidential - in order to preserve the anonymity of their beneficiaries and the integrity of their operations.

40 See, for example, Boutwell & Klare (1998 1995); Louise (1995); and Singh (1995).

41 Of course, civilian death rates vary between 0 and 100 per cent, depending on the context under which small arms are being used. The figures cited above are general and attempt to capture an average rate of civilian death during conflict and post-conflict contexts.

42 The proliferation of increasing numbers of military-style weapons with ammunition clips allowing for a greater numbers of bullets to be fired have resulted in much greater number of casualties than previously was the case. In recognition of particularly lethal (and disproportionate) effects of certain forms of weaponry, international humanitarian law is invoked to limit or even prohibit their use. Weapons classified as excessively injurious or indiscriminate, such as blinding weapons, soft-metal jacket ammunition and, more recently, landmines have been successfully prohibited in "formal" warfare. The ICRC *SIrUS project* is an example of an important ongoing initiative to evaluate weapons' effects (ICRC, 1997).

43 According to Micheals *et al* (1999), over 40 percent of civilians injured during direct-conflict-like situations are hit by fragmenting munitions while approximately 70 per cent of the injuries incurred outside of conflict were attributed to rifles. In Afghanistan, for example, most injuries outside of the context of conflict involved an accidental discharge of an AK-47 rifle - with women and children disproportionately affected. Further, almost 30 per cent of all cases under study resulted from intentional use of firearms during interpersonal disputes. In Croatia, civilians accounted for over 40 per cent of all war-wounded. Analysis of civilian casualties in said country revealed that fragmenting munitions accounted for just fewer than 60 per cent of injuries, whereas firearms accounted for almost 40 per cent. Of these, only 40 per cent sustained injuries as a result of fighting, while the remainder were often injured accidentally while handling weapons or as a result of disputes.

44 See, for example, Dybdhal & Pasagic (2000); Olujic (1998); Swiss *et al* (1998); and Sapir (1993).

45 These figures were not, however, confirmed during interviews with the official spokesperson of the Kenyan Police in December 2000.

46 Lokichokkio currently has a population of 34,000 - though the town numbered only 5,000 in 1989.

47 See, for example, recent editions of the East Africa, BBC Focus on Africa, the Monitor, the Daily Nation, etc.

48 See, for example, Hendrickson & Swift (1999) and Swift (1994).

49 The hospital itself maintains stringent standards on precisely "who" can be evacuated - with only severely wounded, critically ill and snakebite victims being accepted. Though this population is drawn predominantly from conflict-affected southern Sudan, the profile is roughly analogous to frontier regions of Northern Kenya. Conversations with ICRC sub-delegation director in Lokichokkio, December 2000.

50 It should be noted that many potential firearm-victims are not treated because (a) they are unable to access ICRC facilities or have already perished while waiting for some form of treatment or (b) do not qualify for assistance.

51 Sudanese military planes bombed civilian and humanitarian targets in southern Sudan at least 152 times during 2000, according to a compilation by the U.S. Committee for Refugees of bombing reports filed by humanitarian workers in the field.

52 Interview with ICRC delegates in Lokichokkio, January 2001.

53 In Putumayo, for example, firearms were used in over 90 per cent of all killings - "El arma de fuego fue el instrumento mas utilizado para provocar los homicidios en un 92%, pero ademas se ultizaron armas blancoas (objectos cortopunzantes, cortundentes y cortocontudentes) en un 6.1% y explosivos en un 1.7%" (Departamento Administrativa de Salud, 2000: 21). Virtually all of these weapons are considered by the local police to have procured on the black market. See, for example, Policia Nacional (2001); Medicos Legales (2000); and CTI (2000).

54 Further, over 88 per cent of the victims were men (Medicos Legales, 1999).

55 The ICRC conducted 19 evacuations for war-wounded in Uraba and an additional 21 in Putumayo over 1999-2000 – many of those suffering from gunshot wounds to the abdomenon were youth. Nevertheless, the ICRC has a policy of collecting people only if they have absolutely no opportunity to evacuate themselves – and these figures under-represent the number of conflict-related casualties. Interview with ICRC protection officer in Apartado, January 2001.

56 For example, key informants reported a break-in in the nearby town of Riosucio – where it was reported that the three suspects were taken to the river, shot in the head and disposed of. Others have been intimidated and forced to leave within 48 hours.

57 Homicide rates generally increase dramatically when one or another armed actor enters a particular region – and occurs in three phases. The initial stage involves social cleansing (e.g. thieves, drug abusers, prostitutes, IDPs) as either group attempts to assert a moral imperative to their occupation – acting as a provider of security or benefactor. This

period is followed almost immediately by selective intimidation and killings of leaders and political or community actors (e.g. mayors, church leaders). The final stage includes ongoing assassinations of suspected collaborators – and those refusing to ascribe to imposed regulations - such as the forced cultivation of coca. Indeed "el riesgo de morir a causa de las muertes violentas en qcquellos municipios donde las tierras cultivados con coca superan las 5,000 hectareas es de 2 veces mayor con relacion a los municipios donde no existe este tipo de cultivos" (Departamento Administrativo de Salud, 2000).

58 According to Charlie Scheiner, East Timor Action Network, tear gas was also used to force people to flee buildings.

59 Reports of the death toll vary from 20 to more than 60.

60 See Adam Jones, "Gender-Selective Atrocities in East Timor", adamjones.freeservers.com/timor1.htm

61 Conversations with Ross Ballantyne, UNTAET, January 2000.

62 Conversations with NGO and UN officials, East Timor, January 2001.

63 Indeed, "to focus … on a single movement of people, in one direction and at a particular point in time, would be to give a false, if comforting, impression that one is dealing with a simple and well circumscribed event rather than an untidy process, involving multiple, and sometimes overlapping migrations in both directions, and considerable flexibility with respect to nationality and ethnicity" (Allen & Turton, 1996: 14).

64 There are estimated to be over 22 million "persons of concern to UNHCR" - thought his number includes 12.8 million refugees and asylum seekers (in addition to 7 million IDPs and about 2.5 million returned refugees). The NRC, on the other hand, estimates a global total of 23 million IDPs. A global figure for displaced persons includes 12.8 million refugees/asylum seekers, 23 million IDPs and 3.2 million Palestinian refugees (with a separate mandate) - a total of 39 million displacees.

65 Estimates from USCR (2000) suggest that there are less than 10,000 Kenyan refugees in the surrounding region and throughout Europe and North America.

66 At the time of this writing, the UNHCR notes that there are 175,000 Sudanese refugees in Uganda, 80,000 in DRC, 58,500 in Ethiopia, 32,000 in Kenya, 35,500 in CAR and 20,000 in Chad. Sudan itself also hosts some 147,400 Eritrean refugees as of 2000. According to the UN, they're an estimated 4 million IDPs in Sudan, including 2 million in greater Khartoum and 1.2 million in the transitional zone and southern areas.

67 A UNDP programme to resettle 180,000 IDPs met mixed results (USCR, 1998).

68 Dadaab camp, consists of Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera. All the three camps cover a total area of 50 square kilometres, and are within an 18 kilometre-radius of Dadaab town, some 50 kilometres from Garissa. There is a combined total refugee population of some 110,000 people mainly from Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda.

69 Kenyan officials have insisted for years that all refugees must live in designated camps to qualify for assistance. In order to discourage false claimants, Kenyan authorities classified Somalis living outside of camps as illegal aliens. Regular crackdowns to apprehend refugees and other foreigners found in urban areas have been carried out by the Kenyan police.

70 Cutts (2000) has documented how refugees and IDPs trade UNHCR rations for essential foodstuffs - such as milk, meat, etc., otherwise not provided by relief agencies - in order to increase their range of coping strategies and opportunities.

71 See UNHCR (2000).

72 Firewood collecting schemes purportedly cost approximately $US 16,000 dollars per month - the majority of the funds go toward hiring local community members to collect wood for women in the Kakuma camp. Interview with Saber Azam, UNHCR-Kakuma, December 2000.

73 The largest concentration of refugees is in Ecuador and Venezuela - though such flows are often a com

bination of both economic migration and directed violence.

74 According to UNHCR, 90 per cent of refugees moving to Ecuador also move back into the country. The reception capacities of UNHCR in said country are for 5,000 – grossly inadequate for anticipated in flows in the coming months and year. Interview with Leila Lima, Director of UNHCR-Colombia, January 2001.

75 Given the level of conflict in Colombia, one might assume that refugee flows would be higher. Most analysts and humanitarian actors emphasise the point, however, that Colombians are extremely reluctant to leave the country - unless absolutely forced.

76 An anticipated February 2001 visit by the recently appointed OCHA focal point on IDPs, Dennis McNamara, was cancelled.

77 Interview with Nelson Castaño, Director of Colombian Red Cross, January 2001.

78 In a sign of growing frustration, IDP teachers are seeking to organise schools in regions where they have received little state assistance (Muggah, 2000).

79 Based on conversations with representatives of UNHCR and ICRC in Uraba and Putumayo, January 2001.

80 See, for example, the Muggah (2001) for a review of such studies. Also see www.smallarmssurvey.org for a range of methodologies used by health economists and criminologists to assess the impacts of firearm related violence.

81 See, for example, O'Sullivan's (1997) seminal attempt to map entitlements in war-affected Sri Lanka.

82 Because of the way their proliferation undermines the social and economic development of societies, they clearly jeopardise social and economic rights such as the right to work, food, health care, adequate social services and education (Articles 23, 25 and 26, UN Declaration of Human Rights).

83 In Sen's words, entitlements are 'the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces' (Sen 1984: 497). While Sen was careful to specify that entitlements refer to 'alternative commodity bundles', in practice his principal concern was with command over food.

84 For example, in Kenya drought and decreasing livestock (from increasing raids) has lead to a situation where there has been 10-20 per cent drop in maize production in 1999-2000 from previous years. Children are malnourished (a dramatic proxy for decreasing food security as children are generally the most well-fed) (IRIN, September 14, 2000). An estimated 5,000,000 are at risk (WFP, Lokichokkio).

85 Interview with the Director of UNICEF-OLS operations in Lokichokkio, December, 2000.

86 Traditional raiding patterns are between May and October - though are now occurring throughout the year.

87 Interviews with representatives of UNWATER, the UN agency responsible for design and maintenance of water-related facilities, in Lokichokkio, December 2000.

88 Interview with Jan Kamenju, SRIC in March, 2001.

89 Interview with the Deputy Head of ICRC Delegation-Colombia, January 2001.

90 In Putumayo alone, 166 cases of dengue, 1517 cases of malaria, syphilis and rabies have been reported.

91 Public health services are, by virtue of Law 100 (1992), exclusive to all those who are unable to purchase health insurance. According to surveys conducted by MSF – approximately 16,000 people, or 45 per cent of the total population, do not have access to public health (and are forced to pay 100 per cent of their health costs). Furthermore, there is only one functioning hospital for all of lower Putumayo – with a catchment of approximately 200,000 people.

92 El Nino has purportedly affected agricultural production - leading to decreased output of over 50 per cent in the Pacific coastal region and approximately 10 per cent in the Atlantic. Harvest of principal consumption products (e.g. rice, corn, sorghum, soya and cotton) have deteriorated by 20 per cent due to lack of rainfall. Ministry of Environment claims that 20 per cent or, the equivalent of 500 thousand tons of food, have been lost due to lowered productivity. Furthermore - electricity and water shortages are common throughout the country and are attributed to both direct attack and poor infrastructure.

93 Confirmed during conversations with MSF, the Mayor's Secretariat of Puerto Asis and representatives of the UNHCR.

94 Interview with the Pastoral Social January 2001.

95 Interview with Gerard Fajoux, UNHCR in Uraba, January 2001.

96 Though these informal regulations change from week to week, key informants noted that townspeople were not supposed to carry more than $C 50,000 pesos ($US 25) outside of the city limits.

97 In Putumayo, for example, all facets of the public service are under threat: three mayors killed in three years – while many others facing jail terms for corruption.

98 Peter Bartu, 2000: 39.

99 Conversation with Patrick Burgess, Chief, UNTAET Human Rights Unit, 16 January 2001.

100 Conversation with Manuela Pereira Leoung, Executive Director, FOKUPERS, January 2001.

101 The firearm homicide rate for the UN was ascertained by dividing the number of firearm homicides (107) by 9 years, followed by multiplying the percentage by 100,000 divided by the number of UN staff (approximately 70,000 in 2000). At least 51 UN staff members are also believed to have died from machete or knife wounds. This includes staff killed during the genocide in Rwanda, for which UNSECOORD lists the cause of deaths as "ethnic violence".

102 ICRC provides each of its staff members with 3 weeks training - a good portion of which is devoted to security (before they are deployed). Their philosophy is that each staff member has to be his/her own security officer. The also have recourse to a single security officer who manages their portfolio from their HQ in Geneva. UNHCR, on the other hand, have FSOs in the field - which, until September 2000, resulted in few international staff casualties. Interviews with representatives of UNHCR and ICRC in Geneva, October-January 2001.

103 The 32 responding agencies were grouped into three categories: the Red Cross (ICRC, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies), United Nations Programmes and UN Peacekeeping activities. Due to data limitations, the researchers were unable to make distinctions between expatriate and local staff.

104 According to Sheik *et al* (2000), unintentional accidents accounted for 27 deaths (7 per cent) and other causes (disease and natural) for the remaining 31 (8 per cent).

105 During the Rwandan genocide, 36 ICRC delegates and 51 UN employees were killed in "ethnic violence". See the Emergency Relief Coordinator Besslor's statement for OCHA to the USG.

106 Mean age of death in all categories was 38, and men accounted for 90 per cent of casualties: 13 per cent were drivers, 12 per cent were guards, 21 per cent were office staff, 22 per cent field staff, nine per cent were medical staff, 19 per cent were peacekeepers and four per cent consultants.

107 See UNSECOORD (2000) and UNHCR (2000).

108 The MAI, newly introduced in January 2000, covers national and international staff 24 hours a day in about 80 countries around the world. Written correspondence with IOM-Geneva, November 2000.

109 OLS consists of four UN agencies and 35-40 NGOs that operate under the umbrella of UNICEF in Southern Sudan. There are also many other NGOs, operating independently of OLS that are also providing assistance to an estimated 3-4 million people – including IDPs, pastoralists and war-affected.

110 Interview with local police authorities and security officers for OLS (UNICEF and WFP) in Lokichokkio, December 2000.

111 Interview with security officers for UNHCR and WFP in Nairobi, December 2001.

112 Conversations with UNICEF and WFP security officers in Lokichokkio, December 2000.

113 The consultant noted AK-47 bullet holes in the hut-residence of the former security officer for UNICEF-OLS.

114 Conversation with chief of the OLS-UNICEF delegation in Lokichokkio, December 2000.

115 Humanitarian personnel killed in Southern Sudan in 2000 include three operatives for Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), 10 extension workers for the humanitarian wing of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and one polio-eradication officer for WHO who was caught in the crossfire. Conversations with WFP and UNICEF security officers in Lokichokkio. Interview with key informants in Kenya, December 2000.

116 According to Fundacion Pais Libre, in 2000 alone, there was the equivalent of 14 kidnappings a day (or one every 1.5 hours).

117 Indeed, these can be military, police, guerrilla, paramilitary and "delinquent"-organised roadblocks.

118 Conversations with UNHCR staff in Apartado and Puerto Asis, January 2001.

119 According to one UNHCR employee "when young kids are manning the blocks, whether paramilitary or guerrilla, the chains of command often hazy - and the risks increase. Interview in Colombia, January 2001.

120 Conversation with UNHCR official previously based in Kupang, West Timor, December 2000.

121 The UNHCR has invested some $US 1.5-1.75 million per year (since 1998) to pay for 100 police in six camps.

122 According to Roland L'Allier, the UNHCR chief of protection, "people are leaving camps in Tanzania and fighting in Burundi before returning". UNHCR informants within the Tanzanian camps have literally followed armed groups on their raids and noted that weapons were picked up in transit and deposited outside of the camps on return. This explains why very few weapons have been found in camps themselves. Even so, the UNHCR admits to having poor monitoring and intelligence with regards to the issue. According to L'Allier, there is no systematic way of assessing weapons availability in camps. Interview with L'Allier, November 2000.

123 Hazard pay introduced, then revoked three months later in the end part of 2000. Interview with UNHCR staff in Kakuma, December 2000.

124 See, for example, FFP (2000), whose research techniques were criticised by local researchers in Garissa and recent articles in the Kenyan Daily Nation.

125 This is confirmed by a 1997 Kenyan government report conducted with the UNHCR confirmed the absence of arms in UNHCR camps - though acknowledged that an extremely high level of (illegal and legal) ownership existed outside the confines of the camps.

126 Due to donor constraints, local staff have been unpaid for over last four months. This represents, in the word of one UNHCR representative, “a time bomb”.

127 By way of comparison, Nairobi has a police ratio of 1:800 and New York a ratio of 1:500.

128 Interviews with Luis Roqueta, head of protection for the UN in Bogotá (Colombia), January 2001.

129 Interview with IASC members in Bogotá, January 2001.

130 Peace communities or “comunidades de paz” are common in Uraba - particularly along the Rio Sucio. They are comprised of IDPs, predominantly of Afro-Colombian heritage, who have resettled or returned “voluntarily” and are actively declaring themselves “neutral” in the face of conflict. See, for example, DIAL (2000) or Muggah (2000).

131 Focus group meetings with five representatives of the Colombian Red Cross, January 2001.

132 Conversation with Peter Bartu, January 2001.

133 Suh, Sangwon and Tom McCawley, “East Timor's Agony,” Asiaweek, 17 September 1999.

134 Relief trucks commissioned by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), and representatives working with the SRRA (e.g. Sudanese relief and Rehabilitation – such as Christian Aid, Catholic Relief Services and ADRA) have been repeatedly accused of carrying aid into Sudan from Lokichokkio and returning with arms or vice versa – either dumped just before or after the border to intermediaries. Key informants in Nairobi, December 2001.

135 Only a few months before, armed men abducted 17 aid workers on an assessment mission in northern Liberia. In Liberia, during August 1999, 9 NGO staff were abducted and subsequently released - and 800 tons of food looted.

136 Food-drops are also common as a result of the changing seasons and lack of transportation infrastructure in the South of Sudan.

137 Local authorities have requested a number of measures, such as cutting back acacia trees and brush along highways and introducing outdoor lighting on the streets.

138 Meeting with the director of WFP-Colombia, Els Kocken, January 2001.

139 Interview with representatives of UNHCR in Putumayo, January 2001.

140 Motives for the attack are unclear (e.g. could be retaliation against community for complicity with the paramilitaries, or attack against electrical companies who are seen to represent special interests in the region

Picture ICRC 1999

Appendices

Appendix 1

Militarisation of Communities by Governments: The Experiences of Kenya, Colombia and East Timor

Governments' decisions to arm their citizens for national defence have often led to counter-intuitive – if unfortunate - consequences. In the industrialised countries of the so-called North, the state-sanctioned arming of civilian communities, such as reservists in Switzerland, Israel or the US National Guard, was often conducted as part of a strategic project to bolster national defence against external aggressors. Alternatively, the arming of communities in the Former-Yugoslavia, Albania, Guatemala, India, Kenya and Colombia ensured the presence of well-armed militia or paramilitary groups to shore up domestic authority and quell internal dissent.

In many cases, the provision of arms to communities initially serves the purposes of temporarily deterring violence. But more often then not, state-sanctioned militarisation programmes go horribly wrong. Indeed, clear and politically motivated transfers, particularly illicit transfers, are an unpredictable enterprise and often fraught with risk. The consequences of state-led internal militarisation following economic and political state collapse have illustrated the perils of such strategies. In many countries where communities have been armed by the government, the resulting domestic traffic of small arms and light weapons for profit and protection has followed. Each country that the consultants visited for this study has armed civilians ostensibly to provide for their own internal security, and in doing so served to do the opposite – as the following box highlights.

Kenya

In the early 1950s, British colonial authorities armed groups of loyalist Kenyans, later called the "home guard", to fight the Mau Mau, a revolutionary group of nationalists from the Kikuyu region. The Mau Mau's main contention was over fertile land taken over by white settlers in the highland districts. White settlers simultaneously established their own vigilante groups to protect their farms from the Mau Mau threat. In this way, they often hired other Africans to do their killings while also shooting suspected Mau Mau sympathisers with impunity. For almost half a decade, the home guard organised a reign of terror against the Kikuyu with the full compliance of the state. Faced with ongoing repression, and starved of arms and equipment, direct confrontations subsided by the mid-1954. In total, 11,000 suspected Mau Mau insurgents were killed and more than 1,000 were executed as "criminals". The home guard model became a template to contain "insecurity" in the years to follow. But the home guards of the 1950s are different to the home guards of the Twenty First century. Home guards were initially designed as a colonial construction to undermine the struggle for independence; today, they are ethnic-based factions whose main purpose was supposed to entail the protection of the resources of communities.

Following Kenyan independence in 1963, tribal communities in the Western and Northern provinces requested state protection from lightly armed livestock-rustlers from neighbouring communities and across borders in Sudan (e.g. Dinka, Toposa and Tongiros), Uganda (e.g. Karamojong), Ethiopia (e.g. Berilles and Tabaqa) and Somalia (e.g. in Kenya there were the Degodia and in Somalia proper, the Abasame). By the mid-seventies, the government responded to the deteriorating security situation by arming a small number of Pokot and Turkanese communities in the Northwest. Over time, however, only those ethnic groups actively supporting the existing regime received military support. Predictably, those endorsing the opposition were marginalised and excluded from the militarisation exercise. Rifles and ammunition were to be provided through existing customary arrangements - and accounted for by local police. In order to ensure domestic political support, the Kenyan government also proceeded to arm the Ajuran, Gare, Abduwak and Aulyan clans in the North East against incursions from Somali groups across the border.

It is unclear how many home guards were actually armed[i] - though a recent US Senate report (1998) suggests, "in addition to the armed forces (22,000), Kenya employs up to 40,000 police and paramilitary personnel". What is known, however, is that emboldened by the possession of a more sophisticated firepower (most early violent disputes were mete out with a combination of spears, clubs and first and second-world war firearms), the home guards began sending military parties across the border and expanding their interests domestically. The number of livestock raided, the frequency and modus operandi of the

rustlers, suggests that cattle rustling has been institutionalised for commercial (rather than subsistence) gain. The Ugandan government proceeded to arm a number of tribes along their Eastern border, allowing the Karamojong to keep their weapons - "mainly because they were at risk - from armed pastoralists in neighbouring Sudan and Kenya". Inter-tribal and inter-clan fighting ensued – with police on both sides of the border, unable to reign in the rising levels of violence.

Annual checks on the home guards, initially conducted through chiefs, were virtually impossible due to the migratory patterns of the pastoral communities. Disturbingly, a growing number of tribes within Kenya itself began resolving local disputes over common property resources through armed violence. Even in spite of the regions relative isolation, reports of cattle raiding and associated massacres between Kenyan tribes began to grace the pages of national print media. Though the Kenyan government began arming the home guards with G-3 rifles, confidential government security reports, suggest that some 4000 assorted firearms, ranging from G-3s to AK-47s, are currently in the hands of civilians in the Pokot, Marakwet and Turkana Districts. In light of evidence gathered in the following report, the estimate appears to be rather conservative. It is also widely believed that many parts of the North Rift region are literally controlled by private militias armed with munitions that were ostensibly provided to the home guard. As there are relatively few functioning accountability mechanism to ensure that arms are used for "self-protection", it is difficult, if impossible to know with certainty whether spent ammunitions are used against cattle rustlers, bandits, innocent civilians or UN staff.

Disarmament efforts have been, at best, unsuccessful and at worst, absolute disasters. The same problems confound the efforts of the Ugandan government to reign in the rising levels of internal armed violence. In an effort to contain armed Karamojong pastoralists, the Ugandan government formed Local Defence Units and Anti-Stock Theft Units in the districts neighbouring Karamoja. But armed violence continues to spread (East African, March 12, 2001). Indeed, programmes to disarm the Karamojong, have encouraged them to (re)sell the arms to the Kenyan Turkana, Samburu, Maraket and Pokot tribes at astonishingly low prices. According to recent Oxfam reports, an AK-47 rifle has been known to sell for less than two head of cattle along the Kenyan-Ugandan border. Along the Uganda-Sudanese border, "there is a market for guns where an automatic rifle fetches UG$ 150,000 (US$100), a pistol for UG$ 50,000 ($US 50.00) and a bullet for UG$ 20 ($US 0.10)". Armed groups have also been known to attack police stations to secure additional weaponry and ammunition. Recently, both Presidents Moi and Museveni have been expressing reservations about the situation - particularly in light of recent livestock raids that have left thousands of civilians dead. A new disarmament exercise has been announced following the aggressive migration of the Karamojong into Uganda's Eastern districts and the internal displacement of thousands of Ugandan civilians. The soldiers will be spread over 39 sub-counties, where they will await the handling of an estimated 20,000 weapons. Official spokespersons could neither confirm nor deny whether Kenyan "home guards" continued to receive arms. Evidence seems to suggest that they are.[ii] There is no word yet, as to whether President Moi will do the same with the Turkana in Kenya.

Colombia

Colombia, more than any other South American country, has a history marred by violence. The current conflict is rooted in a civil war, "la Violencia", which lead to violent confrontations between leftists and right-wingers from 1948 to 1953. The reconciliation between the two political factions appeased certain tensions, yet locked-in a political game establishing a "limited democracy". Protest movements developed, undertaking guerrilla forms of organisation. An offensive strategy was not taken until the 1970's, in the absence of reforms. In response to the increasing control of guerrilla movements in the late sixties and early seventies, the government legislated a strategy of "auto self defence groups" to ensure internal security.

To do this required that the government declare a state of siege. During a state of siege, the executive implements decrees that abrogate rights by transferring broad judicial and political powers to the military, with no or restricted civilian oversight. Often, supposedly temporary decrees are subsequently converted into permanent legislation. For instance, Decree 3398 laid the legal foundation for the active involvement of civilians in the war from 1965 until 1989. Decree 3398 defined the defence of the nation as "the organisation and tasking of all of the residents of the country and its natural resources ... to guarantee National Independence and institutional stability," and temporarily legalised the arming by the Defence Ministry of civilians. In 1968, Law 48 converted Decree 3398 into permanent legislation. Law 48 authorised the executive to create civil patrols by decree and for the Defence Ministry to provide them with "weapons restricted to the exclusive use of the armed forces." [iii]

Over time, the self-defence groups developed increasingly violent tactics and clear linkages with rightist landowners and narco-traffickers. In the mid-1980s, Carlos Castaño formed the Peasant Self Defence Groups of Córdoba and Urabá (Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá, ACCU), a paramilitary force in Northeast Antioquia and Córdoba. Due to their increasingly violent tactics, and as a result of clear alliances with drug-traffickers (e.g. the group "Death to Kidnappers", or MAS), investigations against members were opened. Among the weapons they used were R-15 rifles, AKMs, Galils, FALs, and G-3 rifles, all prohibited for civilian use. Weapons and munitions were obtained from private sales as well as the military and Industria Militar, INDUMIL the military-run weapons manufacturer and the only entity authorised to produce, store, and distribute firearms in Colombia.

The year 1988 proved a crucial one. The Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), a human rights group, recorded 108 massacres that year - the worst of the decade. By April 1989, President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) spoke out against paramilitaries, calling them "terrorist organisations". The government moved to arrest paramilitary leaders and outlaw further activity. Legislation included Decree 815, which reasserted that the sole power to create "self-defence" groups lay with the president, with additional approval required from the Defence and Government (now Interior) Ministries. On May 25, 1989, the Colombian Supreme Court overturned the provisions in Law 48 that allowed the army to distribute restricted weapons to civilians. Decree 1194, issued in June of 1989, established criminal penalties for civilians and members of the armed forces who recruit, train, promote, finance, organise, lead, or belong to "the armed groups, misnamed paramilitary groups, that have been formed into death squads, bands of hired assassins, self-defence groups, or groups that carry out their own justice."

But government efforts to disarm the paramilitaries, despite massive international pressure, have been half-hearted. In the 1970s, human rights groups recorded 1,053 political killings. In the 1980s, that figure leapt to 12,859. The figures for the 1990s averaged some 1500 per year. It is now well known that paramilitaries commit up to 70 per cent of all massacres in the country. Suspicions of military-paramilitary complicity are growing (HRW; 2000, Kirk, 1999). Such suspicions are not always unwarranted. According to a recent HRW report (2000) "abuses directly attributed to members of the Colombian military have decreased in recent years, but over the same period the number and scale of abuses attributed to paramilitary groups operating with the military's acquiescence or open support have skyrocketed".

East Timor

A government's inability to maintain control of weapons it provides to civilians is clearly evident in Indonesia's arming of the East Timorese militias. Prior to 1999, Jakarta worked effectively to prohibit East Timorese from possessing firearms[iv] (other than the small numbers who served in the police or army). The Government created, trained and armed dozens of militias in an effort to influence the results of the August 1999 Popular Consultation. The militias frequently acted in the interests, and at the instruction, of the Indonesian state. The wanton killings and destruction that they meted out in the months preceding, and the weeks following, the vote are described below in the report.

While the militias, which are now based in West Timor, continue to pose a threat to East Timor, it is increasingly apparent that they also pose a growing domestic threat. The militias have not limited their activities to intimidating East Timorese refugees and crossing the border to attack UN peacekeepers. They are increasingly targeting West Timorese civilians, committing such crimes as murder, rape and robbery, and more generally inciting terror and instability. They have also bartered weapons for cattle, thereby introducing arms into the community.

Two events in Atambua in September 2000 suggest that the near-total control that Jakarta exercised over the East Timorese militias only a year earlier had severely broken down with severe consequences. The first incident is well known and occurred on 6 September when militia members brutally murdered three international UNHCR staff members. With the subsequent and ongoing suspension of UNHCR assistance to some 100,000 East Timorese refugees, Jakarta has been hard-pressed to provide for the refugees' basic needs, and many hundreds have died from malnutrition and preventable diseases. With disease and crime already increasingly common within the camps, the possibility of their spread to neighbouring communities remains a very real concern.

A less well-publicised event illustrates the seriousness of the situation. On 24 September Jakarta extended an invitation to the head of the UN in Dili to attend an official disarmament ceremony in Atambua. The Indonesian Vice-President was invited as were other high-ranking government officials and members of the media. The Government's intention was to show the world that it had responded meaningfully to the awful events earlier that month and was in control of the situation. Instead of witnessing disarmament of the militia, the UN staff members present saw an attack by militia in which they reclaimed many of the collected weapons. The UN staff was forced to take refuge for an hour under armed escort and felt lucky to escape with their lives.

[i] The General Service Unit of the non-military security forces has around 5,000 paramilitary personnel and the National Youth Service that is administered by the office of the president, provides some paramilitary training to young job trainees.

[ii] Actual spending by the Kenya Department of Defence (KDOD) during the 1997/98 fiscal years (July-July) was Kenya shilling (KSH) 10.79 billion or US$ 174.3 million. The KDOD budget estimate for the 1998/99 Fiscal Year is KSH 11.56 billion or US$ 197 million. Importantly, in addition to the KDOD, the 1998/99 budget appropriates KSH 8.93 billion or US$ 149.6 million for non-military security forces (US Senate, 1998). The US Senate report concludes, if pessimistically, "it is unlikely that the GOK [Government of Kenya] will reduce its military budget in the near future. The cost of carrying out the military's mission is increasing. Armed groups of pastoral tribesmen periodically move across the Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan borders and challenge GOK security forces. Chronic instability in Somalia and the ongoing civil war in southern Sudan also pose threats to Kenya's national security".

[iii] Although few civil patrols were ever formally created by the president, the military frequently cited Law 48 as the legal foundation for their support for all paramilitaries. Military strategy manuals note, "this self-defence network is a powerful tool to defend the nation against attacks from outside and within. That is why its control should remain in military hands at all times" (HRW, 2000).

[iv] Conversation with James J. Fox, Australia National University, January 2001.

Appendix 2. Summary of Findings: Kenya

Objectives	Indicators
Mortality and Injury Attributed to Small Arms Use	**Firearm-related homicide:** Estimates range from between 10 and 15,000 firearm deaths per year - and a firearm homicide rate of between 5 and 10 per 100,000. **Types of arms:** Chinese and Russian AK-47s, M-15/M-16, G-3s, Galils, grenades, revolvers and rocket-launchers have been used in all manner of violence. **Type of killing:** Large scale massacres during cattle raids between tribes and clans, armed banditry and robbery and inter-clan or inter-tribal conflicts. **Victim profile:** Young, frequently unemployed, men (livestock herders to wealthy middle class), women of all ages and children. **Areas affected:** Countrywide - though armed crime concentrated in urban centres such as Nairobi and Mombassa. Other forms of banditry and raiding predominantly along frontiers with Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda, as well as in central plains, throughout Turkana and the Northwest.
Forced Displacement	**Numbers of Refugees and IDPs:** Between 50 and 100,000 IDPs (conditional on, among other factors, climactic variables) and between 200 and 210,000 refugees from Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda and the Great Lakes. **Profile of Displacees:** Predominantly civilians, or ex-combatants fleeing violence and persecution in said countries. **Instances of Return or Resettlement:** Instances of return to Ethiopia during heavy fighting, also forcible return. At this stage, it is far too dangerous for most refugees to be repatriated. IDPs are temporarily residing in peri-urban sites around the country.
Declining Access to Entitlements	**Broad impacts on endowments and entitlements:** It is difficult to assess mortality and morbidity associated with declining access entitlements attributed to firearm use - though there is ample evidence that school enrolment rates are extremely low in regions affected by armed violence, that food prices are increasing in areas where armed insecurity is high and transportation costs rising. **Vulnerable groups affected:** Under-five mortality rates are extremely high and there are a growing number of female-headed households - thereby affecting labour market. Pastoralists, IDPs and refugees are also particularly affected by armed violence. **Impacts on children:** Children make up a high proportion of victims and many IASC member programmes focus on psychosocial trauma and long-term care. They also participate as actors in armed violence - approximately 30-40 per cent of children participating in hostilities under the age of 18. **Health and education services affected:** Doctors and teachers unwilling to work in insecure regions - NEP or Northwest. **Food security and impacts on customary institutions:** Livestock industry undermined by armed insecurity - customary institutions (councils of elders, dowry systems, common property resources) also eroding as a result of arms proliferation. **Impacts on livelihoods and labour:** Rural-urban flight in the context of massive unemployment (between 25-50 per cent) and few skills amenable to formal labour market.
Targeting of Humanitarian/ Development Personnel	**Impacts on humanitarian and development personnel:** Growing number of staff affected by arms-related insecurity. Many directly attacked in daily work - though also susceptible to robbery and kidnapping in residences (at least 5 violent deaths since 1992). **Secondary and psychosocial impacts:** Number of aid workers relatively stable - contingent on donor contributions rather than other factors. **Staff turnover:** Relatively stable - with average of between 2 to 5 years. **Security threshold:** Threshold II in urban sites, Threshold III everywhere else. Security clearance required for all movement in the field (some regions, such as north of Wajir, are designated no-go areas).
Militarisation of IDP/ Refugee Camps	**Incidence of refugee camp militarisation:** Significant evidence of militarisation around refugee camps - and occasional reports of arms use in Kakuma and Dadaab. **Types of incidents involving firearms:** High incidence of firearm-related, homicide, armed robbery, armed rape, and banditry near camps. **Vulnerable groups:** Women (e.g. collecting wood) and wealthier refugees at risk as well as livestock herders, and (suspected) combatants. Also, several UN and IASC staff killed. **Impacts on personnel:** Humanitarian and development agency workers often targeted - high investment in security and prevention logistics as well as contingency planning.
Opportunity-Costs of Programmes and Interventions	**Broad opportunity costs:** Rising costs of field operations, due to increased costs associated with transportation (air and convoy), diverted relief, privatised security and burden of security logistics. **Impacts on foreign and local investment:** Significant declines in FDI and local investment to arms affected areas - though there is a traditional bias against the NEP and Northwest **Implications for security:** Many armed guards for IASC members (e.g. ICRC field hospital is one of only two such stations where armed guards exist) and hundreds of Kenyan Police Reserve hired to ensure safety in refugee camps. **Hazard pay:** No hazard pay allocated - though under review.

Appendix 3. Summary of Findings: Colombia	
Objectives	**Indicators**
Mortality and Injury	**Firearm-related homicides:** Between 20-25,000 Colombians killed by firearms per annum - and a firearm homicide rate of 50 per 100,000. **Types of arms:** Predominantly .32s, .38 specials, 9mm and other revolvers, G-3s, Galils, AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers (MFL), grenades, RDX & dynamite. **Type of killing:** Close-quarter execution style killings, street and narco-trafficking-related crime and inter-faction combat between well-armed groups. **Victim profile:** Often indiscriminate - though crime affects young men, from both poor and wealth regions. Political killings affecting "politically-active" community leaders, Afro-Colombian and indigenous actors, suspected guerrilla or paramilitary sympathisers and also "social cleansing" of "delinquents". **Areas affected:** Countrywide - Armed crime is concentrated in urban centres such as Bogotá, Cali, Medellin, Monteria and Barancilla. Political killings concentrated in rural and relatively urbanised areas of Antioquia and Choco (Uraba), Putumayo, Magdalena Medio, Norte de Santander and Sur de Bolivar.
Forced Displacement	**Numbers of refugees and IDPs:** Between 400,000 and 1.8 million IDPs (growing in the past 5 years) and less than 7,000 refugees being cared for in five bordering countries. Extensive out-migration of urban middle class (up to 350,000 per year). **Profile of displacees:** Predominantly rural campesinos and small-scale landowners, Afro-Colombian, indigenous and community leaders, and suspected sympathisers with armed factions. **Instances of return and resettlement:** Very few successful return or resettlement programmes (though some attempts) due to ongoing security threats, limited financial resources and few guarantees of "protection".
Declining Access to Entitlements	**Broad impacts on endowments and access to entitlements:** Difficult to assess mortality and morbidity associated with declining entitlements - though evidence that school enrolment rates are decreasing rapidly, food prices increasing in areas where armed blockades take place and transportation costs increasing or limited altogether. **Vulnerable Groups Affected:** Indigenous people, IDPs, and campesinos. Under-five mortality rates steady - though increase in orphans and widows - thereby affecting labour market. Urban residents increasingly under siege. **Impacts on children:** An estimated 60-70 per cent of all IDPs are under 18 - and many are frequently inducted into "cultures of violence" and or informal military campaigns. Further, "child soldiers" are estimated to represent 5-10 per cent of the total active forces (informal and formal)- (e.g. 1500-2,000 in the case of FARC) **Health and Education Services Affected:** Number of doctors and nurses reduced - both as victims (487 incidents where health workers were attacked), and increasing reluctance to work in insecure regions where armed activity and narco-trafficking predominate. **Food Security:** Local production affected due to coercion of small-scale farmers being forced to produce coca, and also due to massive internal displacement. **Impacts on Livelihood and Employment:** Livelihoods affected as predominantly rural population forcibly displaced to urban settlements - where they often lack appropriate skills and training for formal labour markets. Existing employment situation lacks absorption capacities. **Impacts on Infrastructure:** Evidence of severe affects on infrastructure - such as through bombing campaigns on power-generation facilities.
Targeting of Humanitarian/ Development Personnel	**Impacts on humanitarian and development personnel:** Although no staff have been directly killed by small arms - local and expatriate staff are increasingly at risk. Increase in intimidation, kidnapping and harassment across the country (including IASC members). **Secondary and psychosocial impacts:** A large number of aid workers forced to leave the country - whether working for international or national NGOs. Accompanying trauma registered. **Staff turnover:** Relatively stable - with average of between 1.5 to 3 years. **Security Threshold:** Threshold II in urban areas - all other areas oscillate between II and IV. Security clearance is required for all travel outside of Bogotá and field duty stations.
Militarisation of IDP/ Refugee Camps	**Incidence of Refugee camp militarisation:** No evidence of militarisation of refugee and IDP camps - though possibility may exist as growing numbers of refugees flow into in Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama. **Other impacts on agency mandates:** Some agencies accused of being "para-guerrillas" - severe restriction of access to those areas controlled by military actors.
Opportunity-Costs of Programmes and Interventions	**Broad Opportunity Costs:** Extremely high costs of operation, due to increased transportation (air), diverted relief, and burden of security logistics. **Impacts on Foreign and Local Investment:** Massive declines in FDI and local investment to arms affected areas - though land is being purchased due to speculation and cheap real estate value. **Implications for Security:** No armed guards for IASC members - though privatised security at headquarters, and among government offices. **Existence of Hazard Pay:** No hazard pay allocated - though under review

Appendix 4. Summary of Findings: East Timor

Objectives	Indicators
Mortality and Injury	**Firearm-related deaths:** Firearm-related violence in resulted in 1-3,000 deaths. Impossible to gauge numbers resulting from gunshot wounds because of successful efforts to destroy evidence. Guns also used in conjunction with grenades, machetes and fire with deadly effect. Firearms rarely used in East Timor since INTERFET arrived on 20 September 1999. Hundreds of East Timorese have died in West Timor due to malnutrition and disease since September 1999, and unknown number killed directly from small arms. **Type of killing:** Predominantly politically-motivated murders, including massacres **Victim Profile:** CNRT officials and pro-independence supporters were especially targeted, as were young men to a lesser extent. Women subjected to sexual violence **Areas affected:** Entire country, but especially districts bordering West Timor **Types of arms:** Firearms reported to include: SP-1, M-16A1, AR-15, FNC, SS-1, AK-47, SKS, m/937, G-3, and Steyr AUG rifles, homemade guns, fragmentation grenades (possibly South Korean-produced), bows and arrows, blowguns, machetes and swords.
Forced Displacement	**Numbers of refugees and IDPs:** 40-60,000 East Timorese internally displaced by militia activity in first half of 1999. More than 250,000 crossed into West Timor – most at gunpoint – immediately following 30 August vote. Another 300,000 fled to the hills. Militia activity in East Timor during July and August 2000 resulted in some 3,000 IDPs. **Profile of displacees:** Western districts subjected to greater militia activity and IDPs prior to August 1999 vote and subsequent to INTERFET. Massive displacement in September 1999 was territory-wide **Instances of return or resettlement:** As of January 2001, about 175,000 refugees had returned to East Timor since September 1999; perhaps 120,000 East Timorese remain in West Timor. IDPs largely resettled.
Declining Access to Entitlements	**Broad impacts on entitlements:** Swift and generous international assistance and UNTAET's size and scope have averted another major humanitarian catastrophe in East Timor. Situation in West Timor continues to deteriorate **Vulnerable Groups affected:** Some reports that instances of prostitution growing among women refugees in West Timor who are separated from husbands or widowed. Forced marriage also seen as growing problem. **Impacts on children:** Believed half of refugees in West Timor are children – figures not known, as UNHCR never completed registration due to insecurity. Some Timorese recruited for militias reported to be 17 years of age **Health and education Services Affected:** Almost all hospitals and clinics destroyed and looted in September 1999; schools, including university, similarly targeted and vandalized. Almost all doctors and teachers fled, although militia-instigated armed violence only one of many reasons **Food Security:** Forced recruitment by militias and displacement of population decreased food production. Malnutrition growing problem **Impacts on livelihood and employment:** Some 80 per cent of East Timorese unemployed in January 2001 due in large part to destruction and social upheaval **Impacts on infrastructure:** Water, electric, health, transportation, telephone and sanitation facilities severely damaged during September 1999 violence; high percentage of buildings systematically and extensively destroyed
Targeting of Humanitarian/ Development Personnel	**Impacts on humanitarian and development personnel:** UNAMET staff frequently harassed and threatened: local staff bore brunt of intimidation, but international staff also attacked. Three UNAMET civilian staff killed in August and September 1999. Three UNHCR staff killed in West Timor in September 2000. **Secondary and psychosocial impacts:** Evacuation of UNAMET international staff left local staff vulnerable and population at mercy of militia. Violence unleashed against general population and UN staff resulted in widespread popular distrust of UN. In West Timor, after September 2000 murders, UN operations remain suspended. UN staff offered optional counselling after murders, the reports of which are confidential. Palpable distrust of Indonesian Government remains; **Staff turnover:** Turnover in UNAMET not serious issue given mission's short duration. Turnover within UNTAET quite problematic. (Small arms do not appear to be the cause.) **Threshold:** UNSECOORD declared Phase 1 throughout Indonesia 16 November 1998, and Phase 5 in West Timor on 6 September 2000. It declared Phase 1 for eight districts in East Timor on 26 July 2000 and the remaining five districts on 24 November 2000.
Militarisation of IDP/ Refugee Camps	**Incidence of refugee camp militarisation:** Refugees in West Timor believed to be subjected to intense and sustained pressure from militia. Firearms and grenades in evidence and used on numerous occasions against refugees wishing to repatriate. UNHCR staff threatened. **Other impacts on agency mandates:** The murder of three UNHCR staff members on 6 September 2000 resulted in the evacuation of all UN staff from West Timor as well as hundreds of other international humanitarian aid workers. JRS is only international agency to currently operate in West Timor with any regularity. UN has yet to return to West Timor. Even before the killings, however, intimidation was such that UNHCR was unable to fulfil its mandate.
Opportunity-Costs of Programmes and Interventions	**Broad Opportunity Costs:** Sudden sharp increase in UN humanitarian and peacekeeping missions toward end-1999, resulted in scarcity of personnel, complicating ability of UN to staff missions rapidly or appropriately **Impacts on Foreign and Local Investment:** Paradoxically, sudden humanitarian catastrophe served as a catalyst for significant foreign investment. Much, however, caters to international staff - which may dry up upon departure. **Implications for Security:** The reliance on the Government of Indonesia to provide security - first for the Popular Consultation under UNAMET and then for the refugee camps in West Timor **Existence of Hazard Pay:** Apparently not in force - possible for future operations in West Timor

Interviews and Correspondence

Western Europe & North America: October 2000 - March 2001

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Brav, Laura. UN-Liaison, Medecine Sans Frontiere (MSF-New York).
Cagneux, Michel. Special Envoy, ICRC.
Cairns, Edmund. Oxfam-GB.
Claret, Frances. Political Affairs Officer, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs.
Cook, Francesca. Officer for OECD/DAC.
Correa, Elena. Senior Social Scientist, Social Development Unit, LA/Caribbean Region, World Bank.
Coupland, Robin. Legal Officer for ICRC.
Crisp, Jeffery. Head of Evaluations Department, UNHCR.
Dinde, Philippe. Protection Officer, ICRC.
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Colombia: 7-19 January 2001

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Patrick Burgess, UNTAET Human Rights Unit.
Norbeto Celestino, Program Officer, IOM.
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James J. Fox, Australian National University.
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The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It is also linked to the Graduate Institute's Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies.

Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and by contributions from the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. It collaborates with research institutes and non-governmental organizations in many countries including Brazil, Canada, Georgia, Germany, India, Israel, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

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